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Sieck, Hope Y., M.S., May 2001 Environmental Studies
Toxic Trains: An Analysis of Disclosure in the April 11,1996 Montana Rail Link 
Derailment and Mixed Chemical Spill at Alberton, Montana and Recommendations 
for Improving the Community Right-to-Know
Chairman: William Chaloupka
On April 11, 1996 a Montana Rail Link train derailed just west of Alberton, Montana 
releasing 64.8 tons of chlorine, 17,000 gallons of potassium cresylate and 85 pounds of 
sodium chlorate. The largest mixed chemical spill in U.S. railroad history, the Alberton 
derailment created a suite o f health problems and unanswered questions which continue 
to plague victims. This paper will describe how victims of the Alberton spill were 
impacted negatively by a pattern of non-disclosure by Montana Rail Link and 
government officials regarding chemical exposure and resulting health effects. 
Recommendations for enhancing the community right-to-know in the realm of hazardous 
materials transportation to foster accident prevention using a combination of legal, 
political and community organizing tools will be presented.
Chapter 1 analyzes the events of the Alberton derailment and mixed chemical spill, 
from the April 11 beginning to the April 28 officially sanctioned re-entry into the spill 
zone, for timely and thorough disclosure of information to spill victims. Attention is 
focused on the identification o f chemicals spilled, reactions between chemicals spilled, 
and resulting short and long-term health effects.
Chapter 2 discusses how a lack o f disclosure prevented adequate testing to determine 
the chemical content of the spill and human exposure. Chapter 3 addresses how 
incomplete disclosure prevented spill victims from acquiring proper medical diagnosis 
and treatment o f their illnesses. Chapter 4 examines the aftermath of the incident when 
the lead agency, Montana Department of Environmental Quality, confronted ongoing 
health problems and questions stemming from incomplete disclosure.
Chapter 5 outlines hazardous materials transportation law and regulation, identifying 
opportunities for accident prevention by states and localities. Chapter 6 describes the 
concept of community right-to-know, its history, and current legal applications, 
particularly the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act and the Risk 
Management Program (§112(r)) of the 1990 Clean Air Amendments. Finally, a case 
study of the Missoula County Local Emergency Planning Committee is presented in 
Chapter 7 to examine how localities can increase disclosure of risk from hazardous 
materials transporters and use that information to prevent accidents.
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PREFACE
April 23,1996
Excerpt o f Letter to Mark Simonich, Director of Montana Department of Environmental 
Quality. From Gary Shockey o f Spence, Moriarity and Schuster, Attorneys at Law, 
Jackson, WY.' Emphasis added.
I believe the situation near Alberton presents a unique opportunity to minimize 
the harmful effects o f  uncertainty on the population,..Pcs I speak to individuals, it is 
evident to me that they are experiencing significant uncertainty about their exposures. It 
seems the only thing made certain the them as of April 20, 1996, is that they have been 
exposed to chlorine. That morning, Saturday, they were informed through newspaper 
accounts o f the general nature of other chemical agents tat they were probably exposed 
to. While I am aware of the daily meetings that have been conducted, it does not appear 
that adequate information has been provided, or if provided, not in a format clearly 
understandable.
I am writing to request immediate release of, and immediate access to, all 
pertinent testing, monitoring and other data that has been generated with respect to the 
identity o f and amounts of chemicals involved in this matter. The people are entitled, as 
soon as possible, to the opportunity resolve questions like: What was I  exposed to? How 
much o f  it was I  exposed to? How long was I  exposed? How much was at my house or 
nearby and fo r  how long? What are the likely effects from  a health standpoint? These 
and scores o f  other questions cannot even begin to be resolved without fu ll and total 
disclosure o f  the data immediately. If  indeed the railroad has represented that discussions 
o f “settling up” may occur shortly after people are allowed to return, this underscores the 
need for immediate disclosure of all information. Individuals and families cannot be 
expected to make informed, reasonable decisions about “settling up” without full 
disclosure o f all pertinent facts for them to analyze.
Ill
‘Gerry Spence is well known for representing Karen Silkwood and other citizens harmed 
by corporate toxic disasters.
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Introduction
On April 11, 1996 a Montana Rail Link train derailed just west of Alberton, MT 
spilling chlorine, potassium cresylate, sodium chlorate and setting off a chain of events 
which today continue to plague residents. In the fall o f 1997 a runaway Montana Rail 
Link (MRL) train was intentionally derailed yards from the interstate in Clinton, 
Montana, just east o f Missoula. Fortunately, the chlorine and other hazardous materials 
tanker cars on that train remained intact. As a result o f these and other accidents, 
emergency responders, affected residents, and the general public grew increasingly 
alarmed by the dangers presented by rail transport o f hazardous material.
Rail transportation o f  hazardous materials: Recipe fo r  disaster
Throughout the U.S. and the world, rail transportation of hazardous materials 
creates the risk of large-scale disasters. * The volume and scope of hazardous materials 
transported by rail has been steadily increasing, and with it the likelihood for disaster. 
Rail traffic in the United States increased 40% between 1990 and 1997, while the 
infrastructure was neither expanded nor adequately repaired, and railroad employee 
numbers were reduced by corporate downsizing. Over six hundred railroads operate in 
the U.S., only four are major. The railroads combined operate 173,000 miles of track, 1.2 
million freight cars and employ more than 180,000 workers. In 1997, these railroads
' Few organizations have dedicated themselves solely to transportation risks. The Texas- 
based organization Rail watch (http://www.railwatch.org) is “dedicated to educating the 
public about railroad safety” . Other enviroiunental and public interest organizations 
advocate for public right-to-know, reduction o f rail accidents, and reduction of toxics 
transported by rail and other means.
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generated $33.1 billion. The railroads use more than 19,000 locomotives to pull freight 
trains averaging 67 car loads. Trains are exceedingly difficult to stop once in motion, and 
the result is a high frequency of railroad accidents in the U.S.-one almost every hour- 
and-a-half.^ The agencies regulating the railroad industry-the Federal Railroad 
Administration’s Safety Program (FRA) and the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB)-have a combined budget of less than $65 million and fewer than 2,500 
employees.^ In the face of the gargantuan railroad industry FRA and NTSB are tasked 
with regulating, prevention o f rail accidents is an underdeveloped focus o f the agencies’ 
work.
The frequency of rail accidents is compounded by the seriousness of the 
incidents. Rail accidents carry a high likelihood o f fires and explosions that can have 
grave consequences on public health and safety . The transport of dangerous chemicals 
further raises the probability o f serious impact on human health and the environment. 
Train accidents account for nearly 80% o f chemical transportation accidents.** A train 
derailment resulting in a hazardous chemical release and evacuation occurs 
approximately every two weeks. ̂  Train derailments are the second most frequent cause 
of evacuations. The largest chemical accident evacuation, o f 225,000 people in
 ̂Steven Moss et al. 1998. Why Is There A Train Accident Every Ninety Minutesl M 
Cubed.
"Id.
* Susan L. Cutter and John Tiefenbacher. 1989. Plume and Doom. American 
Demographics 11(11):44-47.
 ̂Steven Moss et al. 1998. Why Is There A Train Accident Every Ninety Minutes'} M 
Cubed.
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Mississauga, Canada—was caused by a train derailment.^ Each year, more than 10,000 
people are evacuated from their homes and exposed to hazardous chemicals as a result of 
train incidents in the U.S.’
O f the myriad chemicals transported by rail, chlorine causes the highest 
percentage o f injury incidents. Releases of chlorine and ammonia are more likely to 
result in evacuations than accidents involving other substances. Releases of more than 
one chemical are twice as likely as single chemical incidents to result in evacuations.® 
Both chlorine and ammonia are in the top ten hazardous materials most commonly 
shipped by rail.® Train accidents involving hazardous materials present high levels of 
risk to the public health and safety because trains carry large volumes of hazardous 
substances and can derail in rural, unprepared areas lacking response expertise and 
resources. While these types o f accidents occur less frequently than other types of 
industrial accidents, “their consequences are more severe, resulting in any given occasion 
in far greater number of deaths and injuries, property damage and destruction, and social
® Sorenson, John H. 1987. Evacuations due to off-site releases from chemical accidents: 
experience from 1980 to 1984. Journal o f  Hazardous Materials 14:247-257.
’ National Safety Transportation Board statistics. Presented on Runaway Trains on the 
Discovery Channel, 1997.
* Hall, Irene H, Gilbert S. Haugh, Patricia Price-Green, V. Ramana Dhara and Wendy E. 
Kaye. 1996. Risk factors for hazardous substance releases that result in injuries and 
evacuations: data from 9 States. American Journal o f  Public Health 86(6)855-857.
’ Association o f America Railroads. 1995-1998. Annual Reports of Hazardous Materials 
Shipped by Rail.
See Tickner, J. and H. Gray. 1994. Accidents Do Happen: Toxic Chemical Accident 
Pattern in the United States. Boston: National Environmental Law Center.
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and ecological disruptions,”" '̂
In urban areas, the risks are enormous. By the late 1990s, each day nearly one 
million tons o f hazardous chemicals were transported by highway and rail through the 
metropolitan Chicago area.'^ Montana, Wyoming and Idaho, however, have the residents 
at greatest risk from rail spills, despite low population densities. Rural areas are 
extremely vulnerable to chemical derailments and less equipped to respond adequately. 
This leads to delayed containment o f the chemical release, increased contamination and, 
as a result, increased risk to human health and safety. Emergency responders and 
medical personnel in rural areas tend to be less experienced in handling chemical 
accidents. In both urban and rural areas, risk is increased further by the lack of 
information provided by rail companies about the type, amount and frequency of 
hazardous shipments. The seriousness of a chemical accident is determined by the 
chemicals involved, accident location, proximity to populations, and time of occurrence 
(day, week and season). Thus, “ [k]nowing where chemical accidents are likely to occur is 
vital to disaster preparedness” as well as knowledge of what a train is likely to be
" E.L. Quarantelli. 1991. Disaster Planning for transportation accidents involving 
hazardous materials. Journal o f  Hazardous Materials 27:49-60.
"  The costs o f the Montana Rail Link toxic spill in Alberton, MT were reported to be 
$10,564,935 for the year of the derailment. U.S. Department of Transportation 
Hazardous Materials Safety, Hazardous Materials Information System Summary for 
1996.
"  Hillel Gray and Allison LaPlante. 1998. Too Close to Home: Chemical Accident Risks 
in the United States. U.S. PIRG and National Environmental Law Center.
Susan Cutter and Ji Minhe. 1997. The Professional Geographer 49(3):318-32. 
Frederick J. Cowie.1992. Beyond Rural: The Montana Frontier Thesis (Emergency 
Management in Extremely Rural-Frontier Areas). Montana Disaster and Emergency 
Services. Helena, MT.
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carrying.** In the aftermath o f the 1996 Alberton derailment, spill victims requested 
access to information that would improve accident prevention. They found that Montana 
Rail Link was not eager to share information regarding risks with the public.
Montana Rail Link: On the wrong track fo r safety
Events in western Montana form an unfortunate microcosm of the risks and 
realities o f hazardous materials transport, and the lack of information surrounding it, on a 
national scope. Montana Rail Link (MRL) is a young railroad, incorporated in 1987, 
which repeatedly falls near the bottom of safety rankings for railroads in its size class. In 
1995 and 1996, Montana Rail Link averaged o f 5.3 accidents each month along its 654.5 
miles o f track, the second highest accident record for Class C railroads. The Federal 
Railroad Administration noted that o f the railroads with the highest accident rates, 
Montana Rail Link’s was deteriorating, not improving.*’
MRL’s atrocious safety ready was all too apparent to Montana residents. On the 
day o f the Alberton derailment and toxic spill, Montana Rail Link derailed a second train 
carrying hazardous materials near Noxon, MT, north of Alberton. Missoula residents 
were reminded o f the dangers presented by railroads the next summer when four fuel 
tankers jumped the track in the company’s rail yard in north Missoula.** On June 16,
1997, eleven cars o f a 36-car train derailed at East Missoula, spilling malt barley but.
** Susan L. Cutter and John Tiefenbacher. 1989. Plume and Doom. American 
Demographics. 1 l(ll):44-47.
'^Federal Railway Administration, August 1997. http://www.fra.dot.gov.
** Missoulian. Rail cars carrying fuel jump track. July 24, 1997.
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fortunately, none of the fuel, fertilizer or sulfur that comprised the loads of the remaining 
derailed cars.*^
Missoula suffered its closest call on the night of November 17, 1997 when a 107- 
car Montana Rail Link train raced backwards towards Missoula at 50 mph, with no 
engineers on board. Forty-nine cars derailed when railroad employees “intentionally 
derailed” the train in Clinton, MT to prevent it from entering Missoula city limits. The 
train’s brakes apparently had not been set at a stop in Drummond.^® Emergency officials 
did not have enough time to prepare Missoula for evacuation, nor did they know what 
hazardous materials were on the train until well after the intentional derailment. The 
newspaper reported that “ [t]o the great relief o f everyone associated with the on-purpose 
pile up, the mangled beast is not bleeding poison.” '̂ The next day, a representative of 
Missoula City-County Health Department stated that there were no apparent leaks and 
that “[w]e are extremely lucky. Extremely.”^̂  Luck was about all that the lack of toxic 
release and injury at Clinton could be ascribed to. A meeting between Montana Rail 
Link, emergency responders and local and state officials was called to fact find and 
discuss why communications between the railroad company and officials regarding train 
contents and risk was so poor.^^
Other Montana cities were no less immune to Montana Rail Link’s derailments. 
On July 20, 1999, in Billings, “a potentially catastrophic derailment of two railroad
Missoulian. MRL derailments near Missoula. November 18, 1997. 
Missoulian. Runaway derailed. November 18, 1997.
Missoulian. No leaks. November 19, 1997.
22 Id.
2̂  This will be discussed further in Chapter 7.
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tanker cars transporting liquid propane gas forced the evacuation of several downtown 
b l o c k s . T h e  cars “inexplicably rolled” through the rail yard at 2:00 in the morning. 
Three tank cars derailed, two carrying 36,000 gallons each of liquid propane and the 
other carrying residue of toluene. As in the Clinton derailment, an officially “empty” rail 
car could have caused significant damage to human health and safety. Rail cars can be 
categorized as empty when carrying only residual amounts. However, these “empty” rail 
cars can harbor hundreds of gallons of toxic chemicals.^®
In the 1990s, derailments accounted for the largest category of Montana Rail Link 
train acciden ts.M any  of these derailments, including the toxic spill at Alberton, were 
attributed to worn rails. Federal railroad inspectors conducted a special investigation of 
Montana Rail Link following the April 11, 1996 Alberton derailment, “prompted by 
several track caused derailments attributed to failed rails. Between January 1, 1991 
and December 31, 1995 the Federal Railroad Administration reported 28 track caused 
derailments on MRL’s line. From January through April 1996, 21 additional MRL 
derailments occurred.^* Track wear was detected, but apparently went uncorrected to 
prevent future accidents. “During 1995 a total of 553 defective rails were detected by 
Sperry Rail Service detector cars.”^̂  Rail wear has been blamed for the Alberton
Billings Gazette. Downtown derailed. July 21, 1999.
Missoulian. No leaks. November 19, 1997.
See Bozeman Chronicle, April 21, 1996 and Federal Railroad Administration web site. 
John Cartwright, Federal Railroad Administration track specialist. 1996. Letter re: 
Draft Rail Assessment of Montana Rail Link line.
2* Id.
Id.
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derailment and railroad employees reported instances of extreme wear because it 
presented increased likelihood of derailment.^® Unfortunately for the people injured, 
evacuated and killed by the Alberton derailment, MRL did not put public welfare above 
profits. Rail wear and other problems went uncorrected as increasing volumes of 
hazardous materials rumbled through communities.
Montana Rail Link’s abysmal safety record does not surprise those who have 
monitored the company since its inception. The Great Northern railroad was cut west 
through Montana in the late 1880s. Burlington Northern (BN) took over from Great 
Northern and ran the tracks in Montana where “[t]he Continental Divide and other 
mountain ranges demand the use o f helpers [additional engines] to move heavy tonnage 
and state-of-the-art intermodal freight over steep passes. Montana has been said to 
draw “railfans from coast to coast each year to witness contemporary Western railroading 
at its finest.
On November 1, 1987 Montana Rail Link assumed control o f 931 miles o f 
Burlington Northern track, 300 o f which are branch lines. Burlington Northern retains 
track rights for through trains and leases the main line to MRL. Montana Rail Link owns 
the branch lines outright. The formation o f MRL and buyout of Burlington Northern did 
not come without controversy and dissent. Burlington Northern employees organized and 
resisted the buyout by non-union Montana Rail Link. The employees were unsuccessful
^  See depositions of Montana Rail Link employees, e.g. William W. Schutter, train 
engineer, 1/27/98.
Rail/an and Railroad. 1990. The Montana Rail Link Story, Part 1.
" 'Id .
Id.
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and MRL’s actions fulfilled their worst expectations. MRL reduced train crews to two, 
eliminated the use o f cabooses, lost numerous experienced Burlington Northern 
employees and brought in railworkers from outside of M o n tan a .T h ese  actions, coupled 
with an overall reduction of costs and increase in traffic, “turned the eyebrows of other 
regional carriers
The results of downsizing a workforce while increasing shipments have been 
documented at other railroads, most notably Union Pacific. Union Pacific increased its 
shipments by sixty-seven per cent between 1985 and 1995. During the same decade. 
Union Pacific also downsized its workforce by 4,200. The ratio of worker to rail car 
shipment doubled from 85:1 in 1985 to 170 rail car shipments per worker in 1995. The 
increase in shipments and reduced work force resulted in worker complaints regarding 
longer hours worked, exhaustion and hindered ability to ensure safety.^^ The national 
increase in hazardous loads points to the necessity o f hard look at the impacts of 
downsizing actions taken by companies like Union Pacific and Montana Rail Link.
Montana Rail Link’s corporate philosophy to reduce costs and increase business 
created problems from the beginning. On October 31, 1987, the first night of operation, 
three engines were released from their train at Livingston, MT and hurtled full throttle up 
Bozeman Pass at speeds reaching 80 mph. Once over the pass, the engines “tore through
See deposition and supporting documents of Robert Raney, former Burlington 
Northern employee and union representative. 2/9/98. Deposition in the matter of Schliep 
V. MRL.
Railfan and Railroad. 1990. The Montana Rail Link Story.
Sanford hew is.1997. Ha::ardous Materials on the Rails: A Case Study o f  Union Pacific 
Railroad, the Nation's Largest Chemical Hauler. The Good Neighbor Project.
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the middle o f West End siding and burrowed down a 30-foot embankment, thoroughly 
demolishing themselves in the process.” ’̂ Montana Rail Link’s record failed to improve 
from its inauspicious start, leaving a wake o f derailments, chemical spills, ruined lives 
and angry communities.
Right-to-Know: The missing piece
Understanding and improving upon railroad safety in western Montana has 
proven a difficult task because federal law and policy regarding hazardous materials 
transport is complex, and states, localities, and Indian tribes have only limited abilities to 
regulate such transport. The problem is made more difficult because transporters are 
exempt from all right-to-know laws, thereby preventing local governments and citizens 
from obtaining information on the risks presented by hazardous materials transportation. 
Thus, a community wishing to encourage transporters to practice accident prevention and 
respond to local concerns must create mechanisms using legal, political, and community 
organizing tools. The case study o f Montana Rail Link's Alberton derailment illustrates 
why accident prevention and increased right-to-know is needed in the arena of hazmat 
transportation. This paper describes how communities can gain access to information, 
expand their right-to-know, improve emergency response preparation and, ultimately, 
prevent rail accidents involving hazardous materials.
The right-to-know is a relatively new concept in U.S. law and policy. It is
Pacific Rail News. 1991. Mountain Country Regional.
10
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consistently resisted by industry.^* The right-to-know (or RTK) is a powerful tool that 
provides citizens access to chemical process information previously kept secret by 
private industry/^ despite its capacity for devastating impact on public health and the 
environment. The disaster at Bhopal, India'*® provided the impetus for the first 
community right-to-know legislation in the U.S.: Title III of the 1986 Superfund 
Amendments, the Emergency Planning and Conununity Right-to-Know Act.'** More 
recently,1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act'*̂  included Section 112(r), which outlines 
a Risk Management Program requiring industrial facilities to make public information 
concerning potential impacts of onsite accidents to the surrounding community. 
Transporters, however, are exempt from the community-right-to-know portions of each 
o f these and other relevant laws.
Right-to-know creates a feedback mechanism that industry would prefer did not 
exist; that is, an informed public raises challenges and sets benchmarks of acceptable 
risk. These demands are then passed along to lawmakers who may support the public 
right-to-know by pressuring industry to share previously secret information and change
"  See the legislative history for the Superfund law reauthorization and amendments. 
Comprehensive Environmental Responsibility, Compensation and Liability Act. 42 
U.S.C.A.§§9601-9675 as amended by SARA. (October 17, 1986).
’̂Proprietary information (known as trade secrets) is protected under law. Industry 
attempts to broaden this protection to avoid chemical and process reporting. The Toxic 
Release Inventory (required by SARA (1986)) has forced companies to share non­
proprietary information.
^Union Carbide Corporation, a U.S. firm, released methyl isocyanate over the sleeping 
city o f Bhopal, India killing over one thousand people and injuring thousands more. This 
incident and others will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Emergency Plarming and Community Right-to-Know Act. 42 U.S.C.A. §§11001-11050. 
« 4 2  u  s  e . §7401 et seq.
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corporate practices in the interest of public health and safety. The RTK simply provides 
access to that information which creates the impetus for people to push for accident 
prevention because they view the risks as too large to bear. Thus, accident prevention, an 
excellent method to achieve toxics release reduction and create changes in corporate 
conduct, is directly informed and empowered by RTK. The right-to-know is an elegant 
example o f the power o f information.
To be fully effective and most protective of human health and the environment, 
the concept o f right-to-know is crucial at every level o f decision making; before, during 
and after a disaster. Inclusion and acceptance o f the right-to-know by official decision­
makers is necessary to enable them to do the best job communicating with the affected 
populace during an emergency. Principles of disclosure and openness key to right-to- 
know can prevent many problems and misunderstandings from arising during an 
emergency event; these problems may be a bureaucratic headache for officials but are 
potentially life-threatening for disaster victims. The lack of this underlying community 
right-to-know philosophy was apparent during the Alberton derailment and aftermath. 
This omission adversely impacted evacuees by denying them access to critical 
information needed to make decisions based on health and safety about re-entiy into the 
spill site during and after evacuation.
Thus, an overall adoption and acceptance of right-to-know principles by decision 
makers would improve protection o f human health and the environment during incidents 
and reduce accidents via accident prevention.
12
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Alberton: The reason fo r  reform
A large human price is paid to allow companies to transport highly dangerous 
chemicals by rail. When a spill occurs, unlucky residents o f track-side towns may lose 
their health, jobs, financial security, and sense of safety and well-being in their 
community and homes.
After the spill at Alberton the affected community was treated patemalistically by 
government and company officials. Information was not immediately or completely 
shared with evacuated citizens and neither scientific uncertainty nor precautionary 
policies were discussed with the community. Community demands for further testing and 
assurances o f safety were rebuffed and marginalized. Basic democratic principles were 
ignored, including the community right-to-know and participation in decision making. 
Officials seemed to place assuring evacuees that all was basically well and under control 
above their responsibility to ensure public health and safety. The Incident Command 
System put in place to handle emergency situations was designed to handle technical 
decisions but a gap exists in the area of handling public concern and satisfying the 
community right-to-know.
Evacuatees who reentered the area and their homes have stated that if  they'd 
known what they know now, after subsequent research and questioning, they never would 
have entered the evacuated zone for pet rescues nor moved home when officials declared 
it safe to return. The exclusion of the affected citizenry catalyzed the formation of a 
community group, first named Alberton Community Evacuees (ACE), later becoming the 
Alberton Community Coalition for Environmental Health (ACCEH). This organization
13
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investigated the details of the toxic spill, response and remediation and pushed for 
answers on behalf of sickened and frustrated residents. They discovered a pattern of 
disturbing actions and decisions by government officials; decisions which directly 
contradicted evidence and paid little consideration to the community's right-to-know, the 
precautionary principle, human health and the environment, or public safety.
Seeking solutions: Working towards accident prevention and increased right-to-know
The dangers inherent in transporting hazardous material by truck and rail are 
faced by communities throughout the country and transporters’ track record is not good 
Federal oversight o f transporters is limited by the sheer size of the industry and interstate 
commerce law further protects transporters’ interests and shields them from public 
scrutiny. Communities have limited jurisdiction as transportation is exempt from 
portions o f existing laws regulating control o f toxic materials and involvement o f the 
affected community.
Congressional studies of the situation found: ". ..that approximately 4 billion tons 
o f regulated hazardous materials are transported each year...; [and] that accidents 
involving the release of hazardous materials are a serious threat to health and safety. A
newspaper article several days after the Alberton derailment quoted Bill Reed, Missoula 
Rural Fire Department chief discussing the transport of dangerous materials through 
Missoula. He said "[t]his stuff travels through Missoula all the time. .. [E]very train has
w Congressional findings for 1990 Amendments o f Hazardous Material Transportation 
Uniform Safety Act (HMTUSA). Pub. L. 101-615, Sec. 2, Nov. 16, 1990, 104 Stat. 3244.
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hazardous material." John Fitzpatrick, spokesman for the Federal Railroad Agency, told 
the newspaper that “the general public has no way of knowing what hazardous materials 
are moving across Montana. ‘The railroad, and the railroad only, would know,' he 
said.".'*  ̂In the same article, the contents o f the derailed Montana Rail Link tanker cars 
were reported erroneously.
The risk presented by hazardous materials transport by rail, including nuclear 
waste, is not disputed, but rather is not fully known. However, what little is known 
evidences significant threats to human health and the environment. The Alberton 
derailment illustrates not only what happens when risk is not known prior to a disaster, 
but also when threats and critical information are inadequately disclosed during and after 
the incident. The derailment at Clinton, MT reinforced how unprepared local responders 
are to deal with a major rail disaster and how uncooperative the company is at sharing 
information necessary to protect public health and safety. The lessons learned from the 
Alberton and Clinton incidents differ, but each supports the need to improve 
communication between the company, responders and the public.
Fortunately, there is much that can be done to ameliorate the existing threats from 
hazardous materials transport. Local government and bodies such as the Local 
Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC)"^ have the power to improve community right- 
to-know and facilitate accident prevention. Citizen groups such as the Alberton
**Missoulian. Hazards routinely ride rails. April 12, 1996.
4) LEPCs were formed under EPCRA to devise emergency plans, coordinate emergency 
response and convey information to the public. Their role will be explored further in 
Chapters 6 and 7.
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Community Coalition for Environmental Health (ACCEH) have been and will continue 
to be effective in pushing for reform and improvement in the area of hazardous material 
transportation safety. Other groups around the country also provide examples of how 
better to protect our communities from these dangers.
Statement o f  Purpose
The first half o f this paper focuses on right-to-know as a pivotal concept and 
illustrate the problems its omission caused for Alberton evacuees during the evacuation 
and aftermath. The temporal gap between officially known data and public disclosure of 
those facts between the spill and re-entry—April 11-28, 1996— will be highlighted by 
comparing inconsistencies in the timing o f information availability to decision makers 
and the public."*® The paper will focus on several contentious issues that were either 
belatedly or never addressed. The majority o f these revolve around very basic and critical 
issues o f identity o f spilled chemicals, spilled materials’ reactions, possible health 
effects, and contamination routes and pathways in humans and the environment.
The second half of this paper examines the right-to-know policy framework for a 
locality such a Missoula County, Montana and recommends actions to reform hazardous 
materials transportation, community right-to-know and accident prevention. The ease 
with which accident prevention could move forward if  transporters were not exempt 
from right-to-know and if  it were accepted and practiced by organizations, such as the
The public record for the Alberton derailment is located at the Missoula County 
Courthouse in the Clerk and Recorder’s Office, Missoula, MT.
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Local Emergency Planning Committee, which work in this area is discussed as a matter 
o f policy and specific recommendations. The resulting suite of solutions and 
recommendations provides Missoula, and other communities, with the information 
needed to fully assess risk and identify tools to reduce risk. The ultimate goal is to 
prevent accidents based on information obtained from increased right-to-know. Some 
accidents, however, will occur, thus the corollary goal of this paper is to show that 
community right-to-know and full disclosure to victims must be an integral part of toxic 
incident mitigation.
Disclosure Analysis and Methods
Information disclosure was analyzed using the public record for all information 
which was available to decision makers and the public at the time of the incident. Daily 
minutes recorded from meetings of the Health and Safety Technical Team, Incident 
Command, and Evacuee Meetings were used to determine who knew what and when. 
Media accounts, primarily the Missoulian newspaper, were also a major source of 
information for evacuees and the public at large and thus were examined for content.
Officials failed in their duties and public protection by not disclosing information 
to the public. These failures continued to plague victims and decision makers long after 
the incident was declared over on April 28, 1996. For this analysis, the areas of non­
disclosure are:
1) Lack o f timely public notification concerning the exact contents of the spill 
(particularly potassium cresylate) and initial toxic cloud, the potential for chemical
17
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reactions among spill components, the results of such reactions and possible human 
health effects.
2) The decision to allow evacuees to re-enter the affected area for “pet rescues” without 
releasing information and data concerning potential risks and before disclosing the mixed 
chemical nature of the spill. Thus, the officials’ lack of information translated into faulty 
decisions which placed evacuees in danger without their informed consent based on 
disclosure of risk.
3) The decision to allow evacuees to permanently re-enter the affected area without full 
disclosure o f possible risks, community input, or adequate data upon which to base such 
a decision. Officials have since contradicted their assertions of safety at the time of re­
entry and acknowledged that additional risks may have been present.'^’In assembling this 
chapter, the public record for the incident duration (April 11- April 28, 1996) were 
consulted. The excerpts, presented as Appendix A, are a fraction of the available 
material. Excerpts were selected to highlight the following areas of concern regarding 
lack of disclosure by government agencies and Montana Rail Link to the evacuated 
residents: chemical composition o f spill, associated potential health effects, re-entry 
decision making process and data, and discrepancies in information received and shared 
by various stakeholders. The chronology of events in Appendix A quotes (directly or via 
media accounts or official meeting notes) evacuees and those who played pivotal roles in 
the Alberton incident: government officials, company representatives and contractors,
For example, in an interview with documentary filmmaker Lisa Mosca, Tom Ellerhoff 
o f Montana Department of Environmental Quality acknowledged that evacuees could 
have been exposed to chemicals other than chlorine in the initial toxic cloud.
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emergency responders and medical personnel.
A thorough review of the record evidences many things done correctly and great 
efforts taken to respond to the spill These efforts include, but are not limited to, the 
technical expertise required to successfully unload chlorine tanker #3, countless hours 
put in by members o f the Incident Command, responders, Montana Rail Link, and 
volunteers who selflessly put themselves at risk for the public good; the chaotic and 
terrifying nature o f such a disaster which places extreme pressure on decision makers to 
normalize the situation; the enormity o f such a response effort for a semi-rural area 
unpracticed in the management o f large scale incidents. However, these components, 
while important, do not excuse or minimize critical mistakes or the resultant injuries.
Rather, scrutinizing the mistakes promotes learning from the mistakes to better 
respond and serve public interests in similar situations. Unfortunately, there are other 
toxic spills like that at Alberton and other flawed responses. Fortunately, there is a body 
o f literature examining such incidents demonstrating commonly repeated mistakes, and 
suggesting solutions and methods to prevent future mistakes. The reasons to avoid these 
common mistakes in hazardous materials incidents are compelling: the injury wrought on 
victims is incalculable; the costs increase as repetitive corrective actions are necessary to 
remedy inappropriate responses; and the ill will and loss of credibility government 
agencies. Most important perhaps is the fact that most mistakes are discovered at great 
cost and anguish to victims and great expense to all.
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Thus, the mistakes are emphasized and traced throughout this analysis of incident 
voices and information. Appendix A creates a narrative from which the reader can 
understand what happened and what went wrong.
Sources Consulted 
Evacuee Meeting Notes
Informational meetings for evacuees were held daily from April 12-27, 1996 in 
various motel meeting rooms. These meetings were hosted by MRL. Incident Command 
members presented the latest news, took questions, and occasionally had other experts on 
hand to address the evacuees. Local interested citizens attended and asked questions as 
well. Eventually, the question and answer period was eliminated or considerably 
shortened at meetings and a facilitator brought in, due to the volume and content of 
questions from evacuees and concerned citizens alike. The shutdown of the question and 
answer period was attributed by Incident Command to local environmentalists’ questions 
regarding chemical reactions and health effects caused by the spill. At one such meeting, 
an evacuee publicly thanked a local environmental activist for providing information 
which officials had not. This information was the foundation for increasing evacuee 
demands for the full story and complete disclosure. Two sets of meeting notes were 
transcribed for the public record. All available notes were reviewed for this paper. 
Technical Group Meeting Notes
The technical group was formed by MRL to address the offloading of chlorine 
from the ruptured tanker and other chemicals, and any other technical questions return
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the site to 'normal'. It consisted o f representatives from MRL, Hulcher, American 
Association o f Railroads, EmTech, Envirocon, Oxychem, and Georgia Pacific. The 
Technical Group met on site at the forward command post, often several times per day 
during the incident.
Incident Command Notes
The Incident Commander, Frenchtown Fire Chief Scott Waldron, and other 
members o f Incident Command met daily to debrief and provide updates concerning each 
area o f the IC's concerns, including health, safety, evacuation, communication with the 
company and public. Members o f the Incident Command debriefed evacuees at the daily 
meetings.
Media Accounts
The media was relied upon heavily during this incident as a means of 
disseminating information to the public. In particular, the local daily newspaper, the 
Missoulian, was seen as a primary source of information regarding the progression of the 
spill, information from incident command and the company, and status of victims. The 
newspaper was not immune to small town politics or pressures, however, and missed 
numerous opportunities to investigate and report in the public interest. Still, media 
accounts represent well the information that was available to the public at that time and 
provide an excellent means for following the changing tides o f public sentiment and 
tracing incident evolution.
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Chapter 1. Montana Rail Link^s Alberton Derailment and Mixed Chemical Spill: 
April 11-April 28, 1996
The sound o f  metal screeching went on and on...the impact made the house shake. 
There was no air, and I  realized I  was in trouble and started backing up to the 
main road, but I  couldn't see through the fog, or breathe, and my eyes were 
burning.'*^
At approximately 4:00 am on April 11, 1996, a 4,319 foot long, 5,551 ton, 71-car 
Montana Rail Link train derailed two miles west o f Alberton, Montana immediately 
south of the Clark Fork R iv e r .E ig h tee n  rail cars came off the tracks; six o f those cars 
contained hazardous materials and three of those released hazardous materials into the 
environment.^ According to Montana Rail Link representatives, an estimated 64.8 tons 
o f chlorine were released between April 11 and April 28, 1996. A 24-inch hole in the 
side o f chlorine Tank Car #3 (ACFX 85824) resulted in the immediate release o f the 
majority of its load that morning, with smaller volumes escaping intermittently 
throughout the next two weeks. Company representatives reported approximately 85 
pounds of dry sodium chlorate prills (pellets) were released from the railcar UNPX 
120603, and tank car GATX 16194 released 17,000 gallons of liquid potassium cresylate 
on April 11, 1996, making the Alberton spill the largest mixed chemical rail accident in 
U.S. history and the second largest chlorine release.^*
ACCEH, 1997. Account of Sylvia Bookout, Alberton resident, of the early morning 
hours o f April 11, 1996 
“̂ NTSB Preliminary Report, 1996
“ Olympus, 1996. Results of Environmental Monitoring Related to Train Derailment, 
Alberton, Montana. 2 Volumes. Olympus Environmental, Inc. Report submitted to 
Montana Rail Link, December 31, 1996.
URS, 1996. Sampling Activities/Trip Report, Revision 1, Alberton Train Derailment, 
Alberton, Montana, TDD No.9604-0008. URS Operating Services, Inc. Consultants 
report submitted to the United States Environmental Protection Agency, Superfund
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The derailment occurred at mile post 154.60, approximately two miles west of the 
town o f Alberton, in Mineral County, Montana (Section 33 of T15N, R23W). The site is 
located about 500 feet south of interstate 90, roughly 200 feet south of the Clark Fork 
River and approximately 500 feet north o f Plateau Road.^^
The train engineers notified Montana Rail Link which in turn notified 911, setting 
the response and evacuation into action. The local fire department, Frenchtown Rural 
Fire Department, was first on the scene. Since the disaster was within its jurisdiction, 
Frenchtown Fire Chief Scott Waldron was named Incident Commander. The local 
Alberton Volunteer Department performed the initial evacuation of the town, despite a 
dearth of respirators and other protective equipment. Evacuees were directed to 
Frenchtown High School where a temporary evacuation center was established for the 
day.
Alberton, with a reported population of 354”  and average annual income of 
$11,000, and the surrounding areas were evacuated firom approximately a four-mile 
radius exclusion zone around the derailment. The evacuations were in effect from April 
11, 1996 through April 28, 1996. An estimated 500 people were evacuated from the 
exclusion zone. This zone included Interstate 90 and local roads, the Clark Fork River, 
homes and the air space above the site.^
Technical Assessment and Response Team, Region Yin. July 18, 1996. 
”  Olympus, 1996a
”  U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 1990.
URS, 1996.
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Due to the size o f the chemical release, the largest mixed chemical release and 
second largest chlorine release in U.S. rail history, the National Response Center (NRC) 
was notified. By 8:00 am that morning, the NRC had in turn notified the National 
Transportation Safety Board, Federal Railroad Agency, Environmental Protection 
Agency, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and Federal Emergency 
Management Agency. ”
Later that morning, the Department o f Military Affairs Disaster and Emergency 
Services sent a memo to Montana hospital emergency departments "re: Chlorine Spill 
emergency...Low level chlorine exposures produce headaches, nausea, vomiting, 
coughing chest pain and breathing difficulties. " The memo provided numbers for clinical 
toxicological assistance such as poison control centers.
Montana Governor Marc Racicot issued a state o f emergency declaration for 
Mineral and Missoula Counties on April 11 in which chlorine is the only chemical 
mentioned. However, a memorandum of understanding between Missoula and Mineral 
Counties dated April 12, 1996 begins by stating that "the derailment has resulted in the 
release o f chlorine gas and other hazardous materials."^*
Routes o f  Exposure and the Toxic Plume
National Response Center Incident Report, 4/11/96.
^  The Poison Center memo, state of emergency declaration and Memorandum of 
Understanding between Missoula and Mineral Counties can be found in the 
Administrative Record stored in the Clerk and Recorder’s Office at the Missoula County 
Courthouse.
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Responders from a myriad of agencies were misled about the actual content and 
effect o f the spilled chemicals by Montana Rail Link for the first four days o f the 
incident. During this time spill victims were not properly decontaminated or informed 
about the potential components or levels of their exposure. Some victims were allowed 
reentry into the evacuated zone. Still other victims were never evacuated from 
contaminated areas or not evacuated until days after the initial chemical release.
It may never be known what people were initially exposed to during the first few 
hours o f the derailment because the correct testing was not done during that time to 
determine the concentrations and kinds of chemicals in the plume. However, some 
fundamental facts are known from personal accounts o f evacuees. The plume traveled 
faster than the evacuation itself, and people were exposed as they woke up and tried to 
get out o f town. Some people reported that when they opened their doors they could 
smell something strange, while others said that when they opened their doors, they could 
see a green cloud and couldn't breathe. Everyone complained of immediate burning skin, 
eyes, lungs, and throat when trying to evacuate. Some people complained of burning 
skin, especially around the ankles as they walked through the grass to get pets or go to 
neighbors' houses. Many people were delayed in getting out while trying to contact 911 
or other emergency services, which prolonged their exposure time. Some people were 
told not to evacuate even though they were smelling the chemicals. Others had no choice
Compiled into a report by ACCEH and Linda King, Environmental Health Network 
1997.
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but to drive through the toxic plume, while others had a hard time starting their cars due 
to a lack o f oxygen.
No decontamination facilities or information were ever provided to the evacuees. 
At the evacuation center at Frenchtown High School people were not told to remove 
clothes, many were not given oxygen, and many were not told to wash their eyes or skin. 
Even at the hospital, many people were not given oxygen or told to wash their eyes or 
skin. In the hours after the evacuation, some people reported that their clothes were 
sticking to their bodies and burning their skin. Some exposure damage could have 
been prevented if  people had received even the minimal care prescribed by the Material 
Safety Data Sheet for chlorine gas exposure. The trauma that victims of the chemical 
spill underwent that first morning was soon complicated by unanswered questions 
regarding the chemicals spilled, chemical reactions and resulting health effects. These 
three areas o f incomplete disclosure to spill victims are the focus of the remainder of this 
chapter.
Chemicals spilled: An Incomplete Story
Three chemical products were released during Montana Rail Link’s derailment, 
and additional chlorine leaked sporadically throughout the evacuation period April 11- 
April 28, 1996. As in any toxic event, information about the chemicals spilled forms the 
foundation o f all decisions concerning victims’ health and safety, worker safety, scope 
and duration of evacuation, re-entry and clean-up. Due to the incompleteness of
« ACCEH and King, 1997.
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information available at Alberton, however, poor decisions were made that put public 
health and safety at risk.. The following section presents the information that was 
available regarding the health risks, decontamination and handling guidelines for the 
three chemical products released. As carrier o f these hazardous chemicals, Montana Rail 
Link had the responsibility to inform emergency responders, government officials and 
spill victims o f the risks, impacts and safety procedures of these chemicals.
Chlorine gas, heavier than air, billowed from the ripped tanker cars. Sodium 
chlorate, in solid form, and potassium cresylate, a liquid, spilled on the ground adjacent 
to the chlorine tankers. The potassium cresylate solution was emitted directly next to 
chlorine tanker #3 which eventually emptied almost completely, and the potassium 
cresylate pooled in a ditch alongside the tracks.
O f the three chemical products spilled, chlorine was the most familiar to victims, 
officials, responders and medical personnel. The chlorine gas formed a low-hanging 
cloud which presented the most immediate risk to health and safety. The continued focus 
on chlorine and its initial effects, however, came at considerable cost to spill victims. 
Long-term neurological and immunological effects o f chlorine exposure went 
undisclosed. Information regarding the other chemicals and by-products of reactions with 
chlorine and potential health effects was never disclosed, despite repeated requests and 
evidence of illness.
Information concerning the two non-chlorine chemical products was scarce for 
victims and government officials during the period o f evacuation. The first Material 
Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) provided to evacuees for the potassium cresylate car was an
27
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
MSDS for Sodium Hydroxide which is just one component of the potassium cresylate
mixture, a waste product of petroleum processing. Additional information, however, was
in fact available and known to Montana Rail Link and their contractors (Envirocon and
Olympus) the day o f the derailment and soon after. Montana Rail Link's contractor
Olympus Environmental, Inc. included this detailed description of the three chemical
products in their report released in June o f 1996:
Rail car ACFX 85824 released approximately 130,000 lbs. of gaseous 
chlorine which formed a cloud which migrated upriver from the site.
Rail Car GATX 1619 released approximately 17,000 gallons of a 
potassium cresylate solution on the derailment site within the MRL right 
o f way. The potassium cresylate was a spent caustic cleaning solution 
composed o f water (70-80%), potassium hydroxide (10-20%), potassium 
cresylate (5-15%), ethyl mercaptan (0.1-0.5%), methyl mercaptan (0.1- 
0.5%), and butyl mercaptan (0.1-0.5%). Potassium cresylate is composed 
o f a variety o f phenolic materials that generally boil above cresol range.
Rail Car UNPX 120603 released approximately 85 gallons of sodium 
chlorate in a solid, granular state. The spilled sodium chlorate formed a 
small mound immediately adjacent to the rail car and was contained in an 
area o f approximately 50 square feet, (emphasis added)
Chlorine: Immediate Threat with Long-Term Risks
Chlorine was first isolated in 1774 by Karl William Scheele of Sweden. In the 
early 1800s, Sir Humphrey Davy coined the name “chlorine” from the Greek 'chloros', 
meaning greenish yellow. By 1825, the harmful health implications of chlorine had been 
recognized and information was published about an antidote for inhalations of chlorine. 
A series o f laboratory and field observations followed. Chlorine was used first by the 
Germans on April 17, 1915 as a poison gas against enemy troops.
” T.E. Samda. 1922. The later effects of gas poisoning. The Lancet: 857-859.
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Health Effects
A wide variety of effects have been reported to be associated with acute and 
chronic exposure to chlorine gas including; cough; conjunctivitis; fever; headache; 
anorexia; nausea; vomiting; befuddled sensorium; pulmonary edema; anxiety and other 
neuroses; anosmia; tuberculosis; nephritis; bronchitis; asthma; pneumonia; pleurisy; 
meningitis; chronic tachycardia; neurocirculatory asthenia; chronic laryngitis; valvular 
heart disease; keratitis; acne; dental caries; and pulmonary fibrosis.
Chlorine gas is an irritating toxic compound that can cause effects on the eyes, 
upper respiratory system, lung, kidneys, liver, and the nervous system at high exposure 
levels (greater than l.Oppm) and may be fatal at very high concentrations (greater than 
60ppm)^‘.
Chlorine inhalation o f 4 hours or longer at concentrations as low as 
0.5ppm does cause short-term (less than one day) changes in lung function 
in humans. Longer-term effects are seen with higher concentrations and/or 
longer exposure periods. The severity o f health effects increases as the 
exposure concentration and exposure time increases. Other effects have 
been noted in cases o f accidental exposures: anxiety, confusion, giddiness, 
headache, and changes in blood enzyme levels and white blood cell count. 
Effects on the liver and kidneys have also been noted following inhalation 
exposure to chlorine gas.“
Symptoms and their correlated exposure levels include; itchy nose 
(0.2ppm);dry throat, cough and difficulty breathing (l.Oppm); shortness of 
breath, headache (above 1.3 ppm); intense choking, chest pain and 
vomiting (above 30ppm).High gas concentrations cause burning, blisters.
“ National Academy o f Science. 1976.Chlorine and hydrogen chloride; Medical and 
biologic effects of environmental pollutants, Washington, DC .Chapter 5; Ejfects o f  
Chlorine and Hydrogen Chloride on Man and Animals.
Chlorine Institute, 1990.
Chlorine Institute,1990.
29
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
reddening to the skin. Long term exposure effects include respiratory 
effects and corrosion o f tooth enamel.
This description o f potential health effects from chlorine exposure is far more 
detailed and thorough than any provided to Montana Rail Link spill victims. Long-term 
effects o f chlorine were not fully disclosed, despite increasing evidence such effects were 
occurring in spill victims. Victims were informed o f respiratory, dermal and ocular 
impacts from chlorine exposure. Long-term and other system effects were not disclosed. 
This lack o f information was compounded by the absence of mapping to show levels of 
exposure. Although chlorine plume modeling was provided to the EPA on the day of the 
spill, victims were told that no plume modeling had been done. As a result, victims did 
not know what chemicals they had been exposed to or at what levels. This prevented spill 
victims and their medical providers from making informed diagnoses and treatment.^ 
Decontamination and First Aid
Proper decontamination procedures were not followed. The spill occurred in the 
early morning hours o f April 11, 1996. Evacuees left homes enshrouded in the chemical 
cloud; those who walked through grass reported burning skin on contact. Many victims 
not already in the midst of the cloud had to drive through it to reach safety. Evacuees 
were told to assemble at Frenchtown High School where officials and emergency 
volunteers met them. Upon arrival, evacuees were not told to remove their clothing or to 
bathe. Many spill victims continued to wear the clothes they’d worn in the chemical
Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety. Information on Chlorine 
Toxicity.
^  Implications of improper and incomplete testing and non-disclosure of results and the 
impact on medical care will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3.
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cloud. Chemical bums and rashes resulted and chemical odors emanated from victims at 
the public meetings.
First aid for acute chlorine exposure is as follows:
Remove contaminated clothing; wash contaminated body parts with cool, 
running water; call a physician as soon as possible; for those who may 
have been 'exposed' but are not in immediate medical distress, obtain 
pulmonary function test data and compare with baseline“
Avoid skin contact with victim. Flush affected area with lukewarm, gently 
running water for at least 20 minutes. Under running water, remove 
contaminated clothing.
Note: Obtain medical attention IMMEDIATELY for all serious 
exposures.*^
Hazardous Material Handling Instructions: Information Existed, But Was Not Disclosed 
Although chlorine is more familiar to responders and officials, information about 
the other chemicals was carried on the train and held by Montana Rail Link for use in 
preparation for such a chemical release. Hazardous Material Handling Instructions are 
required to be on board any train carrying hazardous materials These instructions 
provide guidelines for responding to any release o f the hazardous materials and tend to 
be more specific than the Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) which are obtained from 
the chemical manufacturer. Information contained in the on board instructions should 
have been made available to responders, the media and the public immediately following 
the spill, as they provide specific information necessary for victims and responders to 
comprehend the dangers o f exposure and appropriate treatment. Such detailed
Several days after the spill, Montana Rail Link provided money to evacuees to 
purchase new clothes and supplies.
^  Chlorine Institute, 1993.
7̂ Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety
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information was especially important in this situation for sodium chlorate and potassium 
cresylate. These compounds were unfamiliar to responders, victims and the local medical 
community charged with treating exposed patients.
Potassium Cresylate
According to the hazardous material handling instructions which should have
been carried on the derailed MRL train:
Potassium Cresylate (Cresylic sodium solutions containing sodium hydroxide) 
Causes severe irritation and bums to skin and eyes. May cause blindness.
May be harmful or fatal if  swallowed or inhaled. May be irritating to the 
respiratory tract.
If ingested, potassium cresylate “may cause burning pain the mouth, throat 
and abdomen along with coughing and constriction of the throat, followed 
by nausea, abdominal spasms, vomiting, hematemesis and diarrhea. May 
also cause perforations o f the alimentary track, cardiovascular collapse, 
coma and death. May cause harmful nervous system effects. May cause 
liver and kidney damage.
Inhalation exposure “may cause symptoms similar to those listed under 
ingestion.” *̂
Potassium cresylate is a caustic, corrosive mixture derived from petroleum 
refinery wastes and coal tar (cresol). It contains potassium or sodium hydroxide, 
mercaptans (which contain sulfur), heavy metals, phenols, o, p, and m-cresols.
Potassium cresylate is used as a pesticide on the Western European market, while the 
principal application in the United States and Japan is for resins. Cresylate can produce 
heat if  it comes in contact with water or air when moist. It can be carried in the air in 
vapor form. It is considered an immediate hazard and a reactivity hazard which should be
Hazardous Material Handling Instructions for potassium cresylate.
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kept out o f low areas and human populations are advised to stay upwind.
Perhaps the most confounding thing about the potassium cresylate is that it is a 
spent mixture. Since it is an oil refinery waste, no two batches are ever alike due to the 
vagaries o f  the industrial process. The mixture spilled in the Alberton derailment was 
from the Tosco refinery in Washington state. Two Material Safety Data Sheets are on 
record from Tosco. One lists the mixture as containing 20-40% potassium cresylate. The 
other indicates that the mixture was 70-90% water, with only 5-15% potassium cresylate. 
The result o f this confusion was that evacuees were informed that the mixture was 
mostly water and, therefore, not harmful. On the contrary, the potassium cresylate 
mixture contained a plethora o f extremely harmful substances, some of which were not 
disclosed until after evacuees had returned to homes likely exposed to potassium 
cresylate vapors borne in the chemical cloud.^’
Health Effects
Health problems are severe in both acute and repeated exposure to potassium 
cresylate. It is corrosive to the eyes, skin and mucous membranes on contact. Acute 
exposure may cause damage to the liver, kidneys and central nervous system. It produces 
burning in the mouth and throat, lesions in the mouth, esophagus and stomach, 
abdominal pain, vomiting, bloody diarrhea, pallor, sweating, weakness, headaches, 
dizziness, tinnitus, muscle weakness, dimness of vision, ringing in the ears, mental
The chemical composition o f the cloud was either never tested beyond chlorine, or 
those results have not been made public. It is extremely likely that potassium cresylate 
and its reactants with the chlorine were airborne that morning and inhaled by victims. 
This will be discussed further in proceeding sections.
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confusion, and mental disturbances. If  cresol liquid or vapor contacts the eyes it may 
cause extensive damage, blindness, and comeal or epithelial damage may be permanent. 
If it contacts the skin, the skin becomes first red, then white with blister formation.
The MSDS section on health effects ends with this caveat: “Note: This material 
has not been tested as a whole for all potential health effects. It may have other health 
hazards related to its components.”’’ In addition to synergistic effects of the potassium 
cresylate mixture itself, reactions between chlorine and potassium cresylate occurred at 
Alberton creating another realm o f synergistic effects with undisclosed impacts on 
human health.’^
Decontamination and First Aid
For skin contact: “Remove contaminated clothing immediately. Wash areas of 
contact thoroughly with soap and water. Get immediate medical attention. Place 
contaminated clothing in closed container for storage until discarded.”’  ̂If potassium 
cresylate has made contact with eyes, eyes should be flushed “immediately with large 
amounts of water for at least 15 minutes. Eyelids should be held away from the eyeball to 
ensure thorough rinsing. Get immediate medical attention.”’'*
Personnel working at the site of a spill should be directed to do the following: 
“Caution should be exercised regarding personnel safety and exposure to the spilled 
material. Do not touch or walk through spilled material...Prevent eye contact with this
’° Material Safety Data Sheet Number 2374. Tosco Refining Company. 
”  Material Safety Data Sheet Number 2374. Tosco Refining Company.
72 These reactions and effects will be discussed further in this chapter.
73 Material Safety Data Sheet Number 2374. Tosco Refining Company. 
’Md.
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material. Wear chemical tight goggles and face shield. Provide an eyewash station 
immediately accessible to the work area. Prevent skin contact. A safety deluge shower 
should be located in the work area.”’*
Cresols: Another Dangerous Ingredient of the Potassium Cresvlate Mixture
Cresols are the main component o f the potassium cresylate and are often used as
another name for it. Cresols occur in three forms: o-,m-, and p-cresol. According to the
ATSDR, urine samples can be tested for the presence of cresols, although this test is not
routinely available in hospitals and clinics. The urine sample would have to be
taken within one day o f exposure to be valid. ATSDR notes that studies of the
impacts o f inhaled cresols have not been “adequately detailed” but demonstrate
respiratory effects similar to chlorine;
When inhaled as a concentrated aerosol, o-cresol is a respiratory irritant in 
humans.. .Following brief exposures to 6 mg/m*, 8 out o f 10 subjects 
complained o f mucosal irritation symptoms including dryness, nasal 
constriction, and throat irritation. . . An assortment o f respiratory effects, 
including inflammation and irritation of the upper respiratory tract, 
pulmonary edema, and hemorrhage and perivascular sclerosis in the lungs 
were seen in animals exposed to 9-50mg/m* of o-cresol 2-6 hours/day for 
1 month or more.
Moreover, neurological and carcinogenic effects have been seen as a result of 
cresol exposure, and ATSDR warns of synergistic effects o f cresol with phenols, which 
were also found at high levels at the derailment site:
’* Id. Workers were photographed on site with no protective gear. Protection seemed to 
be based primarily on chlorine exposure risk. From the record, it appears that workers 
were not directed to follow these precautions nor warned of the health risks posed by 
potassium cresylate.
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Neurological effects in animals acutely exposed to cresol aerosols have 
been reported. The effects include mild nervous excitation, muscle 
twitching accompanied by general fatigue, and clonic 
convulsions...Corrosive damage to the skin has been reported in humans 
dermally exposed to cresols. ..Results in a promotion study in mice 
suggested that cresols can be cancer promoters. It is possible that they 
would also promote the development o f tumors initiated by other 
chemicals. Although no evidence is available, it is likely that cresols 
would interact with phenols on the central nervous system to produce 
convulsions and coma, and on the red blood cells to produce 
methemoglobinemia.
None of this information was made available to spill victims. Nor were 
medical professionals informed of spill victims’ exposure to the chemical 
mixture, likely health effects, or potential for synergistic effects even 
when symptoms similar to those described as due to potassium cresylate 
appeared in spill victims.
Sodium Chlorate
Sodium chlorate is an odorless pale yellow to white crystalline solid used for making 
herbicides, explosives, dyes, matches, inks, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, defoliants, paper 
and leather. It is appreciably soluble in water and heavier, so may be expected to sink 
and dissolve at a rapid rate. It is very flammable and combustible.’’
Sodium chlorate is the active ingredient in a variety of commercial herbicides and 
is also used as a bleaching agent in pulp mills. Sodium chlorate comes in dust, spray and 
granule form. There is a risk of fire and explosion in dry mixtures with other substances.
ATSDR. 1992.Toxicological Profile for Cresols: o-cresol, p-cresol, m-cresol; TP-91/11.
”  Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.
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especially organic material, including other herbicides, sulfur, powered metals, strong 
acids, reducing agents and combustible materials.
Health Effects
Acute Sodium Chlorate exposure can cause abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, 
diarrhea and shortness of breath. It can also affect the blood cells and cause kidney 
damage.’*
Decontamination and First Aid
Appropriate chemical protective gloves, boots and goggles should be worn. Wash 
away any material which may have contacted the body with copious amounts of water or 
soap and water. If contact occurs, move victim to fresh air, call emergency medical care. 
Remove and isolate contaminated clothing and shoes at the site. In case o f contact with 
material, immediately flush skin or eyes with running water for at least 15 minutes.’®
Agency response and company control
Due to the scale of the release, forty-three federal, state and local agencies
mobilized to the scene to assist in evacuation and assessment. In addition, Montana Rail
Link requested technical assistance from various industry groups and representatives,
particularly those with expertise in handling chlorine.
Federal agencies involved in the derailment response included the Federal 
Railroad Administration (FRA), National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB), the National Forest Service, The USGS, and the EPA. Local 
agencies included the Frenchtown Fire Department whose Chief served as
’* Id.
’® Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.
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the incident commander (IC), state and county officials. The Missoula 
Hazardous Materials Team (HAZMAT) provided emergency rescue and 
medical support during the hazardous materials transfer and other 
exclusion zone activities. Montana Rail Link assembled an on-site 
technical team consisting of personnel from EmTech, Huelcher, 
Envirocon, Dow, Georgia Pacific. Oxychem and the American Railroads 
Association who met daily with the EPA CSC to develop and review 
response procedures and progress.*”
Local, state and federal response to this largest mixed chemical spill in U.S. 
railroad history was impressive. The agencies notified early that morning by the National 
Response Center monitored the progress and most sent representatives immediately to 
the scene. The EPA, NTSB, FRA, National Forest Service, U.S. Coast Guard had 
personnel on scene during the incident. The EPA and ATSDR emerged as the de facto 
lead federal agencies with the duty to protect health and human safety in the public’s 
mind: EPA during the incident and ATSDR after April 28.
EPA: Missing in Action
The Environmental Protection Agency described its involvement this way:
On April 11, 1996, the Region VDI EPA was notified of the derailment in 
Alberton and mobilized two On Scene Coordinators (OSCs) to the site.
The EPA then mobilized URS Operating Services (UOS) Superfund 
Technical Assessment and Response Team (START) personnel and the 
U S Coast Guard (USCG) Pacific Strike Team. An EPA toxicologist and a 
single OSC mobilized to the site on April 14, 1996, to replace the original 
two OSCs...From April 11, 1996, until mid-moming April 14, 1996,
EPA's and START’s assistance was not requested by the state of Montana 
and MRL within the wreckage area (hot zone), however EPA was allowed 
access to the forward command post....Entry to the derailment area was 
controlled by security personnel and records o f all entries and exits from
*” URS, 1996.
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the derailment site were recorded. On the afternoon o f  April 14, 1996, an 
EPA OSC, a START member and a Strike Team Member were allowed to 
enter the hot zone. During this visit, the body o f  Mr. John Elmer Smith, Jr.
(age 70) from  Seattle, Washington, was discovered by them...Th&
Missoula County Coroner removed the body to St. Patrick’s Hospital for 
definitive identification and autopsy. As mentioned, the cause of death 
was overexposure to chlorine gas/vapors (emphasis added).**
EPA states that their assistance was “not requested” in the hot zone by MRL. EPA
describes their eventual entry into the hot zone and presence at the forward command
post as “allowed” by MRL. Montana Rail Link displayed its attitude to the
Environmental Protection Agency during the Technical Group meetings from the second
day of the incident on. On April 12, 1996 the Technical Group noted that “EPA
personnel have been at the Nine Mile Road Command Post asking questions.”*̂  At the
same meeting, MRL and its technical advisors asserted that a “Pet Rescue/Feed may
being tomorrow. Another assessment will be done at daybreak. After that, the decision
will be made whether or not to begin the operation...” .*̂  It is unclear who was in a
position to make the decision that citizens exposed on April 11 could safely re-enter the
chemical spill area.*^ EPA had not yet viewed the site nor conducted any tests to
determine chemical composition o f the initial chemical cloud or hazardous substances on
the ground and threats to human health and safety. While EPA officials were “asking
** URS, 1996. The discovery of a dead body by EPA immediately upon its first site visit 
calls to question what else the agency would have been able to discover had it entered the 
site on April 11, prior to manipulation o f the site by Montana Rail Link. MRL moved 
soil, rail and did other site work prior to federal agency oversight.
“  Technical Group Meeting Notes. 4/12/96 AM. Appendix A.
*Md.
The decision to allow “Pet Rescues” (before data on the chemicals spilled and 
potential health effects were collected) proved to be a serious mistake. This will be 
addressed in more detail later in this chapter.
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questions” at the roadblock, the technical group reported that MRL’s sister company, 
Envirocon, was doing water and soil testing for pH levels only and reported that their 
data indicated that the situation “is not serious.” But Envirocon insisted that “there was 
no ground sampling done on the immediate site.”*̂
The next morning’s newspaper quoted the Incident Commander as saying,
“We’ve got all the best people in the country here doing all that they can do.” This 
statement neglected to clarify that the “best” people on site were experts in technical off­
loading of chemicals from trains and chlorine producers skilled in handling the chemical. 
Meanwhile, the government employees “best” skilled at identifying and mitigating risks 
to human health and safety-the Environmental Protection Agency— failed to gain entry to 
the disaster site.
The same day, April 13, MRL reported that “We have negotiated an entry plan for 
the NTSB, the EPA and the Coast Guard. By the afternoon meeting a permanent 
decontamination station was added on site “at the request of the EPA.” At that meeting it 
was also mentioned that EPA had requested to review the plan for off-loading the 
remaining chlorine, and the Coast Guard had requested to be present throughout the 
operation. The response from MRL was: “It was noted we need to limit the total number 
of personnel on site. It was decided to allow the USCG and EPA 15 minutes on site to
Technical Group Meeting Notes. 4/12/96 1800 hours. Appendix A.
^  The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was present to determine the causes 
of the derailment. The agency was kept off-site for three days while MRL moved and 
removed the train cars and track. During these operations (which should have been a 
focus of EPA investigation), MRL also moved soil and began “clean-up” of the 
contaminated site.
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view the operations. They may be allowed in more than once but only in 15 minute 
windows.”®’
After one, or perhaps several, fifteen minute trips to the derailment site, Chris 
Weis, EPA Region VIII toxicologist, somehow felt confident asserting to evacuees that 
“It is very safe to re-enter the areas [for pet rescues and early return for residents farthest 
from the derailment site] with respect to residual chemicals. We think your home is 
safe.”*® Although EPA had only gained access to the site that day and then only for a 
fifteen minute period, the agency personnel had found a dead body and requested 
additional testing of the chemicals spilled to ascertain health and safety risks. Despite the 
stark contrast between EPA’s and MRL’s thoroughness and priorities on site, it is unclear 
why EPA did not inform spill victims that key information was yet to be uncovered and 
disclosed. Instead, EPA echoed MRL’s statements regarding the status of the site.
The next day, MRL stated that they “negotiated with EPA for entry and revision 
of site operations... The EPA will be included in the meeting from now on. He will not be 
a speaking member, he’s just here to listening (sic).”®® In the intervening three days 
before EPA’s entry damage had been done, some of it permanently affecting victims 
ability to gain information regarding their chemical exposure and likely health effects. 
Even after EPA was “allowed” on site to listen in on meetings, damage to public health 
and safety continued.
®’ Technical Group Meeting Notes. 4/14/96 1800 hours. Appendix A.
®* Evacuee Meeting Notes. 4/14/96. Appendix A.
*® Technical Group Meeting Notes. 4/15/96. 1300 and 1800 hours. Appendix A.
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The reasoning behind EPA's acceptance of MRL's edict that no governmental 
agencies be allowed on site until it allowed remains unclear. EPA had authority under 
CERCLA (the Superfund law) to enter the private property site, as it was the source of an 
offsite risk to human health and safety. Why they stood aside and allowed the responsible 
company full control over the site, testing, and information release for the critical first 
four days o f the incident is a question that remains unanswered to this day. The 
repercussions of that decision, however, prejudiced the entire incident and adversely 
affected victims of the derailment. The prime example o f EPA’s failure to assert control 
and resulting impact on human health and safety is found in the “pet rescues”.
Pet Rescues: Undisclosed Danger, Devastating Impacts
Montana Rail Link and government officials decided, based on incomplete 
information, to allow residents back into the evacuated zone for the now infamous pet 
rescues as early as April 13. “Alberton residents were allowed to temporarily re-enter 
their homes to get personal belongs (sic) and to feed their animals ...Prior to these 
temporary re-entries, chlorine concentrations were not detected by START in Alberton 
above background concentrations.”^  The decision to allow already injured residents to 
re-enter an area contaminated with still unknown chemicals which had only been tested 
for chlorine residues, had lasting repercussions. The pet rescues provided the first source
*«URS, 1996.
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of information about conditions in the impacted zone from people other than Montana 
Rail Link and their employees. As a result, the pet rescues played a significant and 
pivotal role in galvanizing government interest in the other chemical spilled on site.
The first pet rescue took place on April 13 '̂, and approximately 50-60 people 
participated. The second time people were allowed in was on April 15^, for a livestock 
feeding. People were again allowed to feed their animals on April 17^ and livestock 
feeding continued throughout the evacuation.
Despite the non-detection of chlorine by the EPA at the time of the pet rescues, a 
number o f people not exposed to the initial cloud entered Alberton to feed animals and 
became severely ill afterward. The pet rescuers reported “pesticide-like” odors and 
developed symptoms similar to those which evacuees were suffering, all in the absence 
o f exposure to chlorine. For example, one man who was not initially exposed by the 
derailment went on the pet rescue to remove his father's livestock from the hot zone and 
developed symptoms consistent with those o f evacuees.^' Some residents who had been 
exposed to the initial cloud and evacuated, re-entered and were further exposed and 
injured during the pet rescues.^^ The pet rescuers were allowed officially onto their 
properties for only five minutes (for pet owners) or half an hour (for ranchers). In reality, 
recent evacuees and previously non-exposed people were in the exclusion zone for many 
hours on board a school bus as it stopped at each residence.^^
According to the personal accounts o f evacuees, the pet rescues did not proceed
Pers. Comm, ACCEH, 1998.
’̂ ACCEH and King, 1997
” Lisa Mosca, 1997. Interview with Paul Lodge, Alberton, MT.
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as the official record indicates. Many people refused to sign a release saying MRL was 
not responsible if they got sick or died as a result o f going back to rescue their pets, while 
some were not asked to sign a release at all.^ The vital importance o f the pet rescues 
turned out to be the symptoms caused by re-entry to the contaminated zone at times when 
chlorine levels were safe for human exposure provided the first evidence that chemicals 
other than chlorine were present and at levels which made people ill. The dramatic 
difference between MRL’s version of conditions at the site, and the actual situation as 
experienced by the pet rescuers set into motion a search for answers and accountability 
that continues to this day.
Company Control and Effect on Information Disclosttre
Montana Rail Link was able to assert full control o f the incident and arrange the 
information regarding chemicals and health threats in a disingenuously benign manner. 
This initial tide of company public relations about chlorine and minimal health effects 
was difficult to turn, even when clear evidence o f additional information and illness 
became obvious to MRL and agency officials.
The gaps in the information made available to victims and the public at large can 
be attributed to several areas of non-disclosure. First, Montana Rail Link controlled the 
scene exclusively from April 11-April 14, 1996. Two members o f the Missoula 
Hazardous Materials Team were the first people on site following 911 notification. Soon 
after their arrival, Montana Rail Link employees arrived and asked the HazMat Team
^  Pers. Comm. ACCEH, 1997.
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members to leave the site.’  ̂ From that point on, the highly trained and experienced team 
members would be asked only to man the evacuation roadblock entry points. The 
HazMat team, USCG, EPA and others blocked from entering the site, would have, as a 
matter o f process, immediately taken samples to identify the chemicals spilled in order to 
protect their own health and safety as well as the public’s. On the site controlled by MRL 
there were instances of workers not wearing protective gear, presumably because they 
were told that risk from the chlorine was minimal and that the other chemicals were of 
little concern due to MRL’s ongoing position that no movement o f chemicals other than 
chlorine had taken place. In fact, responders and workers were most at risk from the 
potassium cresylate and its reactants with chlorine, but there is no evidence that MRL 
informed its employees and contractors of such dangers.
Even after Montana Rail Link allowed federal agencies on site in a limited 
capacity, the company remained in control by virtue of having “set the scene” in the first 
four days and by exerting pressure on Incident Command, agencies and individuals. This 
control was pervasive, but not always explicit. The agencies responsible for making 
decisions regarding public health and safety were not provided with accurate and 
complete information during the critical first four days of the incident. During this time 
plans were made and themes and atmospheres set. Once better information was 
available, the agencies failed to assert their autonomy by questioning many of the 
assumptions established in the first four days. This failure allowed many of MRL's 
“omissions’* to carry the day. Coupled with the company’s tight control of the scene and
Pers. Comm. 9/99. LEPC/HazMat team meeting. Missoula Rural Fire District station.
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public relations, this prevented victims from knowing the full story and having the ability 
to make informed decisions in their best interest. Moreover, evacuees were depending on 
MRL for temporary housing, food and medicine, and responders, many Alberton 
residents, were earning big money through the emergency. This all added to the feeling 
MRL that was “taking care” o f everyone.
Both the company and the agencies are at fault in varying ways. A crucial 
difference is that government agencies should not have expected a company to put 
people above profits and provide information which could jeopardize them in the 
inevitable onslaught o f lawsuits (for which they were already preparing, despite their 
public relations plea for "neighborly resolution” o f the problem). But the spill victims did 
expect the governmental agencies to defend the public interest and not surrender to 
business interests.
The failure of EPA to press Montana Rail Link for full disclosure became more 
apparent as the health effects of chemicals other than chlorine manifested themselves, 
and as the facts of the incident grew beyond the fiction of chlorine-only the agencies and 
MRL stubbornly clung to. The symptoms experienced by the pet rescuers, and their 
reports o f pesticide and chemical smells when no chlorine was detectable in the area, 
forced the agencies to address the question o f “the other chemicals”.
“Alberton Syndrome '. MRL and Agencies Confronted by Symptoms not Attributable to 
Chlorine
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Classic, acute chlorine symptoms can be categorized as respiratory, dermal and 
ocular. These symptoms were acknowledged by the agencies, company and medical 
professionals involved. Long-term symptoms of extensive exposure to chlorine include 
neurological effects, corrosion of tooth enamel and damage to other systems.^ None of 
the long-term health effects of chlorine were disclosed to victims, and no health effects, 
short or long-term, resulting from exposure to the other chemicals and synergistic effects 
were discussed. Spill victims became dubious when their own bodies told them 
something different from the “experts” in charge.
The divergence between victims’ health and officially sanctioned symptoms 
occurred early on, as did official denial of the problems. On April 14 at the second 
meeting for evacuees with Incident Command, Ellen Leahy, Director o f the Missoula 
City-County Health Department reassured victims: “We have been testing since the first 
release. Everything is okay. If  you find anything questionable, please call.” This 
indication o f official confidence came after 50-60 people had entered the site for pet 
rescues and as countless more were preparing. The confidence was misplaced, for at this 
point neither MCCHD nor EPA had any test results on chemicals other than chlorine. At
^  Dr. Kaye Kilbum is one of the few researchers who has investigated non-classic effects 
o f chlorine exposure. He has followed workers and citizens exposed in industrial and 
transportation accidents. His work indicates that neurological effects can occur, along 
with a suite o f other health effects. These have yet to accepted by the mainstream 
medical community, in large part because the responsible companies have no interest in 
funding such studies and government agencies fail to follow through on their own. This 
is exactly what happened in Alberton. Dr. Kilbum offered MRL and the agencies his 
services to study the exposed victims o f the second largest chlorine release in U.S. 
history. He was refused, and later did his research as an expert witness for a plaintiffs’ 
attorney.
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the meeting, an evacuee stated “My wife has been having reactions.” The answer came
that there was “[n]o evidence of exposure that would lead to long term health problems.”
Dr. Walt Peschel, a local physician treating his first chlorine exposure victims, added that
“Chlorine is very toxic, can cause tissue damage. Long exposure might have long term
respiratory problems.
The next day the newspaper reported that residents of outlying areas given
permission to return home weren’t going because “there are just too many unanswered
questions.” ®̂ Resident Jamie Becker raised concerns about the potassium cresylate
(which had not yet been officially properly named or described to victims). The
Missoulian newspaper described her concerns;
“All o f the materials that were in that other car, that they don’t want to 
talk about”, Becker said, referring to a tank o f material railroad officials 
are calling a “caustic” substance. “We have no idea what’s in it, Becker 
said. “I don’t want to be asking about one thing if  the problem is 
something else.” Becker ended by stating concern for the responders on 
the scene, “I think they’re exposing themselves to things they don’t even 
know about.
No answers were given, but officials asked evacuees who had entered for pet 
rescues to contact them if  they had any health problems as a result. Evacuees who had re­
entered for pet rescues were now told that the officials—who had failed to supply them 
necessary information regarding health risks prior to re-entry—were suddenly interested
Evacuee Meeting Notes, 4/14/96.
Missoulian. Evacuated families staying put. 4/15/96.
^M issoulian. Evacuated families staying put. 4/15/96. Note: Jamie Becker died of 
cancer the summer o f 2001. Neighbors on her road who have also died since the spill 
include: Forrest Tolker, Ron Stone and Naomi James. A cancer cluster is being 
investigated by the Montana State Health Department after repeated requests by area 
residents.
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in any health problems they may have had as a result. At the April 16 evacuee meeting 
the questions increased. People from outside of the evacuation zone reported health 
problems and described symptoms of house guests who had arrived after the initial 
release. One evacuee requested a “notarized statement declaring the home free from any 
chemicals in order to rent or sell the house in the future.” A request was made that 
workers cleaning up the site not bring their work equipment and clothes back into their 
hotels, the same ones where injured evacuees also were staying.
The main line of questioning at the meeting challenged the officials’ assertion 
that there were no chemicals on site and nothing to detect. This statement was based on 
monitoring for chlorine released during the patching o f the leaking tank car and pH 
testing o f soils and water for evidence o f chlorine-caused acidification. Yet chlorine 
spikes were becoming less frequent and had not occurred while pet rescuers were in the 
area. Nevertheless, people had smelled and reacted adversely to chemicals. One evacuee 
said “You say there is nothing detectable- you need to adjust to people’s reaction”. 
Another added “Who should we listen to, monitors or people? The nose is sensitive and 
we smell gas.” Another evacuee said “ I live in the middle o f Alberton and go in for 
livestock feeding...people are having reactions. Is there a buildup effect-should we go 
back in?”‘®'
The EPA toxicologist, Chris Weis, answered “You are more sensitive after 
exposure, after a period o f time sensitivity does disappear.” He said it could take six to
Evacuee Meeting Notes, April 16, 1996. Appendix A. 
Evacuee Meeting Notes, April 16, 1996. Appendix A.
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eight weeks for the sensitivity to subside. The injured evacuee, dissatisfied, pressed on. 
“Should you go back in for livestock feeding if  you have a reaction?” Finally, another 
official on the panel answered “If you have a reaction, no.”
Another pet rescuer said that after he/she “returned to the area-[I] was forced to 
return to the hospital-[this] does not match the monitor.” After that statement, another 
evacuee observed “My nose is a better indicator than a monitor.” To this, Weis answered 
that just because something is smelled does not mean that it is dangerous. On this day, a 
full six days after the derailment, three days after the first evacuees were allowed to re­
enter the contaminated area to feed pets and livestock, issues that EPA and other officials 
should have pursued and addressed immediately were raised by victims: “Can other 
chemicals be produced?”; “Were there any fires at the site?” “Can chlorine cause 
permanent lung damage?” “What was in the box cars next to the tankers?” “What do skin 
irritations look like? My animal did not want to brushed.”
The meeting ended with a pointed question that clearly demonstrated victims’ 
frustrations, fears and need for honest, timely information: “If you had a family, would 
you move back into the [hot] zone after the incident is over?” The MRL official present 
at the meeting quickly answered “Yes” .
The April 16 newspaper again featured EPA toxicologist Chris Weis‘°̂  
reassuring victims: “Once any chlorine clouds move out of the area, there will be no 
residual chemical left in your soil or your water that we are concerned about.” Again, this
Evacuee Meeting Notes, April 16, 1996. Appendix A.
Chris Weis was not part of Incident Command. He addressed residents’ concerns from 
the audience, not from the podium.
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statement was made in the absence of test results from soils at or around the derailment 
site or any information regarding chemicals other than chlorine. On April 17, victims had 
more questions. “What do we know about long term effects?” “Does chlorine exposure 
knock you down, make you lose consciousness”. The answer; No. “I was knocked down 
twice after exposure. This is not classic from chlorine exposure.” No response was given 
and the meeting moved on to a discussion o f roadblocks and re-entry. Ellen Leahy, 
Director o f the Health Department advised “If you are experiencing any problems or have 
any concerns, we encourage you to consult your physician.” The last question: “The off- 
gassing coming out o f the ground? Is that what the smell is? Should we be concerned?”'^  
No answer was given and no information provided to evacuees that would assist the 
physicians they would call upon to diagnose and treat their symptoms.
Finally, on April 19, eight days after the chemical spill. Health Department Ellen Leahy
told evacuees that the officials:
believe that you smell something. We don’t have answers yet, but we are 
working on it. We have contacted Garon Smith [University o f Montana 
Professor o f Chemistry]. We are attempting to find what the smell is. We 
are in the assessment phase to determine the chemicals on site. We are 
testing the soils, water and air. The DEQ, EPA and local health 
department are working on it. The results will be public information.
A full week after the derailment, the local, state and federal agencies responsible
for protecting human health and the environment told the injured public that they finally
would do their job. This constituted a terrible irony for spill victims, whose bodies
Evacuee Meeting Notes. 4/17/96. Appendix A. 
Evacuee Meeting Notes. 4/18/96. Appendix A.
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provided the evidence that forced these agencies into action; whose sickness and outrage 
forced the agencies, for the first time, to question Montana Rail Link’s information. Later 
the same day, victims were told for the first time exactly what three chemical products 
had spilled. The next question was “What by-products can be produced? Are the 
chemicals being analyzed. We need a chemist to explain ’’ Another evacuated resident 
who had re-entered for pet rescues, reported that trees were browning on their road. EPA 
noted that a plant specialist was being brought in, despite having earlier stated that there 
was no damage to area vegetation.
Protecting Public Health: Conflicting Mandates. Mounting Pressures
The public officials found themselves in charge of a situation spinning quickly 
out of control. Victims were experiencing unexpected health symptoms, which had 
forced officials to admit publicly that they did not know the extent o f chemicals involved 
and that no testing had been done to determine the most basic information regarding 
chemical content and interaction. At the same time, Montana Rail Link continued to 
focus only on chlorine and put pressure on everyone involved to get the clean-up job 
done and people back into their homes. Not only was the incident a public relations 
nightmare for MRL, but each day the tracks were closed was costing the company 
considerable profit. In addition, traffic on Interstate 90 was detoured about 200 miles 
onto a two-lane highway during the evacuation to prevent exposure to motorists. On 
April 19, a Department o f Transportation official followed up on Ellen Leahy’s
An initial study o f damage to vegetation was conducted by Meikle and lanson for 
Bitterroot Restoration, Inc. Additional research was done by University of Montana PhD 
student Marten Schroeder.
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presentation about the need to determine other chemical risks by stating; “We also need 
the information on the threat o f the chemical [potassium cresylate/chlorine reactants].
We also have a life threatening potential with a detour o f 1-90. The threat o f both will 
have to be weighed.” '®̂
Spill victims were on the verge o f getting important questions answered, but the 
odds were stacked against them. Public officials from EPA and the Missoula City-County 
Health Department were attempting to find answers, but only after a week o f delay and 
deference to Montana Rail Link. Full investigation and disclosure o f critical information 
to the public would require the health agencies to stand up to MRL and its allies with the 
clear statement: “Stop. We need to start over and do it right.”
Such a reversal proved impossible. EPA, MCCHD and DEQ had deferred to 
MRL, and in doing, had lost valuable time, information, and, apparently, backbone. The 
agencies had every right and responsibility to halt the re-entry indefinitely, continue the I- 
90 detour, and assert control o f the site until they could ensure that citizens were 
protected. Instead, the agencies ventured halfway down this path, found no easy answers, 
and then succumbed to pressures and allowed the status quo to continue. The best time 
for the agencies to have turned the course of this incident was at this time: few data were 
in, evacuees were clamoring for valid information, and the public would have supported 
the agencies on the side o f precaution. The time was ripe for the agencies to conduct a 
thorough, scientific and unbiased analysis o f what happened and what health impacts to 
spill victims were likely.
Incident Command Notes. 4/19/96. Noon. Appendix A.
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Alberton was a scientific and medical mystery begging for a qualified sleuth to 
solve it. It was a perfect time to undertake an unbiased, scientific analysis of what was 
spilled, what could have reacted with what, what products could have been formed, what 
could have been in the initial cloud, what was still present on site, what was causing 
health symptoms and what long-term health effects were possible. A thorough analysis 
of the data collected and additional analyses would have allowed extrapolation to re­
create the initial cloud the morning of April 11 and the chemical reactions that occurred 
then and afterwards. This type and specificity o f information was necessary to answer 
questions regarding ongoing symptoms and long-term health effects. One can only 
surmise that countless toxicologists and chemists would have welcomed the opportunity 
to solve such a mystery and provide the affected populace with answers to questions 
about what they were exposed to, at what levels, and what health effects could be 
expected in the future. Unfortunately, no such expert investigators were given the 
opportunity. The mystery was left unsolved.
Once EPA, MCCHD and DEQ chose to forgo the opportunity to do right by the 
Alberton victims, their only choice was to revert back to the status quo as developed by 
Montana Rail Link during that first week and defend it to the end. Any indication o f a 
mistake or omission could be the fissure that would send the intricate wall of their 
defense crumbling. The potential for fissures was great as the information regarding 
potassium cresylate reactions with chlorine (upon which decisions for re-entry were 
based) was shown to be incomplete and additional chemicals were shown to be risks to 
human health.
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Non-Disclosed Chemicals: 2,4,5 & 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol, Benzene, Toluene and Xylene
On April 15 it was reported at the 1 ;00 PM Technical Group Meeting that two 
boxcars were pulled out o f way near the leaking chlorine car. “A yellow substance was 
observed on the end of the boxcars which looks like a reaction to the chlorine.” On April 
18, the Technical Group reported that the soil around chlorine tanker #3 was yellow. This 
substance was likely 2, 4, 6- Trichlorophenol, a chemical that appears as a yellow solid.
It has a strong, sweet smell with an odor threshold o f .0026 ppm in air and .30 ppm in 
water. It is produced when chlorine is added to phenol in the presence of aluminum 
chloride catalyst. Production of chlorophenols is known to produce highly toxic 
polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins (PCDDs). The amount o f contaminants formed is 
dependent upon the temperature and pressure o f the chlorination reaction, as well as 
which solvents and catalysts were used. TCDDs (dioxins) also have been reported as 
byproducts o f trichlorophenol p ro d u ctio n .P ro d u c tio n  o f 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol was 
discontinued in 1975 because o f the prohibitive costs o f removing its toxic dioxin 
impurities.
Trichlorophenol is primarily present in the atmosphere as a gas and can be 
significantly removed by dissolution in rain. It appears to bioaccumulate in fish and
Dioxins, by-products o f chlorine chemistry, are widely considered most toxic 
chemical known. See Dying from  Dioxin. Lois Gibbs et al for a full treatment of dioxin 
health effects, chemistry, sources, and campaigns to eliminate them. See Our Stolen 
Future by Theo Colburn et al. for a treatment of organochlorines, dioxins and other 
hormone mimicking chemicals.
The EPA reportable quantity regulations require that a spill o f 10 pounds or more of
2,4,6-Trichlorophenol be reported to the Federal Government National Response Center. 
No estimates o f the total release was ever provided, despite the visual evidence of a 
yellow solid on the site.
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invertebrates. Although the compound is readily metabolized by fish and eliminated in
the feces and urine, it has been detected in the tissues of fish-eating eagles and may have
some potential to accumulate in food chains.*'®
2,4,6-Trichlorophenol was detected April 20 in the potassium cresylate spilled at
levels o f 183 ppm*" 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol was not detected at the Alberton site in areas
of air deposition by the cloud in tests conducted nine to fifteen days after the release.
These results are not surprising. Trichlorophenol can evaporate into the air. Sunlight
changes it into other chemicals within 1 day to 3 weeks. As a solid it breaks down
quickly-in one to nine days— with the help of bacteria. **̂
ATSDR reports that they:
do not know what happens to 2,4,6 in the body after you breathe this 
chemical or get it directly on your skin....Cancer occurs in animals after 
continued long-term oral exposure to 2,4,6. 2,4,6 has not been studied to 
determine if it causes birth defects, but 2,4,6 has been shown in animals to 
cause lowered body weight in newborns and a decrease in the number of 
offsprings. The health effects resulting from short and long-term exposure 
o f humans to air containing specific levels o f 2,4,6 are not known. **̂
Commonly, with diagnosing exposure to toxic chemicals early detection is the
key. Since disclosure o f its presence on the Alberton site came with the assurance that no
exposure had occurred, victims were not directed to take advantage of an available test
that can measure the amount of 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol in blood. ATSDR points out that
“Soon after exposure occurs, 2,4,6 enters the blood. Much of the 2,4,6 can leave the
ATSDR. 1990.Toxicological Profile for 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol. U.S. Department of 
Health & Human Services Public Health Service, TP-90-28.
"* E n e rg y  Labs. Semi-Volatile Organics Analysis Report. May 7, 1996. Billings, MT. 
"Hd.
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blood and the body very quickly (within hours or days), so the test should be done as 
soon as possible after exposure occurs.” Trace amounts of 2,4,6 can be detected in 
biological samples such as urine, semen, whole blood, serum and adipose tissue.
In epidemiological terms, the Alberton release was extremely rare. Particularly, if 
trichlorophenol was inhaled because in the US only "about 5% of known releases of 
trichlorophenols were to the atmosphere.” ATSDR stated that "More information on 
exposure levels for the general population, as well as populations living in the vicinity of 
hazardous waste sites, would be useful.” The opportunity to gain important, unusual 
data from the exposed populace in Alberton was lost when health officials discounted 
potential health impacts o f 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol and, instead, focused solely on 
chlorine.
Benzene, toluene, xylene and other components o f the potassium cresylate 
mixture of oil refinery waste were also detected on and off site. Exposure to these 
compounds alone can lead to serious health effects; in conjunction with exposure to 
chlorine and chlorinated phenols, the possibilities for negative impacts to health are 
enormous.
Benzene...is a colorless liquid with a sweet odor. Benzene evaporates into 
air very quickly, dissolves slightly in water, and is highly flammable. Most 
people can begin to smell benzene in air at 1.5-4.7ppm. Brief exposure (5- 
10 minutes) to very high levels of benzene in air (10,000-20,000ppm) can 
result in death. Lower levels (700-3000ppm) can cause drowsiness.
ATSDR. 1990.Toxicological Profile for 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol. U.S. Department of 
Health & Human Services Public Health Service, TP-90-28.
"‘ATSDR. 1990.Toxicological Profile for 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol. U.S. Department of 
Health & Human Services Public Health Service.
"*URS, 1996.
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dizziness, rapid heart rate, headaches, tremors, confusion and 
unconsciousness. In most cases, people will stop feeling these effects 
when they stop being exposed and begin to breathe fresh air.
Following acute inhalation of benzene, humans exhibit symptoms 
indicative o f central nervous system effects. These symptoms, reported to 
occur at levels ranging form 300 to 3000 ppm included drowsiness, 
dizziness, headache, vertigo, tremor, delirium, and loss o f consciousness.
These symptoms are similar to the consequences of exposure to multiple 
organic solvents (sic) are reversible when symptomatic workers are 
transferred from the problem area.. .Chronic exposure to benzene has been 
reported to produce neurological abnormalities in humans...[Those with] 
chronic exposure to benzene and toluene....complained o f frequent 
headaches, became tired easily, had difficulties sleeping, and complained 
of memory loss. Data on the reproductive effects of occupation exposure 
to benzene suggest that benzene may impair fertility in women.
Damage to both the humoral and cellular components of the immune 
system has been known to occur in humans following inhalation exposure.
This is manifested by decreased levels of antibodies and decreased levels 
of leukocytes in workers. Many epidemiological and case studies correlate 
benzene exposure with leukemia. These studies indicate that benzene is 
carcinogenic."^
Thus, victims o f Montana Rail Link’s toxic spill were exposed to a panoply o f 
toxic chemicals which went undisclosed and untested for, on the site and in victims’ 
bodies. In the meantime, Montana Rail Link and government officials continued to assert 
that chlorine was the only danger to public health and safety.
Potassium Cresylate and The Myth o f  “Chlorine Only”
Any release of potassium cresylate over 1,000 pounds above this must by law, be
reported to the National Response Center.'" 17,000 gallons, which is 
equivalent to 255,000 pounds, o f the potassium cresylate spilled at 
Alberton. It appears that Montana Rail Link did not comply with the 
federal reporting law and report the potassium cresylate release to the
ATSDR. 1995.Toxicological Profile for Benzene (Draft for Public Comment). 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act.
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National Response Center."*
From this inauspicious beginning, potassium cresylate presented a series of problems to 
officials and victims, most o f which have yet to be resolved. First, government officials 
knew little about potassium cresylate for the first seven days o f the incident calling it by 
several different names with a variety of spellings ranging from “caustic solution”to 
“cresylic sodium” to “potassium chiysilate”." ’ These discrepancies served only to 
confuse spill victims and obfuscate the true nature and dangers o f potassium cresylate. 
Montana Rail Link failed to educate agency officials, responders, and victims about the 
nature of their chemical cargo. The railroad company prevented disclosure concerning the 
dangers of potassium cresylate to victims by insuring that government officials knew 
nothing about it.
The lack o f accurate disclosure on the part o f the company, and failure to question and 
dig for answers on the part o f the officials and responders, placed already exposed spill victims 
at further risk in two ways. First, basic information was not shared with spill victims, thereby 
preventing them from knowing exactly what chemicals they had been exposed to at what levels 
and the concomitant health risks. Second, the spilled potassium cresylate was injected with 
chlorine gas the morning o f the derailment, leading to the formation o f additional toxic 
compounds. It is this chemical reaction and its toxic by-products which would ultimately
"* See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion o f the non-profit organization Cold 
Mountain, Cold Rivers’ lawsuit alleging failure to report potassium cresylate and MRL’s 
response.
See media accounts. Technical Committee Meeting Notes and Evacuee Meeting 
Notes, 4/11/96-4/18/96. Appendix A.
This is apparent from the physical proximity of Tanker Car #3 and the potassium 
cresylate car. Professor Garon Smith concurred with this in a video interview with Lisa
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overshadow the chlorine exposure and raise many questions which remain unanswered to this 
day.
Despite the mixed chemical nature of the spill, it was publicly portrayed as a “chlorine
only” event. The evacuation to protect human health and safety was initially ascribed only to
dangers from chlorine, and remained so even when impacts from the other chemicals became
evident. M ontana Rail Link's contractor, Olympus Environmental, Inc., described the officially
sanctioned health threats and protective measures taken in this way:
[P]otential health threats presented by the chlorine resulted in an evacuation order 
from the Health Department on April 11, 1996 for the area located between 
Interstate 90 mile marker 70 (west) to mile marker 82 (east). On April 14, 1996, 
the Health Department reduced the evacuation area to Interstate 90 mile marker 70 
(west) to the Petty Creek Bridge (east). On April 24, 1996 the Health 
Departm ent reduced the evacuation zone to areas adjacent to the derailment site 
along Plateau Road. By 9:00 am April 28, 1996 the Health Department ended the 
evacuation order entirely.
In reality, M ontana Rail Link knew that the potassium cresylate tank car had 
dumped nearly its entire load into the ditch along the tracks, and that almost a full tanker 
load o f  chlorine gas had been released directly onto the cresylate. MRL was also aware of 
the components o f the cresylate, that it was a spent waste product containing phenols, 
cresols, and possibly dioxins. Montana Rail Link’s sister company and environmental 
contractor, Envirocon, was on site April 12th, collecting samples o f the potassium 
cresylate stained soil, which the company stated it tested only for elevated pH. MRL 
and Envirocon should have suspected that a chemical reaction with the chlorine had
Mosca..
Olympus Environmental Inc., 1996.
>22 Technical Team Notes, A!\2l9(i.Appendix A.
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created semi-volatile by-product chemicals as early as the 12th o f  April, but the company 
informed no one o f  this possibility and, in fact, allowed residents to enter the hot zone the 
very next day, April 13th, for a pet rescue.
On April 12th and 13th evacuees were told at the daily briefings that they were 
only out o f  their honies to protect them from an accidental chlorine release while the 
technical teams transferred the chlorine product from the ruptured tanker cars offsite. 
Otherwise, it was declared safe inside the evacuation zone, and only very low levels of 
chlorine were being detected in residential areas. It seems likely that the emergency 
responders were being told the same thing, after all, they were only equipped with 
chlorine monitors.
The myth o f “chlorine only” pervaded the entire incident and aftermath. Evacuees 
were told that the only reason for the evacuation after the initial cloud dispersed was due 
to a risk o f another release o f  chlorine during the offloading and cleanup. Because o f this 
explanation, residents clamored to be allowed home, at least for long enough to attend to 
pets and livestock. Officials did not emphasize the enormity o f the health risk of another 
chlorine exposure to people recently exposed, nor did they disclose the potential dangers 
presented by the two other chemicals and chemical by-products when they became aware 
o f such dangers.
Spill Victims: Canaries in a Toxic Zone
123 Evacuee Meeting Notes, 4/12/96 and 4/13/96. Appendix A.
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The sequence o f cause and effect at Alberton was tragically inverted. Spill victims 
were the canaries-they were sent back into the Hot Zone, exposed to unknown additional 
chemicals and reactants, and developed symptoms. The existence and veracity o f these 
new  symptoms was ignored by the agencies and MRL, until ignorance became impossible. 
Then, victim s’ symptoms were the reason for additional testing to determine the chemical 
composition o f  the spill, resulting reactions and assessing migration.
Evacuees trusted the information provided until their bodies demonstrated the 
falseness o f  that information. Once victims realized this, based on their suite o f symptoms 
and the apparent causes and relief for them, they had to fight the agencies and MRL for 
legitimacy. Spill victims were at a serious disadvantage: their experiences and symptoms 
did not fit into the official assessment o f the incident. Altering the official line on the 
incident would require MRL to adm it culpability for more than chlorine impacts; 
government agencies to admit to a lack o f  oversight and engagement in determining what 
chemicals were spilled and potential health effects and capitulation to responsible 
company control over the incident. This is why nearly five years after the incident, victims 
remain organized into a community group and press on to get the facts about what 
happened to their health and their fam ilies’ health.
Potassium Cresylate Reactions with Chlorine: The Twisted Road to (Partial) Disclosure 
The chronology o f non-disclosure concerning potassium cresylate, its contents, 
and the results o f  its reactions with chlorine is astounding: officials charged with 
protecting the public knew nothing o f  this major spill component for the first four days o f
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the incident, and when they became aware o f the cresylate, they succumbed to pressures 
to move the cleanup and re-entiy plans forward at any cost. The initial impression given 
is that Garon Smith, Associate Professor o f  Chemistry at the University o f Montana, 
conducted the first analysis o f  the potassium cresylate stained soil and then shared those 
results with the public on April 19th. At that point it was disclosed that a reaction between 
the contents o f  the chlorine car and the potassium cresylate car had in fact occurred 
creating chlorinated compounds.
Smith became involved in the analysis o f  the spilled potassium cresylate through a 
request from the Missoula County Health Department on April 16th, 1996, the sixth day 
o f the incident. He immediately verified that ’’potassium cresylate" is a non-systematic 
name for potassium salt o f  the aromatic alcohol, cresol. Smith indicated he could provide 
analysis o f the potassium cresylate using gas chromatography and mass spectrometry 
(GC/MS). Olympus Environmental collected a soil sample from directly under the 
cresylate car and delivered it to Smith's lab the evening o f  April 17.
Dr. Smith's first GC/MS results, obtained on April 18, showed eight compounds 
before the potent sample overwhelmed the equipment, leading him to state that "[c]Iearly, 
chlorinated phenolic cross products had been formed from a combination o f chlorine and 
the aromatics in the cresylate tank car."‘̂  ̂He immediately contacted the Incident 
Command Post and alerted them to discoveiy. His recommendation to Incident Command 
and M ontana Rail Link was to cover the concentrated sludge with plastic to prevent
124 E v a c u e e  M eeting.,4/19/96.Appendix A.
:25 Garon Smith, 1996. Chlorine spill, narrative o f sample analysis and rationale for re­
entry criteria. Missoula, MT.
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infiltration o f rain from moving toxic compounds down into the soil toward ground water.
This recommendation was not carried out; the company did not feel it was feasible to 
cover the sludge because o f all the cleanup work in progress.
In a discussion with Olympus Environmental later in the day on 4/19/96, Smith 
learned that the "soil sample" had been pure product sludge collected from beneath the 
cresylate car. After cleaning out his laboratory equipment. Smith tested a less potent 
sample o f potassium cresylate sludge and identified a total thirty-five compounds in it, 
including an assortment o f  toxic chlorophenols.*^*
That afternoon. Smith gave a presentation at the Evacuee meeting. He discussed 
the behavior o f  these compounds in the environment and answered questions. He felt that 
once the initial chlorine venting had ended, there was little reason to expect the 
chlorinated phenols and cresols to move MRL makes no mention o f his information in 
their meeting notes for that day. Smith noted that a judgment could not be made if  the 
chlorinated phenols impacted the residents’ health till further testing was completed. He 
went on to state that "[tjhere is some possibility that the chemicals floated away from the 
derailment on water particles —either particles created by the release o f chlorine or in the 
light rain that was falling at the time."'^** When pressed, no public official ever disputed
Smith, 1996.
ACCEH, 1997. It is recommended in the Emergency Response Guidebook that 
personnel should not walk on potassium cresylate contaminated material; if  it is walked 
on, the Guidebook directs that shoes must be removed and left at the site at the end o f 
work.
‘2* Smith, 1996.
12» Technical Committee Meeting Notes, 4/19/96. Appendix A.
1% Missoulian, 4/20/96, Appendix A.
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the possibility that the initial cloud, which they consistently referred to as a “chlorine 
cloud”, might have been laden with myriad chlorinated phenols, cresols, benzene, toluene, 
xylene and other component o f  potassium cresylate and by-products o f its reaction with 
chlorine.
This assertion is impossible to prove based on the environmental monitoring; no 
testing o f the initial plume was ever done. All air monitoring after that morning which has 
been made available to the public was for chlorine only. The contents o f the cloud could 
have been ascertained from human and animal tests such as fat bioassays, blood serum 
testing, urine analyses and so on. No such tests were performed, despite evacuees 
demands that such information be collected.'^' If  such tests were performed on railroad 
employees or others, the results have never been made public. The basic, critical questions 
about which chemicals migrated in the cloud that morning remain unanswered, ignored by 
government officials, scientists, and industry.
Not only did officials silence the issue o f  what was in the original plume and never 
disclose or discuss it with evacuees, they quickly moved to a group agreement that there 
was no significant hazard from the products o f  the potassium cresylate/chlorine reactions 
despite incomplete test results, lingering questions and concerns. On the evening of April 
20, 1996, the Incident Command log states, "There will be a meeting with the doctors on
"I The community group, Alberton Community Evacuees (ACE), demanded additional 
testing. Individual evacuees also asked for the same information and attention during 
several evacuee meetings. These demands were denied by MRL and the agencies. Spill 
victims then reached out to independent scientists and medical professionals outside o f 
the Missoula-Alberton area to provide adequate testing and treatment. This issue will be 
addressed further in Chapter 3.
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site, the toxicologists, chemists, the Health Department, etc. It is the consensus that the 
compound is a  heavy mass and did not migrate far from the site—Chlorinated organics 
remain close to the site." This statement written by MRL makes it sound like the decision 
has already been made that the chemical did not migrate from the site on the basis o f 
consensus, rather than on the basis o f analysis, since most samples had not been analyzed 
yet.
While consensual decisions were being made concerning evacuees' health and 
welfare, data were still coming in. According to EPA notes, Envirocon tested the contents 
o f  the potassium cresylate car on April 20, 1996. The sample was not analyzed by Energy 
Labs until May 1st, 1996, three days after all evacuees were told it was safe to return 
home. 2,4,6- Trichlorophenol was detected at 183 ppm. The sample also tested positively 
for eight o f  the thirty five compounds that Garon Smith had previously identified in the 
cresylate sludge from under the tanker car. Had Energy Labs tested for all thirty-five of 
the known compounds previously identified in the potassium cresylate sludge by Smith’s 
lab, and thereby compared the contents o f the pure cresylate contained in the tanker with 
the composition o f the cresylate sludge exposed to chlorine, answers about exactly what 
was formed in the potassium cresylate/chlorine reaction would have been obtained. 
Unfortunately, this was not done and confusion lingered, as evidenced by Olympus 
Environm ental’s description o f potassium cresylate and reaction products with chlorine in 
their final report;
132 Energy Laboratories, Inc., 1996. EPA M ethod 8270: Semi-volatile organics analysis 
report.
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The potassium cresylate solution is a caustic solution (potassium 
hydroxide) containing a mix o f organic compounds, including various 
phenols and mercaptans. Some o f these compounds can cause adverse 
health effects above specific concentrations. In addition, analytical results 
o f  soil samples collected by Olympus at the spill site indicated that various 
chlorophenols were present in impacted soils at the derailment site. The 
chlorophenols may have originally been present in the potassium cresylate 
solution or they may have form ed when phenols from  the spent caustic 
potassium  cresylate solution reacted with the released gaseous chlorine.
There were concerns with the potential distribution o f these chemicals 
throughout the area, ‘̂ ^(emphasis added)
The problems created by the release o f the cresylate continued as residents who 
had returned for pet rescues were reporting a pesticide smell in the evacuated area and 
were experiencing symptoms not attributable to classic chlorine such as difficulty 
thinking, severe headaches, mouth sores, and more. At a Sunday morning meeting on 
April 21 including Chris Weis, EPA Region 8 toxicologist. Dr. Brown o f Missoula, Mike 
Sehestedt o f  the Missoula County Attorney's Office, and doctors from the Poison Control 
Center discussed criteria for allowing reentry to the evacuated area. A participant stated 
that "[t]he numerical values from the data would determine if  it was safe for humans to 
return to Alberton; or if  unable to obtain numerical values, it would be by consensus o f 
this group”. The meeting notes included a list o f symptoms, including headache and 
dizziness, reported by people re-entering the site. Ellen Leahy, Director o f the Missoula 
City/County Health Department wrote; "April 21, 1996, Sunday 9:00 am - 13 ppm 
trichlorophenol in air near tracks.""'* In direct contradiction to this is Olympus' statement 
in their final report: "No organic vapors were detected by the OVA, organic vapor
Olympus, 1996b.
Incident Command Team Log. April 21, 1996. Appendix A
67
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
monitor, on the derailment site or beyond the derailment site.”‘̂  ̂ The existence of 
conflicting information in the public record about air monitoring and the chlorinated 
compounds raises further doubt about the credibility o f contractors, agencies, MRL and 
the reporting o f  information to the unified command who was charged with making public 
health decisions.
Despite scanty and conflicting data, Ellen Leahy made a statement about this 
meeting later in the day to the Unified Command; "There was a two hour meeting Sunday 
morning. The decision was made to contain the odor and move some of the soil out... get 
the bulk out. The toxicologists feel there are true symptoms from the odor: nausea, 
headache." There is evidence o f dissension around the migration potential o f phenols,
prior to analysis o f all relevant data. EPA’s Steve Way stated: "I totally disagree that the 
compound migrated from the site." Someone else in the meeting commented: "To get the 
people back into their homes the issue o f  the ‘other chemical’ must be resolved There will 
be data to resolve the issue. The next day, on the 22nd, the Incident Command log 
reflects that Scott Waldron said, "The other issue is no threat."’̂ ®
Garon Smith met with the technical task force on April 22, 1996. At this point 
everyone was apparently in agreement that the chlorinated cross products did not migrate 
more than 200 feet from the site as evidenced by soil sampling available at that time. 
Smith, apparently abandoning his previous statement concerning the likelihood that the
136
Id.
13K Incident Command Log, 4/22/96.
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original plume contained chlorinated by-products, reported: "Even if  some trace levels 
dioxins were produced, again, they posed no risk to the residents' return because they 
would be restricted to the actual derailment site. We concurred, therefore, that the 
chlorinated cross products criteria for re-entry had been satisfied. Smith had earlier 
suggested that the cresylic tank be examined for pre-existing dioxin and furan ring 
assemblies. He noted that 3,4,6-trichloro-o-cresol was present and would form 2,3,7,8- 
TCDD if  dimerized. No dioxin testing was conducted on site or from samples taken 
inside the cresylate tank car, based upon a rationale designed by the EPA.
The conclusion that chlorinated phenols had not migrated from the site was based 
on soil analysis, though some soil samples collected had not been analyzed yet. In 
particular, two soil samples that are significant were not analyzed till May 1, 1996, after 
the residents were home. Olympus sampled the cresylate stained soil on site and found the 
following concentrations; 2-methylphenol detected at 7320 ppm, 4-methylphenol detected 
at 7190 ppm, phenol detected at 6010 ppm, 2,4,6-trichlorophenol detected at 599 ppm. 
These levels o f phenols and 2,4,6-trichlorophenol, specifically, are significantly higher 
than the levels which the evacuees were told about at the informational meetings. If these 
higher levels had been made public to the evacuees, as well as to the chemists who were 
relied upon for technical assistance, perhaps different conclusions would have been 
reached by evacuees and experts concerning the safety o f re-entry.
»» Incident Command Notes.4/24/96. Appendix A.
‘•“ Lisa Mosca. 1997. Video interview with Garon Smith, Missoula, MT. 
Olympus Environmental Inc., 1996b.
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The chemical reactions between chlorine and potassium cresylate created 
chlorophenols which were detected on site; when tests were conducted off site, many of 
the results came up 'non-detecf. These tests for volatile and semi-volatile compounds, 
however, were completed on April 20, 21 and 26: nine to 15 days after the release. The 
non-detect results have never been adequately explained to the concerned public nor have 
the following questions been satisfactorily answered. First, how likely is it that 
chlorophenol levels decreased (via volatilization) in the 9-15 days between air deposition 
and soil and wipe testing? It seems probable that deposition o f organic compounds from 
the cloud was not detected due to the delay in testing coupled with the intermittent rainy 
weather at the site. Second, how likely is it that inhalation o f those chlorophenols the 
morning o f evacuation and during subsequent re-exposures, including pet rescues and re­
entry, caused injury? Inhalation o f chlorinated organics carried in the plume was one route 
o f exposure, but the continued offgassing o f those air deposited organics inside and 
outside homes might have resulted in continued insult to already injured people. These 
questions are critically important to spill survivors confronted with a melange o f health 
effects which are not correlated with chlorine exposure effects as described by health 
officials.
The health risks from chlorinated phenols and original petroleum components of 
potassium cresylate, such as benzene, are enormous. Official refusal to concede publicly 
that exposure to more than chlorine occurred from inhalation o f the toxic plume and that 
chlorinated organic products continued to linger in the affected area denied residents the 
opportunity to understand potential risks and make decisions regarding their own health.
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Meanwhile, symptoms not attributable to chlorine continue to confound victims, health 
officials, and medical caregivers.
Early Return
The Nine Mile and Six Mile residents were allowed to return home on April 11th, 
despite reports from the Ninr Mile Valley o f health effects and chemical odors not 
attributable to chlorine alone. Ponderosa and Southside Road residents were allowed to go 
home on April 14th. No guarantee o f safety was given. Reports o f smells and chemical 
clouds/plumes continued for many weeks after the derailment from as far away as 
Missoula and Arlee. Some people were exposed to the chemical residue in their homes, in 
the outside environment, and from the accidental releases o f chlorine which took place 
through April 28th. After April 28th, people continued to be exposed to the potassium 
cresylate and its by-products, until it was moved on May 18th.
There were three distinct smells that people complained o f upon returning home. 
One was a sweet medicinal smell, one was a pesticide like smell (often described to smell 
like the commercial products, weed and feed, and Malathion), and the other was a 
chlorine smell. The pesticide-like smell remains detectable to many at present.
The O fficial"End" o f  the Incident. Just the Beginning fo r  Spill Victims
The official incident was declared over on April 28, 1996 when all residents 
except those with homes in the hot zone were allowed to return home. The chlorine was 
completely offloaded, presenting no risk o f further release. The potassium cresylate was
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in the process o f being excavated. This excavation exposed the heavily contaminated
soils to the air and, therefore, residents and others who drove by the derailment site. The
most heavily contaminated soils were to be shipped to a hazardous waste incinerator in
Texas, while the less contaminated were to be landfilled by Browning Ferris Industries in
Missoula. The contaminated soils shipped to Texas were contaminated at levels requiring
disposal under federal law. All o f the cresylate contaminated soils were still on site at
the time o f re-entry, April 28, 1996, against the Health Department’s recommendations to
Incident Command. None o f the previously exposed residents, however, were told that
they were moving home adjacent to a federal hazardous waste site.
Residents were allowed to return to their homes in the exclusion zone after 
the damaged chlorine cars were off-loaded or stabilized and the risk from 
contamination was evaluated (by the EPA regional toxicologist on scene 
and the Missoula City-County Health Department). Wipe and soil samples 
were collected in the town o f Alberton and near other residences, and 
analyzed to verify that chlorinated phenols contamination was not present.
Soil sampling and analysis revealed chlorinated phenols at the wreckage 
area and not beyond 2,500 feet. Analytical results have shown no evidence 
o f residual contaminants that pose a threat to the surrounding 
community.
The pressures brought to bear to end the incident proved stronger than the desire to 
precautionarily protect public health and safety. Criteria for allowing re-entry were 
devised by Incident Command under the guidance o f  the Health Department and selected 
“medical experts”
These criteria were developed under intense pressure to get people home as soon 
as possible. There was little patience for precaution and none for delay not clearly
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 42 U.S.C.A. §6951 et seq. 
i«URS, 1996.
72
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
necessitated by the chlorine monitors. Re-entry was encouraged but not mandatory for 
evacuated residents. Government officials and company spokespeople used the sheer 
number o f  tests done as an indication that all was well. MRL spokesperson said “Our 
position is basically... thus far, thousands o f tests have been performed.”*'*̂ The company 
went so far as to host a picnic next to the derailment site to welcome evacuees home. No 
cleaning or decontamination o f homes was provided. The official line was that everything 
was perfectly fine: all o f the chlorine had dissipated, and any that was left could be dealt 
with by airing out or cleaning surfaces with baking soda. Furthermore, crucial tests of 
potassium cresylate and the contaminated soils were outstanding; decisions were made 
despite pending lab results.
The removal o f  the potassium cresylate and the tanker cars, which occurred after 
re-entry was deemed safe by health officials, was another route o f  exposure according to 
numerous personal accounts. Ellen Leahy stated in reference to the scheduled 
potassium cresylate soil removal: "Some people won't smell it at all, and some people 
will, and some that will smell it will be bothered by it, and others won’t be. " People 
were more than "bothered by it", they were experiencing ill health effects due to exposure 
to potassium cresylate on top o f extremely high doses o f chlorine and other chemicals. 
Ellen Leahy had previously stated in the Incident Command log that these health effects
Appendix A, 4/27/96-4/29/96.
'45 jiPissoulian, 4/29/96. No more detour- last o f  evacuees allowed back into their homes. 
•■*4 Health and Environmental Information for People Returning to Alberton. 1996. 
Advisory fact sheet prepared by Missoula City-County Health Department and signed by 
the Incident Command Team.
a CCEH  and King, 1997,
'4* Missoulian, 5/14/96.
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were valid according to the toxicologists.*'*^
Yet prior to this, with the end o f the incident, all o f the agencies absolved 
themselves o f responsibility and publicly stated that everything was fine. The majority 
official opinion, that there had been no problem beyond chlorine in the evacuated area, set 
the stage for what was to happen in the aftermath; numerous complaints would be made 
concerning continuing contamination and illness but few would be believed or addressed 
by officials, because, under the official theme o f  the incident continuing ailments not 
attributable to chlorine simply were not possible. This adherence to the sheer 
impossibility o f  what residents were complaining o f made it easy for government officials 
to ignore and reject complaints as the psychosomatic, hypochondriacal rantings o f a 
radical minority which could be easily dismissed. For sickened residents, April 28, 1996 
marked not the end o f  the incident, but instead, the beginning o f a difficult battle to gain 
recognition o f their injuries and desperately needed assistance to address the variety of 
problems—medical, economic and social—stemming from the disaster.
Government officials created a web o f  non-accountability: the buck stopped 
nowhere. Everyone had another agency to invoke for each decision made, and decisions 
had been made jointly, so there really was no one to blame. This made it exceedingly 
difficult for evacuees to access information and assistance in their battle. They were 
passed along from agency to agency until finally, three years later, at the behest o f Sen. 
M ax Baucus, the EPA Ombudsman stepped in to reexamine the incident’s handling. The 
fact that officials clung so stubbornly to their version o f  the incident forced residents to
Incident Command Log, 4/21/96. Appendix A.
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fight for years to gain justice and official recognition that all was not well in Alberton and 
there was more to the story than respiratory effects from chlorine.
The next chapters examine the impacts that non-disclosure o f the chemicals 
involved and possible health effects had on the adequacy o f testing done on site, health 
care provided to victims, and handling o f the aftermath by the Montana Department of 
Environmental Quality.
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C h ap te r 2. Chem ical Testing: Risks and Results
By and large, people want to be told about potential risks.
Lay people are not stupid or irrational.
There are a number ways in which the experts fail, either deliberately or inadvertently, to 
inform the public. One is by not telling the whole story about the hazards they know best, 
because they fe a r  the information would make the public anxious, because dissemination 
is not their job, or because they have a vested interest in keeping things quiet.
In any toxic release event, environmental and health testing is conducted to 
determine what chemicals are present in humans, air, water and soil. Initial test results are 
analyzed to assess the situation and determine what further tests are required. Test results 
are powerful and considered the purest form o f unbiased data. Numbers are seen as 
holding the answer to our problems, and we are often instructed to trust numbers above all 
else, including our intuition, senses and best judgement.
Citizens are rarely warned, however, o f  the pitfalls associated with testing and 
numbers. The power o f  numbers rests on the credibility and political power o f the data 
gatherer. Citizens and advocacy groups are consistently accused o f having unreliable data 
that invariably is touched by politics and emotion. Industry numbers are critiqued by 
citizen advocates as skewed towards whatever results best serve the purpose o f that 
particular industry. Government numbers are often viewed with suspicion by both citizens 
and industry.
Many o f the problems seen in the Alberton situation revolve around issues of 
environmental and human health tests which either were or were not done. The decision 
not to test for something is a major decision which must be examined as thoroughly as
150 Fischoff, F; P. Slovic and S. Lichtenstein. 1982. Lay foibles and expert fables in 
judgm ents about risk. The American Statistician 36(3);240-255.
76
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
decisions to test and what to test for. Omissions are able to slip by quietly, while tests for
the wrong chemicals are often used to placate the public. A noteworthy characteristic of
the Alberton incident was the notion that "enough tests have been done”. Numbers were
thrown at the community without much explanation or justification. Then the sheer
numbers of'sam ples' or 'tests' were held up as proof that the area was safe. Ellen Leahy,
director o f  the Missoula City-County Health Department told victims “We have tested
2000 samples”. The total number o f tests was purported to indicate evidence o f safety,
even though the majority were pH tests to identify traces o f chlorine gas deposition,
Montana Rail Link’s spokesperson also relied on the number o f tests to assure safety and
marginalize community concerns:
"It's entirely safe for these people to return to their homes," said Lynda 
Frost, Montana Rail Link spokesman.(jzc) And although MRL, the local 
and state health departments and the Environmental Protection Agency say 
the area is now safe, a small group o f  residents says they just won't go 
back.. .None o f  the evacuees were forced to return to their homes this 
weekend. Frost said. MRL will continue to pay for their lodging, "we're 
willing to work with the group," she said....ACE wants an independent 
tester-and perhaps two separate labs-to perform tests on their homes an 
property, before they'll feel safe enough to return. "Our position is 
basically...thus far, thousands o f tests have been performed," Frost said.
Those tests have been analyzed and Alberton has been deemed safe for 
reentry.*®^
Who performs the testing is also important. The decision o f what not to test for is 
often made silently and with the intent o f  not being disclosed. At Alberton, Montana Rail 
Link and its sister company, Envirocon, and then its contractor, Olympus Environmental,
151 Evacuee Meeting Notes. 4/24/96. Appendix A.
152 j^iissoulian, 4/29/96.No more detour- last o f evacuees allowed back into their homes.
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Inc. controlled o f environmental sampling during the initial days o f the incident, April 11- 
14. By the tim e the EPA entered the hot zone on April 14, on-site remediation and 
assertions had been made by the EPA and county health department concerning health 
risks based solely on the MRL's testing. EPA’s Regional Toxicologist, Chris Weis stated 
on April 14 “It is very safe to re-enter the area with respect to residual chemicals. We 
think your home is safe. There is technical activity in the Hot Zone. The EPA is 
continually monitoring the activity. We have reviewed the evacuation plan. Things are in 
order”. E l l e n  Leahy, Director o f the Missoula City/County Health Department reassured 
evacuees "[w]e have been testing since the first release. Everything is okay. I f  you find 
anything questionable, please call.”’̂
No government agency publicly questioned reliance on MRL data, nor did they 
push the company to make improvements in testing or disclosure. Government officials, 
to the public at least, appeared to support the company entirely and advocate for the 
public only within the framework established by the company in the first few days of the 
incident.
E v a c u e e  Meeting Notes, 4/14/96. Appendix A. 
Id.
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The incident began with MRL on the scene with its subsidiary, Envirocon, doing 
environmental testing. Missoula Regional HazMat Team members were told to leave the 
site soon after their arrival on the morning o f April 11, 1996, before they could conduct
The E P A  perform ed quality assurance sampling. Sam ples that were collected by Olympus 
Environm ental w ere split w ith the EPA. The EPA  used Paragon Laboratories for analysis.
O lym pus E n v iro n m en ta l collected samples o f  soü, air, and water. Olympus used Energy 
Labs for analysis o f  the ir samples.
M a r in e  E n v iro n m en ta l perform ed m ost o f  the a ir m onitoring o f  chlorine and all o f  the 
air m onitoring for organic vapors. B ioSystem s provided the data loggers and probably 
analyzed the data. N o  report from  M arine Environm ental has ever been made available to 
the public.
E nv irocon  is a  subsidiary  o f  W ashington Corporation, as is MRL. There is no written 
report from  Envirocon in  the public record. Envirocon did the first on-site sampling, site 
clean up and rem ediation. Energy Labs did the analysis for Envirocon.
G a ro n  S m ith  is a  U niversity o f  M ontana Chem istry Professor and did testing o f  the 
potassium  cresylate contam inated soil from  sam ples provided by Olympus.
Figure 1. Overview O f  Primary Environmental Testing Contractors and Agencies.
sampling to determine contaminants o f concern. Marine Environmental was contracted by 
MRL to do air monitoring for chlorine and other chemicals. On April 13, 1996, Olympus 
Environmental, hired by MRL, began work. The EPA Region 8 toxicologist and risk 
assessor did not access the site until April 14, 1996. In the meantime, a variety of tests had 
been done by MRL's contractors and conveyed to the public as evidence that all was well at 
the site and in Alberton. Chlorine air monitoring and pH level testing were the dominant 
tests done and the only results made public in the initial days o f  the incident. Olympus took
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the lead and was the sole testing entity on site until the EPA arrived on April 14. In their
final report, released in June o f 1996, they describe their work this way:
The objectives o f the sampling program were to collect data that could be 
used to assess potential impacts to human health and the environment 
through contact with the released chemicals in the soil, vegetation, water, air 
(lim ited real time air monitoring) and solid surfaces... Continuous air 
monitoring was conducted by Marine Environmental Services. Additional 
soils sampling, water sampling and air monitoring was performed by various 
health officials and regulatory agencies including the Missoula County 
Health Department and the USEPA.
Several important inconsistencies have been found in Olympus Environmental's 
final report. Olympus reports that no organic vapors were detected in the air monitoring, 
but there is direct evidence to the contrary from Ellen Leahy’s notes and Marine 
Environmental's field logs. Olympus also reports that they did not find the white dust 
(while other logs suggest that they did). Despite these significant inconsistencies and 
omissions, DEQ and EPA relied on MRL and Olympus data to make decisions regarding 
human health and safety.
General Factors Affecting, Testing
During the first two hours o f the derailment, chemicals were mixing and creating 
secondary reactions which were possibly transported by the rain that morning. The total 
amount o f  all types o f  chemicals released and by-products produced during the spill is still 
unknown.
Olympus Environmental, Inc., 1996a.
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The wind played an important role in the accuracy o f the testing. The Marine 
Environmental Fieldbook verified that when testing was done on one side o f a car leaking 
product, the reading was low or zero if  the wind was blowing in the opposite direction. 
When technicians were testing in the direction o f the wind, the reading would be high. 
According to several logs and reports, contractors hoped the wind would disperse the 
chemical clouds that were hanging over the Alberton area. Dispersal did not mean that the 
chemicals were neutralized and rendered harmless, as susceptible people could still be 
injured by low dose exposures. The wind also caused the chemicals to move erratically and 
to collect in pockets. The inconsistent dispersal exposed some people and their property, 
while leaving others unharmed. The mountainous terrain helped to prevent complete 
dispersal o f the plume, and in general, the Alberton canyon tunneled the wind in a west to 
east direction towards Missoula.
Elevation played a role in correct testing. Clouds containing the other chemicals 
were likely well above the testing meters that were being used to test for ground-hugging 
plumes o f  chlorine and it wasn't until April 14“', three days after the spill, that Marine 
Environmental tested for chlorophenols. I f  the clouds o f chemicals were floating higher 
than the testing meters, then there would not have been an accurate reading o f what was 
still in the plume.
ACCEH and King, 1997. Reports o f the initial cloud describe it as greenish and low 
lying, typical o f a chlorine plume. Reports from several hours later, however, mention 
a higher rain cloud looking plume which was bluish. This is consistent with the fact 
that fires on site were reported several times that morning, and later denied, but never 
proved not to have occurred. A fire could have created the numerous chemical by­
products eventually discovered, as well as a non-chlorine plume.
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A ir Testing
The major initial exposure route to the chemical cloud the morning of April 11, 1996 
was through the air. Injuries were sustained from inhalation o f chemicals and exposure of 
skin and eyes to the cloud. The scene was understandably chaotic that morning, as a result 
no testing o f the chemical contents o f the initial plume was ever conducted. In addition, no 
mixed chemical air modeling has ever been released to the public. Organic vapor 
monitoring data and analysis performed by Marine Environmental has never been released 
to the public, only to MRL in June o f 1996. None o f Marine Environmental ' s nor 
Envirocon’s results are included even by reference in Olympus Environmental's report, 
which stands as the sole MRL funded environmental testing authority.
Chlorine was the only chemical air monitored for during the entire incident, except 
for the above mentioned publicly unreleased Marine Environmental data. Even this 
chlorine information was unavailable to the public in a useful format, such as a model of 
the chemical cloud that first morning. The shape and movement o f the initial cloud was 
critical to exploring and understanding spatial variations in residents’ symptoms and 
vegetative damage. Montana Rail Link contracted a company from Wisconsin to conduct 
plume modeling throughout the incident, however this information was not made available 
to residents.
In fact, residents were repeatedly told that the microclimatic variations o f Alberton 
Canyon made such modeling impossible, or at least unreliable. When in truth MRL
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understood from the very beginning that plume modeling was crucial to their litigation and
held that information secret. According the community group ACCEH:
Chlorine air modeling was withheld from the public as long as possible.
ACCEH received through a FOIA request the very air modeling we were 
told did not exist. The air modeling document is dated April 11, 1996 
7:55 AM. Before many evacuees were even out o f the hot zone, facts were 
available to EPA and MRL. These same facts were never presented to the 
people suffering from direct exposure to the toxic plume. Parents, 
responsible for young children, were not able to provide their physicians the 
very information physicians needed most: what chemicals and chemical 
interactions were you and your children exposed to and in what quantity?
Knowing the levels o f chlorine leaking from the tanker car during offloading was
critical to the safety o f workers on site. Chlorine levels, however, were used solely to
determine the safety o f evacuees reentering the site for pet rescues or permanent re-entry
and for reopening o f the interstate. Chlorine concentration data was the only information
about air quality used by officials in their determinations o f safety for evacuated residents,
even when other smells and symptoms were reported.
Chlorine concentrations were measured by ten continuous air samplers and 
nine direct reading stations set up and used from April 12-28, 1996. These 
instruments were read, maintained and calibrated by MRL's contractor 
M arine Environmental....On April 16, 1996 START accompanied Marine 
Environmental to their fixed and direct reading instrument locations.
START gathered independent chlorine concentration readings...to confirm 
M arine Environmental's readings o f estimated chlorine contamination and 
migration during offloading o f Tank Car #3, and to determine if  the Health 
and Safety o f  personnel within the exclusion zone were being 
compromised.. . The EPA OSC and toxicologist reviewed air sample 
locations .and reviewed the data gathered by those instruments daily. Air 
quality health and safety issues were monitored daily by the EPA OSC and 
toxicologist on scene.
‘” URS, 1996.
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Thus, there is no data upon which an assertion that air exposure to chemicals other 
than chlorine had occurred. The only non-chlorine air monitoring was done by MRL’s 
contractor and never released to the public. The same fate o f nondisclosure by the 
responsible party befell the crucial plume modeling. And finally, the EPA never made 
public any plume modeling obtained through their involvement.
Soils Testing
The 17,000 gallons o f  potassium cresylate released ended up on the ground adjacent 
to the derailed cars. The cresylate was a liquid heavier than water, and therefore had the 
ability to leach downward into the water table. Chlorine tanker car #3, which emptied 
completely, was offgassing directly onto the pooled potassium cresylate, hence the 
chemical reactions between chlorine and cresylate. The delay in testing the potassium 
cresylate to assess its components and potential health effects on evacuated residents and 
responders is inexplicable. It seems likely that MRL would have asked their original 
contractor, Envirocon, to sample the spilled liquid, but such testing was never disclosed.
MRL maintained that chlorine was the main chemical o f concern, and apparently 
directed their second contractor, Olympus Environmental, to not fully test the petroleum 
waste product pooling on a steep bank just above the Clark Fork River. On April 13, 
Olympus Environmental gave first mention to potassium cresylate in their test plans. 
“Liquid was spilled on south west side o f railroad tracks and confined to that area. No 
visible evidence o f  spill within 150 feet o f river. Principle impacts related to caustic 
properties. Impacts will be adequately evaluated from pH analyses related to chlorine
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evaluation”'̂ * This petroleum refinery waste containing numerous toxic components was
not tested to assess its impacts or reactions, but instead simply tested for pH to indicate
presence o f  chlorine. This plan worked until the EPA arrived on site.
When the EPA finally made it onto the site on the fourth day of the incident,
April 14, 1996, they shadowed MRL's contractor on their testing rounds. EPA saw fit to
rubberstamp these testing regimes and analyze chiefly the same samples that Olympus
chose to test (which is referred to as a split sample). EPA took only one independently
selected sample, AB-SO-01.
The EPA OSC, USCG and START collected soil sample AB-SO-01 from 
the stained soil in the depression south o f and adjacent to the railroad 
track near the derailed potassium cresylate car (GATX 16194) during their 
initial walk through o f  the hot zone on April 14, 1996 to determine the 
contaminants o f concern. Olympus Environmental, Inc., collected two 
stained soil samples from the same area (SS-1 and SS-2) for the same 
purpose.
EPA's soil sample AB-SO-01 yielded some disturbing results which forced 
changes in the chlorine only testing protocols to incorporate chlorine by-products like 
chlorophenols and other hydrocarbons. The results showed detectable levels of 
benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, m,p-Xylene, 1,3,5-Trimethylbenzene, and 1,2,4- 
Trimethylbenzene. The presence o f  chloroform, n-propylbenzene and chloromethane 
were detected below the detection level (and in the first two samples, very close to 
detection levels).*^®
*** Olympus, 1996. 
•*’ URS, 1996. 
‘«U R S , 1996.
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These tests were concerned with volatile and semi-volatile organic compounds
formed in the reaction between chlorine and potassium cresylate.
The VOC analysis requested by START determined that chloroform 
was present above the detection limit in surface soil-split sample 
Pl(0.031ppm ), P3 (O.OOSppm) and P4 (0.35ppm). Chloroform is formed 
in the presence o f organic precursors, water, and chlorine, all of which 
were present where these samples were taken. VOC analysis also 
detected toluene (O.OOSppm), p-isopropyltoluene (0.007ppm) and 
chloromethane (0.017ppm) in surface soil-split sample P4. Olympus 
Environmental did not request a VOC analysis on these samples and 
therefore a VOC result comparison o f the sample and split is not 
made.'*’
It is important to note that Olympus did not request a Volatile Organic Compound 
analysis o f  the above described samples. This example perfectly illustrates the power 
contained in the decision o f what to test for, or not. Had EPA not done a split o f that 
sample and requested a VOC analysis, important information regarding hydrocarbon 
contamination would have been lacking. As it was, the absence o f EPA for the crucial first 
three days o f  the incident and their lack o f dialogue concerning the adequacy o f company 
sponsored tests leads to the question o f what other information may be missing.
On April 16, three full days after testing potassium cresylate only for pH, Olympus 
devised a "sampling and analysis plan to evaluate composition o f potassium cresylate 
solution mixed with chlorine in area o f release at M ontana Rail Link Derailment, Alberton, 
M ontana”. At this point Olympus already knew and probably had always known that the 
chlorine and cresylate had mixed, because it was obvious from the proximity o f the two 
cars ruptures and emitted contents.
URS, 1996.
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Once the presence o f chlorophenols and other hydrocarbons was established, the 
next task was to determine if  and how far these compounds had migrated off site. Since no 
sampling o f the cloud had been conducted, the next best thing was to test for air deposition 
in the form o f  residual chemicals. This testing protocol was problematic for several 
reasons. Most importantly, the time delay between the original cloud and soil and surface 
deposition testing, and the low number o f  sites tested make the reliance on the results used 
to state that the chemicals never impacted residents extremely suspect. Furthermore, the 
patchiness o f the cloud’s movement through the affected area alone necessitated numerous 
sites for soil testing. The lag time between suspected air deposition and testing made 
extrapolation and precautionary readings o f data necessary. None o f this occurred.
On April 20, 21, and 26, 1996 START collected soil samples in the 
wreckage area, all o f which are splits from MRL’s Olympus Environmental 
sampling efforts with the exception o f AB-SO-01. Soil sampling efforts 
were conducted to determine the extent o f  contamination (specially 
chlorinated phenols).
Surface soil sample P4 was collected approximately 60 feet north o f 
the MRL railroad tracks by Olympus Environmental and split with START 
(Figure 3). 2,4,6 trichlorophenol was reported at 11 mg/kg in the Olympus 
sample and at 8.1 mg/kg in the START soils split.
Due to high levels o f phenols detected on and around the site, further testing was
done to trace the migration o f these compounds. This offsite testing was not done until
April 26, 1996 two days before re-entry and 15 days, many rainy, after the chemical release.
The EPA report confirms this timeline:
Because 2,4,6 trichlorophenol was detected at ppm levels in surface soils 
sample P4, additional sampling was conducted to determine the extent of 
migration. Surface soils sample SI was collected from a residence southeast
•«URS, 1996.
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of the wreckage area, and soil sample S2 was collected from a residence 
southwest o f the wreckage area on April 26, 1996. The results from these 
surface soil samples indicated that SVOCs were not present above the 
laboratory detection limits. ..
In order to determine if  SVOC (chlorinated phenols) deposition by air 
transport had occurred, wipe samples were collected in the wreckage...[a] 
wipe sample (Wl)  was collected by START and Olympus Environmental on 
April 26, 1996, from the porch located at the residence on Plateau Road 
southeast of the wreckage area. The results from the SVOC analysis 
indicates that chlorinated phenols were not present above the laboratory 
detection limits.
Only one wipe sample was collected and this sample was not correlated with plume 
modeling to show that the cloud traveled over that residence. Residences farther from the 
site should have been tested to determine the distance that phenols traveled, even if  those 
results were all below detect. However, these types of questions are so critical to litigation 
that MRL was unwilling to share such information or request detailed testing to shed light 
on such concerns. EPA did not pressure Olympus to do more tests in this area, nor did they 
undertake them on their own.
The act o f not testing for something is a seemingly passive, yet often well thought 
out, method for obfuscating the truth about chemical contamination. Time is on the 
polluter’s side, since the chemicals, particularly the volatile and semi-volatile chemicals of 
concern in this case, will eventually dissipate to levels below detect. The longer tests are 
delayed, the more likely it is that volatile compounds will have broken down leaving levels 
which are “below detect”. Once the compounds are “below detect” only extrapolation is 
possible to determine when and if  the chemicals were present above detect. This is the 
position which evacuees and their advocates were left in regard to soil testing. The
URS, 1996.
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presence o f chemicals below detect leads to the assumption that they likely were once 
present in greater quantities, and this raises the question of continued possible health 
effects even at or below detection levels in an already impacted population. Repeated 
testing o f those same soils to trace breakdown and dissipation would have allowed for a 
more scientifically rigorous extrapolation of what the highest levels were likely to have 
been. Such testing never was conducted
In addition ‘‘[n]o indoor monitoring of people’s homes was thought to be necessary, 
even after months o f complaints from residents to the DEQ about the lingering and ever 
present odors o f chemicals inside and outside o f evacuees homes. Private testing obtained 
by some hot zone residents has revealed phenols in soil and inside homes”**” This calls into 
question the adequacy and timing o f testing conducted by MRL and EPA.
Potassium Cresylate Impacted Soils
Evacuated residents returned when the area was deemed safe by officials and were 
soon sickened again by exposure to the cresylate contaminated soils, which remained on 
site against the urgings of health officials. Odors and associated symptoms were reported 
from: 1) the contaminated soils in and around the site; 2) exposure to the soils as they were 
carried out by train to disposal (in reportedly not well prepared batches which leaked odors 
and particulate matter); and 3) the empty railcars as they sat in a siding in Lothrop, a 
community several mile east of Alberton, for days before being taken to the scrap yard, 
despite assurances that all of the dangerous soils were to be removed and contained. These
ACCEH 1998,
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odors and illnesses would not have occurred had the Health Department insisted that, as
initially discussed, the bulk o f the contaminated soils be removed prior to re-entry. The
EPA left the scene after agreeing to the re-entry criteria and prior to removal of
contaminated soils. This removal was left to Montana Rail Link and its contractors.
According to MRL representatives, all o f the soil that was stained with 
potassium cresylate was to be removed. A removal plan was prepared, 
reviewed by EPA, approved, and in place as of April 25, 1996, to excavate 
the stained soils and the topsoil within the wreckage area by MRL contractor 
Envirocon. Excavation began on April 25, 1996. The excavated soils were 
staged on top of a high density polyethylene liner by Envirocon. A berm was 
built around the area to prevent runoff of contaminants. The contaminated 
soil piles were located immediately south o f the stained ditch. As of April 
27, 1996, Envirocon had excavated and segregated the soils as described in 
Table 3 below. (125 cubic yards o f highly contaminated surface soils; 60 
yards o f lightly stained soils). Envirocon anticipated excavating a soil pit a 
25 feet wide and 325 feet long to a total depth of 7 feet.
Samples were taken of the excavated soils, but the tests had to wait to be analyzed 
and "addressed by the state o f Montana. As o f April 28, 1996, the state of Montana 
assumed responsibility as the lead regulatory agency in charge o f determining the extent of 
subsurface contamination and the final disposal o f the contaminated soil".^^  ̂The Montana 
DEQ, newly on the scene and without direct cooperation with the EPA, assessed that MRL 
was competent and in control of the remediation.
Final Re-entry to Evacuated Area
The official end of the incident came on April 28 at which time:
‘«U RS, 1996. 
«« Id.
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Residents were allowed to return to their homes in the exclusion zone after 
the damaged chlorine cars were off-loaded or stabilized and the risk from 
contamination was evaluated (by the EPA regional toxicologist on scene and 
the Missoula City-County Health Department.). Wipe and soil samples were 
collected in the town of Alberton and near other residences, and analyzed to 
verity that chlorinated phenols contamination was not present. Soil sampling 
and analysis revealed chlorinated phenols at the wreckage area and not 
beyond 2,500 feet. Analytical results have shown no evidence of residual 
contaminants that pose a threat to the surrounding community.
Re-entry was sanctioned by the Missoula City-County Health Department and the 
EPA once each o f four re-entry criteria were met. These criteria were:
1) Chlorine Gas: The absence o f any further risk from chlorine gas.
2) Potassium Cresylate: The removal of the ‘bulk’ of cresylate contaminated
soils.
3) Chlorophenols: The absence o f chlorophenol migration off site at high
levels.
4) White Dust: The absence o f a harmful white dust.*®*
The decision to allow re-entry was negotiated between officials from government, 
the company, the Department o f Transportation and responders. There was tremendous 
pressure from all sides to allow residents back in and normalize the situation. The DOT 
was extremely eager to reopen the highway, but could not do so until residents returned. 
The decision to allow reentry was arrived at through a consensus-type process among 
officials. The concerns o f some were overridden by the desires of many. Residents were 
told that the area was safe to re-enter and provided with guidance on throwing away 
perishable food items and cleaning surfaces. Residents were to notify officials if  chlorine
'«URS, 1996.
‘«Incident Command, 4/22/96. Appendix A.
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pockets were discovered in closed areas. The outside environment was deemed safe for
children’s play, gardening and the like.
Soon after reentry, the residents’ troubles began anew. After April 28, 1996 the
hazardous soils sat on the site for several more weeks sickening area residents. Prior to
removal o f the soils, they were analyzed for chemical content and "temporarily stockpiled
on site.” Four of the six piles of soils were deemed hazardous waste under federal law and,
as such, were required to be disposed o f in a hazardous waste incinerator and landfill. The
other two piles fell just below the EPA levels for hazardous waste and were shipped, more
cheaply, to the local landfill. All of the piles remained on site, were manipulated, loaded
onto rail cars and moved through the previously evacuated area. The soils were extremely
odorous and evoked numerous complaints from residents who were further sickened by
exposure to these soils. Residents were not notified that these soils were classified as
hazardous wastes. Instead, residents were told that remediation was moving forward
smoothly and all contaminants of concern had been removed already from the site. The
EPA report clarifies that the soil which remained on site until May 18, 1996 was certainly
not uncontaminated
Detectable concentration of Chlorophenols were observed in each of the six 
samples. Chlorophenol concentrations from four of the six soil stockpile 
samples exceeded toxicity characteristic standards and were classified as a 
hazardous waste for disposal. The hazardous waste classified soils were 
manifested, transported according to RCRA and DOT regulations and 
disposed of by MRL at the Chemical Waste Management Thermal 
Operations facility in Port Aurthor (sic), Texas. The non-hazardous 
classified soils were disposed of by MRL at the Browning Ferris Industries 
landfill in Missoula, Montana.
•®URS, 1996.
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Dioxin Testing
The presence of all ingredients necessary to produce to most toxic chemical known 
raised serious questions at Alberton. Organochlorine dioxin precursors to dioxins such as 
2,4,6-Trichlorophenol and other phenols abounded at the site. Whether the heat necessary 
to allow the full reaction to dioxin was unknown. Rumors of several fires on site and the 
use of heavy machinery and welding equipment made it possible. Moreover, dioxin 
contamination o f oil refinery waste (potassium cresylate) is not uncommon. Therefore, 
dioxin could be on site even in the absence o f a heat catalyst. For these reasons, victims and 
dioxin experts from environmental non-profits requested dioxin testing to rule out the 
possibility. EPA, however, decided not to test for dioxin and based their decision not to 
test on the following rationale;
1) There was "not likely to" have been sufficient heat produced for the 
formation of dioxins the morning o f the spill.
2) Although dioxin could have been formed without elevated temperature, in 
the presence o f free chlorine molecules, the "high pH of the cresylate 
solution would have increased the concentration o f potassium thiolate and 
the potassium phenalate; both are free radical scavengers likely to have 
significantly inhibited dioxin formation."
3) Since soil sampling did not identify the presence o f dioxin prescursors 
(di- and trichlorophenols) in high concentrations far away from the site.
"[tjherefore, there is not evidence o f significant environmental transport to 
these compounds (or dioxins) off the immediate site of procut spillage. It 
was judged implausible that toxic dioxin congeners were formed in high 
concentrations as a result o f the collision or migrated into the adjacent 
residential area.”
4) “All stained and cresylate-contaminated soils will be removed."
The EPA concluded by stating, “[b]ased upon these findings and removal 
actions, dioxin sampling is judged to be unwarranted”*™
‘™ URS, 1996.
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The EPA’s argument against dioxin testing is inconsistent and seems to protest a bit 
too much, based on the evidence of dioxin precursors on site and beyond. Residents of the 
town of Alberton were interested in whether dioxin was present on site; questions of 
exposure and migration would follow from that initial assessment. To that end. University 
of Montana professor of chemistry Dr. Garon Smith recommended taking dioxin tests 
inside of the potassium cresylate car, as a start. This suggestion was not heeded. Moreover, 
EPA’s assertions that the temperature was never high enough (200-300 degrees Fahrenheit) 
to lead to the formation o f dioxin is questionable. There were conflicting reports of an 
April 11 fire on the scene and a grass fire at a later point. Also, the use of heavy equipment 
(blowtorches, etc.) could have created combustion level temperatures at various points and 
places on the wrecked cars.
EPA's argument rests on a preponderance of "unlikely” and "not likely” statements 
which do not stand up to the evidence. Dioxin, the most toxic chemical known, is a 
political hot potato and its presence, even at low levels on the derailment site, would have 
raised a series o f questions concerning worker and resident safety. The primary question, 
however, would have been; Why wasn’t dioxin tested for immediately upon recognition that 
chlorine and organic compounds mixed? The longer EPA stalled such testing in the face of 
strident demands by residents to do so, the greater the cost o f a positive dioxin test grew, 
politically and legally. Dioxin testing, like all other testing, became a moot issue once 
enough time elapsed and once the bulk of the contaminated soils were removed. Like so
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many other questions concerning this incident, we simply may never know if  dioxins were 
formed on site.
Damage to Vegetation, Pet and Livestock Health
Government officials and Montana Rail Link repeatedly made statements early on 
in the incident that there was no damage to v eg e t a t i o n .T h e s e  statements, like so many 
others made in an atmosphere of incomplete disclosure, were made not on the basis of facts 
or data, but simply in order to reassure residents regardless of the impact such faulty 
information might have on their perception o f the spill and ability to make informed 
decisions concerning re-entry. These statements were in fact later shown to be completely 
without basis when the company hired a contractor to assess damage to vegetation and a 
biology graduate student undertook a detailed study of damage to vegetation for his PhD 
project. Officials never apologized or publicly corrected their earlier assertions. As was so 
common in this incident, contradictory information co-existed and then replaced itself with 
the ‘correct’ information as if by magic and with no one to blame.
Indeed, at the same time officials were reassuring the public that there was no 
damage to vegetation, MRL’s own contractors were doing vegetative damage inventories of 
the people’s properties and town parks. On April 16 the following observations were made: 
“Lawns within town exhibit symptoms of chlorine exposure and will likely experience 
short-term dieback ” The extent of damage was eventually summarized as:
Evacuee Meeting, Technical Committee and other notes. 4/12-4/14/96. Appendix A.
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A majority of the stressed vegetation appears to the east o f the actual spill 
site. In general, damage to vegetation appears to begin at Milemarker 72.5 
Eastbound on 1-90 and ends at approximately Milemarker 81.0 eastbound. 
The highest elevation to which stresses Douglas-fir are visible is roughly 
3400 feet above sea level. The extent of damage varies greatly along the 
elevational gradient. This is probably due to localized topography and 
weather patterns.
This situation was analogous to the pet health situation. Officials went out of their 
way to tell pet owners that there were no ill effect to animals from exposure, despite no 
evidence on which to base this. Once ill effects were reported by residents themselves, 
officials stepped back and adopted instead the message that any damage was fleeting and 
not serious.
Conclusion
The issues surrounding testing in Alberton illustrate the problem of non- 
independent scientific analysis and the large area o f discretion left to the analyzers in terms 
o f what to test for. This set up the common problem in Alberton: lay people do not know 
the proper tests that should be done; testers had agendas and pressure not to fully explore 
possible contamination via testing and not to explain the omissions to the public; the 
company and officials then used the existence o f sheer numbers of tests and data as proof 
that the area was safe and presented no health risk. In this way, the numbers of tests 
conducted and the repetitive pattern of non-detects obfuscated the fact that, more likely
‘̂ Report to Montana Rail Link: Vegetation Damage Assessment for the Alberton 
Chlorine Spill May 20, 1996 by Tim Meikle and Dr. David lanson, Bitterroot 
Consultants, Corvallis, MT
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than not, the wrong things were tested for. Furthermore, the meaning of non-detect was not 
explained to the media or affected citizens, and the media then portrayed non-detect to 
mean zero. This, o f course, was never corrected by the company or officials.
No blood serum samples for dioxins, phenols, cresols, and chlorinated phenols were 
ever collected despite the knowledge of an on-site chemical reaction and SVOC results 
from the site at high levels (2,4,6 trichlorophenol 599ppm, 2-methylphenol at 7190 ppm, 
and phenol at 6010ppm). The issue of human health testing and medical management of a 
toxic disaster like Alberton is discussed in the next chapter. Like with environmental 
testing, human health testing and diagnosis fell victim to the pervasive non-disclosure and 
political vagaries of the incident.
Most disturbing of all was that the notion o f basic scientific inquiry was lost in the 
Alberton disaster. The company controlled the site and did not ask questions or dig deeper 
to ascertain unknown contaminants or by-products. Once the officials came on the scene, 
the need to continue forward momentum to re-entry and the chlorine only message had 
been adopted already by them so it was too late for them to turn back. They executed a half 
turn and did not push any farther, despite lingering questions concerning the contents of the 
initial cloud, air deposition of by-products and resulting health effects.
No one took up the inquiry purely in the name of science to answer the fascinating 
question o f what exactly were the people exposed to. Since the contents of the initial cloud 
were unknown and delays had undoubtedly led to loss of product remaining by the time 
samples were taken to assess off-site migration, a backwards approach to the problem was 
the only way to solve it. The backwards approach would consist of a thorough analysis of
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what the "ingredients” present at the derailment site could produce in the presence of rain 
and possibly fire. And finally, what chemicals or by-products produced that morning could 
have created the health problems reported by victims?
Evacuees and concerned citizens have repeatedly demanded that this exact process 
occur; they desire an outside scientist to come in and do a proper analysis and re-creation, 
starting with the initial release, o f the chemical recipe of the spill to answer the most basic 
o f questions; What was released and how are the symptoms related to those chemicals? 
and What are the holes in the existing data and theory o f exposure routes and effects?
EPA and ATSDR have been asked to fund and support such an effort, but neither 
have agreed. It appears that until the community group raises enough money to hire an 
independent scientist to review the documented data, the mystery remains.
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C hapter 3. Effects of Non-Disclosure on Medical C are Provided to Spill Victims
Viewedfrom the perspective o f  traditional medicine, the health problems o f  the 
families were a collection o f  incoherent anomalies. Viewed with reference to the 
chemicals, their problems began to make sense. The chemicals provided a 
framework fo r  understanding their health experiences that accorded them a 
legitimacy that professional medicine was unable or unwilling to give them.
It is not surprising to fin d  the Woburn families preoccupied with their current and 
future health. In fact, they harbor a feeling that they have not really survived, but 
have only been given a reprieve, with a threat o f  disease—even a death 
sentence—over themselves and their loved ones.^^*
The medical management of a toxic disaster is always challenging, and these 
challenges increase with the number of people affected, amounts, types and interactions of 
the chemicals involved, and the level of infrastructure and expertise existing in the area. 
The mixed chemical spill in Alberton officially caused the evacuation of approximately 
1000 people, but the numbers of those affected increase when injured people outside of the 
official evacuation zone are included. Despite official attempt to label the incident a 
chlorine spill, there were three chemical products released and a host of by-products 
created, all o f which potentially affected exposed victims. Alberton is a small town of 354 
in a rural county with three physicians and a ten bed hospital. The city of Missoula, 30 
miles from Alberton, has two hospitals which serve as regional medical centers. Montana 
has no medical school, public health or epidemiology programs. All of this factored into 
the trouble victims encountered as they tried to get their exposure diagnosed and treated.
An area of major disagreement among evacuees and officials which continues today 
is the quality and availability of health impact information and treatment options
Brown, Phil and Edwin J. Mikkelsen. 1990. No Safe Place: Toxic waste, leukemia, 
and community action. University o f California Press, Berkeley.
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concerning the chemical exposure. In keeping with the “chlorine only” official nature of 
the incident, health information concerning chlorine was initially provided to evacuees in a 
variety of forms, mainly verbally, by the county health departments. Montana Rail Link 
arranged a forum where local doctors addressed evacuees but focused exclusively on 
respiratory symptoms from chlorine, what will be called “classic” symptoms here. Other 
symptoms were rarely commented on or accepted as valid by the local medical community; 
this attitude was adopted by Incident Command as well These “non-classic” symptoms of 
concern were 1 ) long term health effects from chlorine, particularly non-respiratory 
ailments; and 2) injuries arising from exposure to potassium cresylate and reactants from 
the chemicals mixing.
Determining the true extent and content of the chemical exposure proved difficult 
for the evacuees because Montana Rail Link never made public the extensive plume 
mapping used in the response, or other pertinent information such as aerial photography or 
infrared imaging. Officials never made a public statement that chemicals other than 
chlorine could be causing health problems. Indeed, to make such a statement would 
conflict with years o f official posturing on what really took place in Alberton. Officials 
were given plenty of opportunity to revise their initial diagnosis of the spill, but never did. 
Such a revision would still be met with gratitude and relief by many evacuees who have 
developed symptoms which, according to the official line, are “impossible” from the spill. 
Community group members have pleaded for a réévaluation of the spill, an unbiased, 
scientific assessment o f what spilled and what health effects could result. This seemingly 
simple request has been marginalized and rejected at every turn, because in its simplicity it
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exposes the grave, fundamental mistakes which were made in the handling of this toxic 
incident.
A significant problem victims of Montana Rail Link’s chemical disaster was that 
the exposure was not properly identified by medical personnel. Though some medical 
professionals did attempt to find out more information such as Dr. Greg Moore, physician 
for the Frenchtown Fire Department, who sent a fax to a colleague stating “Please let me 
know if any other chemicals involved. I have seen some contact dermatitis not too typical 
for chlorine”(emphasis in original). Montana Rail Link made no official or public response 
to this inquiry. This is another glaring example of the responsible company’s failure to 
disclose the components o f the spill to physicians, responders, and government officials, 
who in turn were responsible for communicating information to victims. Incident 
Command failed in its responsibility to insure that the information it was basing public 
health and safety decisions on was accurate and complete. In the same way, most medical 
professionals failed to insure that the information they obtained concerning the release was 
accurate and complete prior to dispensing diagnoses and treatment. This cycle of 
misinformation and lack o f accountability which caused harm to victims proved difficult to 
break.
The lack of a comprehensive assessment of exactly what chemicals evacuees were 
exposed to and at what levels on the morning of April 11, as well as during pet rescues and 
other hot zone re-entries and upon the return home, was a significant problem for sickened 
evacuees. While the circumstances in Alberton unfortunately are not unique, they are 
certainly preventable based on guidance provided to medical personnel in the relevant
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literature. The first step in medical management of any toxic incident must be to 
“[e]valuate the problem. At the veiy beginning, you need the most accurate possible 
information on the following: (1) What hazardous substances are involved? (2) What are 
their toxicities and safety hazards?...
In many cases "a specific exposure may not be identifiable and an expected health 
outcome may not be apparent. A true hazardous substances emergency is best managed by 
a specialist with training in toxicology, epidemiology, and public health, but such 
specialists are in short supply and may not be on the scene when an incident occurs. As 
a result, local physicians without training in toxic chemical effects become involved in 
treatment and diagnosis o f victims. When a physician is called in to manage a hazardous 
substance incident, there are two “cardinal rules to be followed. The first is to keep 
cool.... Secondly, i f  you don't know, you shouldn't g u e s s . . . . added). Guidotti 
(1986) provides a list of questions which must be asked immediately following a hazardous 
substance release to avoid guessing:
1. What toxic and hazardous substances have been identified?
(a) What are their concentrations in air, water, and soil?
(b)What are the known health hazards at these concentrations?
(c) What are the potential hazards of fire, explosion, or chemical
interaction?"’̂ *
Guidotti, T.L. 1986. Managing incidents involving hazardous substances. American 
Journal o f  Preventive Medicine 2(3): 148-154.
Id.
Id.
Guidotti, T.L. 1986,Managing incidents involving hazardous substances. American 
Journal o f  Preventive Medicine 2(3): 148-154.
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Had these questions been asked on April 11, 1996 by local medical personnel, and 
in turn been accurately answered by Montana Rail Link, medical providers and victims 
alike would have been alerted to the presence o f more chemicals than chlorine and the high 
likelihood of chemicals reactions.*’  ̂ Instead, physicians and medical providers accepted 
the (lack of) information provided by the responsible party, Montana Rail Link, at face 
value and proceeded to call the incident a “chlorine spill” and assess injuries based on this 
misinformed assessment.
There is guidance offered to health care providers in the absence of accurate 
chemical information. It is suggested that exposed individuals who are not acutely ill 
receive a “general medical evaluation... when the nature of the exposure or probable 
response is not known. The suggested evaluation is performed on the second day following 
exposure and emphasizes the early detection of dermatologie, pulmonaiy , hepatic, renal, 
and neurologic sequelae.” '®" Alberton victims were never given general evaluations for 
chemical injury, and, as a result, much information about the chemical components of the 
exposure that could have been determined through such human health testing was lost.
Recognizing thaf'[c]orrect identification of the substances involved is essential and 
requires technical expertise of a different sort than that of most physicians",'®' particularly
Strong questions from the medical community early on would likely have pushed 
Montana Rail Link and the government agencies into a position of greater disclosure. 
'®" Guidotti, T.L. 1984. San Diego County’s community right-to know ordinance; Case 
Study o f a local approach to hazardous substances control. Journal o f  Public Health 
Policy.396-409.
'®' Guidotti, T.L. 1984. San Diego County’s community right-to know ordinance: Case 
Study o f a local approach to hazardous substances control. Journal o f  Public Health 
Policy:396-A09
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those in a rural area. Thus, ‘‘[t]he successful medical management of a major incident 
depends upon a rapid and complete evaluation for the acute and possible long-term health 
hazards and this is likely to require the urgent deployment to the scene of specialists from 
the key disciplines" including clinical medicine, pathology, epidemiology, biochemistry, 
environmental sampling and toxicology.
This technical expertise was in short supply in Alberton, and lacking in the crucial 
first four days o f the incident, with the exception of company contractors performing 
environmental testing. The EPA toxicologist did not survey the scene firsthand until four 
days after the original release, at which point some evacuees had received treatment for 
assumed chlorine symptoms and been released. The Agency for Toxic Substance and 
Diseases Registry (ATSDR) researchers had not arrived on the scene either. Local doctors 
and health officials were telling evacuees that the effects from chlorine were fleeting and 
mainly respiratory. This information was amended when more information concerning the 
chemicals was made public, but it was never replaced with adequate new information 
concerning long-term chlorine and non-chlorine health effects. In addition, ATSDR’S 
chlorine plume modeling, provided to the EPA and MRL on the morning of the derailment, 
was never released to the medical community. This plume modeling would have given 
guidelines to physicians for potential patient exposure levels.
Most hospital doctors have little previous experience in dealing with chemical 
emergencies. This creates the likelihood for the “mishandling of the rare but devastating
Baxter, J.1991. Major chemical disasters: Britain’s health services are poorly 
prepared. British Medical Journal 301:61-62.
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release. Some major incidents in the future, as in the past, may well not be immediately 
recognized for what they are until large numbers o f people have been exposed or inordinate 
delays have occurred before an adequate response has been mounted.”*®̂ There is always 
the risk that the medical response to an uncommon but major incident might be delayed or 
mismanaged because the epidemiological, laboratory, and toxicological skill needed 
rapidly to evaluate and advise on the hazard are not available locally.’*̂  In Alberton, this 
problem was compounded when local officials were also unwilling to ask questions and go 
against the interests o f  a powerful, locally based company.
Despite local doctors’ inexperience and lack o f knowledge concerning the 
chemicals involved and potential health effects, they came to be relied upon as “experts” by 
Incident Command, and in some cases were hired as “experts” by MRL who conveyed their 
assessments to victims. Local arrogance and refusal to bring in outside help, had negative 
effects on spill victims. Based on what is publicly available, it is clear that government 
officials were privy to only that information which Montana Rail Link chose to share in the 
first four days o f the incident. Officials, in turn, provided that information to local medical 
personnel, who based their diagnoses and treatment on that same incomplete information. 
The first four days o f the incident, during which time the terms and definitions (such as 
“chlorine only”) were set, was controlled solely by MRL, the responsible company. Only 
when govenunent officials were allowed on site, on April 14, was it even possible for
Baxter, J.1991. Major chemical disasters; Britain’s health services are poorly 
prepared. British M edical Journal 301:61-62.
Baxter, J. 1991. Major chemical disasters: Britain’s health services are poorly 
prepared. British M edical Journal 301:61-62.
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physicians to be informed of the mixing o f chemicals, as MRL previously obscured this 
possibility from the public and medical community.
In order to remedy these conditions where responsible parties are given leeway and 
not questioned as vigorously as public welfare demands, Baxter suggests that "[a] team of 
experts may need to be deployed to make an urgent clinical and epidemiological 
assessment o f the health impact and to ascertain the sources and extent o f a toxic exposure 
in the population."'*^ Government officials have a responsibility to improve in this arena, as 
"[t]he many agencies and professional groups concerned need to develop much closer links 
and identify nationally the sources of expertise available in an emergency."'*^ Such a team 
would be best comprised on non-aligned doctors and scientists, those who are not 
politically beholden and who would not be swayed by local politics or fears o f offending 
local power structures. Had such a team arrived and paid no heed to company directives 
concerning entry to the site, spill victims may have had a better chance to gain recognition, 
diagnosis and treatment o f their symptoms early on.
Even with a correct identification o f the chemicals involved, however, information 
on health effects is likely still to be incomplete. A majority o f chemicals in use today have 
not been studied for human health effects at varying exposure levels, or in combination 
with other chemicals. “Material Safety Data Sheets...are almost always incomplete in their 
descriptions o f the compounds' toxic effects. Since many chemical formulations are 
proprietary mixtures, the data sheet may not identify specific chemicals or their
Baxter, J. 1991. Major chemical disasters; Britain’s health services are poorly 
prepared. British Medical Journal 301:61-62.
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proportions."^*’ Even if  the identity o f the agent is known, knowledge about its human 
toxicity may be sparse.
The National Research Council estimated that only 2% o f at least 60,000 
chemicals that are used widely have been comprehensively studied for toxic 
effects. Many o f these chemicals were studied in animals; far fewer were 
studies in humans. The few compounds that have been studies for chronic, 
low-level effects have very rarely been evaluated for neurologic, 
neurobehavioral, immune, endocrine, reproductive and pulmonary effects.
Rarely have they been studied in combined exposures, which actually exist 
in the real world.
Thus, the lack o f identification o f the chemicals involved and their by-products,
coupled with incomplete information available on human health effects o f those chemicals,
made the correct assessment o f health effects in Alberton victims nearly impossible. In the
absence o f baseline information or complete toxicological information concerning the
chemicals involved, early detection and establishment o f  a record o f all health effects is key
to future understanding. Health officials failed in this facet o f medical management as well.
When the substance is not known or involves a complex mixture, the 
appropriate medical evaluation may be difficult to determine....[in those 
cases] the clinician should at least consider the possibility o f acute effects 
involving those organ systems most commonly involved in toxic injury: the 
respiratory, renal, hepatic, dermatologie, and nervous systems. In San Diego, 
California, an advisory committee to the County Department o f Health 
Services has recommended that [an]., evaluation be performed on or about 
day 3 in cases where the putatively exposed person is not acutely ill and the 
identity o f  the exposure is not known.
Guidotti, T.L. Managing incidents involving hazardous substances. American Journal 
o f  Preventive Medicine 2(3): 148-154.
'** Ziem and Davidoff. 1992. Archives o f  Environmental Health.
Guidotti, T.L. Managing incidents involving hazardous substances. American Journal 
o f  Preventive Medicine 2(3): 148-154.
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Such a comprehensive evaluation was not done in the Alberton case. Patients were 
not tested for anything except for respiratory damage despite evidence o f reported 
symptoms inconsistent with chlorine effects, which supported the hypothesis that exposures 
involved substantially more than chlorine. In addition to respiratory damage, eye and skin 
bums were seen as the only other possible symptoms from chlorine exposure. Basic tests 
for general chemical injury were not recommended, indeed some patients had difficulty 
even obtaining referrals to have additional tests done or second opinions given if  chemical 
injury were mentioned.
According to the literature on the medical management o f disasters, the onus for 
determining the chemicals involved and possible health effects must rest also on the 
physicians. This failure created a myriad o f problems for victims o f the spill. Medical 
professionals, instead, accepted the company’s assessment o f the situation in the face of 
conflicting information and visible symptoms in their patients. Sick individuals faced 
disbelief and ignorance from those who were supposed to care for them. Victims reported 
time and again that their physicians refused to acknowledge that any symptoms not 
ascribed to classic effects o f chlorine could in any way be related to their exposure. Instead, 
most physicians were passive acceptors o f company sanctioned information, to the point 
that patients who researched on their own and suggested tests to their own doctors, were 
often rebuffed and marginalized. Physicians often diagnosed confounding symptoms as 
“psychological' problems. While serious psychological effects may certainly result from
Spill victims reported numerous occasions where their attempts to gain meaningful 
diagnosis o f  chemical injury were stymied by physicians who did not believe exposure to 
chlorine had occurred, or that chlorine was capable o f causing long-term health effects.
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exposure to a toxic spill and evacuation, invoking them universally minimizes the reality 
o f physiological as well as psychological symptoms.
The sickest residents quickly learned that nearly the entire medical community in 
Missoula, save one ophthamologist, had bought into the ‘chlorine only' myth and could not 
be trusted to make unbiased diagnoses or to assist their patients in determining the cause o f 
their ailments. Many patients turned elsewhere for help; they enlisted the help of 
naturopaths, osteopaths, and other more progressive caregivers. They located physicians 
and researchers who listened to victims’ concerns and tested beyond the chlorine myth. All 
o f these practitioners worked outside o f western Montana. Victims traveled to Billings, 
Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Denver for expert medical treatment and testing.
These tests showed evidence o f chemical injury to the brain, immune and other 
systems far beyond what would be expected from an exposure to chlorine.*^' Another 
problem confronting Alberton evacuees was the lack o f information on long-term health 
effects resulting from their exposure. This lack o f information was detrimental to the 
progression o f medical evaluation and treatment. "The successful management o f a major 
toxic release will therefore depend upon a rapid and complete assessment o f the health 
hazard, a process which must begin as soon as possible and be updated as the emergency
Many o f  these victims were prescribed anti-depressants.
ACCEH has compiled test results and health information for a number o f spill victims. 
They are considering completing a community health survey to assess ongoing symptoms 
and diagnoses.
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unfolds. This assessment should include long-term as well as immediate health effects.
Unfortunately, however;
the greatest area o f ignorance in a toxic release may relate to potential long­
term health hazards, as there may be few if  any immediate casualties...
Chronic injury to any organ system in the body may occur and the 
establishing o f epidemiological databases on exposed and control 
populations should be considered from the outset. ...The risk o f long term 
effects from chemical injury, such as carcinogenicity, teratogenicity, and 
other target organ damage, must also be considered from the outset. Such 
long term effects can occur even in the absence o f severe acute effects in the 
exposed population...
Follow-up o f victims’ health in the long term is critical for better understanding the 
impacts o f chemical exposure. Indeed, tragic events such as Alberton provide unique 
opportunities to study the effects o f various chemicals on human health. ”..[I]t is very 
useful to establish a central registry o f individuals exposed...This registry can become 
invaluable for future epidemiologic studies, to establish eligibility for disability benefits at 
some future date, and to support later legal action. " Medical professionals in Missoula did 
not suggest or pursue this notion. Nor did any o f the government agencies even compile a 
list o f all people exposed during the incident; recognizing the extreme importance o f this 
type o f information, the community group has attempted to compile a list o f all evacuees in 
order to track them and their health problems. Clearly, an “[ejpidemiologist should be 
involved early so that relevant data on the exposed population are not lost, and long-term
Baxter, J.1991. Major chemical disasters: Britain’s health services are poorly 
prepared. British M edical Journal 301:61-62.
Id.
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follow up can be instituted. The mere presence o f epidemiologists, however, does not 
insure quality studies which will be o f use to victims and medical providers. Any studies 
conducted are useless and even harmful to victims, unless done completely and done well. 
For example, the lack o f complete information concerning the content o f the Alberton 
exposures allowed all officially sanctioned health studies (by ATSDR and MCCHD) to 
look at classic chlorine symptoms only. To spill victims, these studies wasted a lot o f 
money asking the wrong questions about health effects resulting from the incident. This 
is unfortunately not uncommon in toxic disasters where "...epidemiological follow-up in 
most o f these events has been incomplete or not even attempted.
Since medical officials were first not aware o f and then were slow to disclose the 
actual components o f the spill and as a result diagnosed patients as affected by chlorine 
only, a backwards approach to toxicology and epidemiology occurred in Alberton. Victims, 
including many who re-entered for pet rescues, began reporting symptoms inconsistent with 
chlorine effects within days of the initial release. Victims quickly grew frustrated at health 
officials inability and/or unwillingness to address these symptoms. Officials finally 
acknowledged these complaints and requested testing o f the potassium cresylate and 
discovered the chemical reactions and by-products. The conclusion they arrived at, 
however, was that the other chemicals hadn’t migrated from the site in levels high enough
Guidotti, T.L. 1986.Managing incidents involving hazardous substances. American 
Journal o f  Preventive Medicine 2(3): 148-154.
ACCEH wrote numerous letters to ATSDR commenting on the agency’s continued 
testing for classic chlorine symptoms only. Several o f these are in the administrative 
record in Missoula.
Baxter, J.1991. Major chemical disasters: Britain’s health services are poorly 
prepared. British Medical Journal 301:61-62.
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to damage human health. Officials did not discuss or disclose the possibility that other 
chemicals could have been in the initial cloud; furthermore, they never disclosed possible 
health effects from the contaminated soils, beyond odor concerns, which remained 
stockpiled on site for a month after evacuees were allowed home.
This lack o f disclosure and lack o f information allowed doctors to stick to the 
chlorine only diagtiosis o f  the spill, as they said they had no ‘proof o f  any other exposures. 
This completed the circle of official ignorance and non-disclosure which effectively shut 
victims and their concerns out. Health officials required proof to believe that a symptom 
which did not fit the parameters o f a chlorine exposure was real, but the environmental 
testing done on site had not comprehensively looked for such proof Thus, weeks elapsed 
after the derailment with victims reporting various health effects and getting no assistance 
from medical personnel who, moreover, did nothing to push government officials to find 
the actual components o f the spill.
The mistakes made by medical personnel in the Alberton incident are two-parted: 
first, health effects from other chemicals involved in the spill, and combinations o f 
chemicals, were not acknowledged or treated; and second, only classic symptoms 
(respiratory, dermal and ocular effects) from chlorine exposure were considered. These two 
areas o f omissions caused victims endless frustration in trying to understand and gain 
treatment for their symptoms.
Long Term Health Effects o f  Chlorine Exposure
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Chlorine has always been considered to have deleterious impacts to the skin, eyes, 
and lungs. For this reason, investigations into other possible types o f damage from chlorine 
inhalation did not occur until the 1970s. Before then, investigators thought they knew what 
they were looking for and usually found it, and o f course did not find what they did not 
look for. For example, in 1947, approximately 1,000 persons were exposed to high 
concentrations o f chlorine gas when it leaked into the ventilation system o f a Brooklyn 
subway. Researchers stated that “[t]here were no deaths, and, by the methods used for 
evaluation, none had detectable residual damage.” The limitations which evaluation 
methods place on information obtained is evidenced repeatedly in toxicological research.
In Alberton, ATSDR decided to study only classic respiratory symptoms, thereby finding 
only those types o f symptoms and marginalizing as 'anecdotal' any other health problems.
In 1969, fumes leaked from a filtration plant in Cleveland, killing two people. A 
team of researchers were surprised to find that a single acute exposure resulted in 
measurable permanent abnormality. They found evidence o f lesions in two sites o f outside 
o f the lungs: the kidneys and brain. Lesions o f this type had not been previously described 
in fatal chlorine poisoning. The results o f the study o f patients with brain injury resulting 
from acute chlorine caused the researchers to state: “At this moment we must beg the 
question o f how inhalation o f gaseous chlorine gives rise to the renal and cerebral lesions 
observed here.”
Adelson, L. and Kaufman, J.1971. Fatal chlorine poisoning: report of two cases with 
clinicopathologic correlation. American Journal o f  Clinical Pathology 56:430-442.
Adelson, L. and Kaufman, J. 1971. Fatal chlorine poisoning: report o f two cases with 
clinicopathologic correlation. American Journal o f  Clinical Pathology 56:430-442.
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This question opened up a new realm o f chlorine toxicity research. The Alberton 
evacuees were lucky in that one o f the researchers to attempt to answer Adelson's and 
Kaufman’s question came to Montana to study what is the largest assemblage o f chlorine 
injured people in recent history. Dr. Kaye Kilbum, whose body o f research includes 
showing links between asbestos and the deadly lung disease we know now it causes, saw 
Alberton as an exceptional research opportunity. Unfortunately for spill victims, neither 
Montana Rail Link nor government officials felt the same.
For their part, spill victims were thrilled to have a bona fide chlorine expert arrive 
on the scene and offer the testing and diagnosis for which they had been begging for weeks. 
Dr. Kilbum found evidence o f non-classic chlorine symptoms, all o f which would have 
escaped unrecorded by the Missoula medical community had he not done his study. He 
found that "97 residents 7 weeks after exposure to a chlorine spill differed from 202 adults 
and 135 children who were unexposed to chemicals. There were 81 adults ages 18-63 years 
and 16 children ages 8-17". His results indicated neurological abnormalities including 
abnormal visual fields, abnormal hearing, abnormal balance, elevated finger writing errors, 
and evidence o f memory problems such as delayed verbal recall.
His results led him to the conclusion that “[i]t appears that chlorine damages the 
central nervous system (CNS) within 7 weeks. Follow-up studies are planned in one year to 
evaluate the rates of deterioration o f these important functions using patients as their own 
controls.” '^
Kilbum, Kaye H.1996. Persisting neurobehavioral and pulmonary impairment after 
chlorine exposure. USC School of Medicine.
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Unlike other health officials, Kilbum and his team o f researchers openly listened to 
victims’ complaints and recorded the following assessment o f  the situation and resulting 
symptoms:
Derailment and puncture o f a tank car carrying chlorine and one carrying 
"spent" potassium cresylate created a noxious aerosol over Alberton,
M T...Recurrence and/or persistence o f voice changes, skin burning, 
respiratory symptoms coupled with difficulty recalling and concentrating, 
trouble sleeping, headaches and other complaints led to neurobehavioral 
investigation 7 weeks after the spill. Many residents remained displaced 
because o f recurrence o f chest tightness, headaches, nausea, and memory 
disorders within minutes when they returned home. An odor described 
frequently as "like pesticide sprays" persisted at the derailment site and in 
Alberton for two months or more.^°®
His “97 adult subjects had significant impairment of neurobehavioral function 
compared to regional and to national reference groups. They shared exposure to the 
chlorine-creosote mixture created by the derailment.. .Thus, overall these subjects who 
were exposed briefly to chlorine and perhaps other chlorinated chemicals from on site 
combinations have chronic neurobehavioral impairment particularly o f unconscious and 
automatic functions o f the nervous system."
The Alberton results are similar to those obtained by Kilbum in other chlorine exposure 
cases;
At intervals from one to three years after the acute exposure, all had 
shortness o f breath, six had chest pain, four had asthma, and three had cough 
with sputum. Six also had memory loss, four each had decreased ability to 
concentrate, difficulty sleeping, dizziness, and loss o f balance, and three had
Kilbum, Kaye H .1996. Persisting neurobehavioral and pulmonary impairment after 
chlorine exposure. USC School o f Medicine.
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excessive fatigue, loss o f strength, depression and irritability.
Neurobehavioral testing showed....^®*
It is information o f  this type which was ignored and rejected by officials in the 
Alberton incident, despite pleas by exposed citizens to explore every possible avenue for 
diagnosing and treating their ailments. The tenets o f medical management o f toxic chemical 
incidents requires a look at all possible symptoms; notably, systemic toxic injury. This was 
ignored as if  it were a baseless idea for weeks, months and years. It was only when positive 
test results came back in from tests sponsored by attorneys, that the sought after proof was 
gained and spill victims had data to show that they were not “crazy hypochondriacs” and 
that their bodies had not lied.
The diagnosis and research o f toxic injury is still relatively new, but everything now 
widely accepted was at some time. Government officials and medical providers sounded 
much like industry as it rejects any data that threatens the profitable status quo by labeling 
it “biased” or unproven. This view was immediately adopted towards any doctors working 
with plaintiffs attorneys to gain damages for injury, regardless o f their stature and 
credibility field o f toxicology. The same officials, however, were noticeably silent when it 
came to questioning or monitoring the scientists, doctors, and environmental samplers on 
Montana Rail Link's tab who were running the show.
Chemical injury such as Multiple Chemical Sensitivity (MCS) is politically 
unpopular and has been slow to be accepted as a disease. It is marginalized, and those
Kilbum, Kaye H. . 1995. Evidence that inhaled chlorine is neurotoxic and causes 
airways obstruction. International Journal o f  Occupational Medicine and Toxicology 
4(2):267-276.
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suffering are labeled as hypochondriacs or suffering from psychological or psychiatric 
disorders. This is done in spite of the fact that “[ijt is an axiom of medicine that, when 
investigating the origins o f illness, physiologic causes must be ruled out before ascribing 
psychologic etiologies. This has simply not been done for illnesses associated with low- 
level chemical exposure. Missoula doctors made this mistake with Alberton residents 
when they reportedly prescribed anti-depressants to patients with real, but undiagnosed 
pain. Health officials seemed more comfortable focusing on the stress and psychological 
effects o f the spill, yet at same time did nothing to address the root o f the stress by 
providing patients with accurate information. Patients instead left doctors’ offices with 
undiagnosed and misunderstood health problems, a condition which only leads to more 
stress. Health officials and doctors did not dig very deep to uncover the truth about the 
Alberton exposures, and committed a grave disservice to their patients.
The evacuees were generally hungry for any and all information concerning health 
effects and trusted government officials and the medical community to be looking out for 
their best interests. This trust gradually eroded as evacuees grew aware o f the holes in the 
information provided and pushed for more information. Throughout the incident runs a 
common theme o f evacuees asking for more information and o f officials providing 
unsatisfactory pieces o f information. This lack o f information to address their needs led 
directly to the formation o f a community group whose mission was to address health 
concerns o f  evacuees. The group came to rely on a handful o f  local and regional physicians
Ziem, G. and Davidoff, 1992. Archives o f  Environmental Health.
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who were willing to look beyond the officially sanctioned diagnosis o f 'short term chlorine 
symptoms' and assist and support their patients in the search for the truth.
Flexibility is o f the utmost importance in insuring disclosure. It is highly important 
that health care providers do not become beholden to any set conclusion or particular 
interest group in an incident; their focus and goal must be to provide victims with the best 
information in a honest manner in order to best make decisions impacting public health and 
welfare. The atmosphere for making these decisions must remain free o f political agendas 
and industry pressure: the health and well-being o f the affected population is o f the utmost 
importance. Even if  information is incomplete or if  the atmosphere is politically 
uncomfortable, the responsibility o f  medical providers is clear: "If an emergency forces 
action before the material is identified, the only prudent move is to assume the worst...
"In a typical incident there are innumerable false reports, doubts, and updates. The 
physician involved must be prepared to constantly revise his or her opinions. In a serious 
incident, doctrinaire adherence to one's first impression may lead to disaster."^®'*
“The mental health consequences o f evacuation are only now beginning to be 
appreciated; large-scale population evacuations are very rare and carry a high cost in stress 
and safety problems..Any incident provokes rumors and misinformation, which must be 
controlled to avoid panic or misguided interference in public safety measures." It seems 
obvious that the best way to accomplish this is to be honest and work hard to insure that
Guidotti, T.L. Managing incidents involving hazardous substances. American Journal 
o f  Preventive Medicine 2(3): 148-154.
Guidotti, T.L. Managing incidents involving hazardous substances. American Journal 
o f  Preventive Medicine 2(3): 148-154.
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full disclosure o f  risks occurs and that the affected community is assisted in understanding 
those risks. It has been shown that people prefer to know the truth, even if  that truth is 
negative or disturbing. In a toxic event, the medical community has a distinct role to play, 
and does a disservice by accepting at face value everything that the responsible party says 
regarding health risks. The affected population
at a recent (1988) disaster in Cornwall, UK was given advice which was later described by 
an investigatory committee set up afterwards as "contradictory, confusing and sometimes 
inappropriate'. Yet similar criticisms can be made o f the management of many previous 
major incidents around the world...the evaluation o f the health hazard can be slow and 
inadequate, leading to difficulties for doctors who have to manage the patients and for 
decision-makers who have to direct the emergency response or give advice to the public.
A similar situation occurred in northern California in 1991 when a train derailment 
dumped the pesticide metam sodium into the Upper Sacramento river, at the same time 
producing an airborne plume. As is common, little information was known o f the health 
effects from metam sodium. “This lack o f knowledge resulted in conflicting reports by 
various governmental officials, when informing residents o f the dangers o f metam 
sodium.
A central element o f responding to such an event “is the importance o f accurate and 
early health information on the adverse effects o f particular chemicals.” This is due to the
Baxter, J. 1991. Major chemical disasters; Britain’s health services are poorly 
prepared. British Medical Journal 301:61-62.
Freed, D., Bowler, R., and I. Fleming. 1998. Post-traumatic stress disorder as a 
consequence o f  a toxic spill in Northern California. Journal o f  Applied Social 
Psychology 28(3):264-281.
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fact that "chemical spills, with unknown long-term endpoints and relatively unknown long­
term impact on health, are even more devastating and more likely to cause long-term 
impairment in health” than natural disasters.^®’
The discovery o f leaking drum o f toxic chemicals in a residential district in San 
Diego led to a series o f events similar to Alberton and other chemical disasters where 
disclosure is slow or incomplete.
The exposure caused much concern among the nearby residents. Fears were 
expressed that other, more dangerous substances may have been undetected 
or may have volatilized, leaving no trace. Rumors circulated o f a 
miscarriage and chronic illnesses in the families exposed. Public agency 
pronouncements on the safety o f the site were made and then rescinded in 
the face o f new information. Uncertainly over the identity o f the chemicals 
found and the significance o f the presence o f PCBs led to skepticism that 
reassurances o f safety had a valid medical bases. Doubts were raised 
regarding the training and commitment o f county health authorities to deal 
with such incidents. Residents o f the area who had health problems they 
suspected might have due to exposure were urged through the media and 
direct communication with county representatives to seek care at the 
county’s network o f community health clinics. On doing so, they discovered 
that the clinic’s physicians lacked the expertise or access to the information 
which might have reassured the. Caught off guard in its first major incident 
o f this sort, the County Department o f Health Services had no standard 
procedures that applied and rapidly lost the confidence of the community .
This series o f events is similar to what occurred due to the lack o f disclosure in
Alberton; knowledge o f the chemicals involved was the foundation upon which all
decisions affecting public health and welfare were made. Due to incomplete disclosure.
Freed, D., Bowler, R., and I. Fleming. 1998. Post-traumatic stress disorder as a 
consequence o f  a toxic spill in Northern California. Journal o f Applied Social 
Psychology 28(3).264-281.
Guidotti, T. 1984. San Diego County’s community right-to-know ordinance: Case 
study o f a local approach to hazardous substances control. Journal o f Public Health: 396- 
409.
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that foundation was incomplete, causing the collapse of public confidence in officials. This 
loss of trust and confidence added to the stress levels which victims were already 
experiencing during and after the incident.
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C hapter 4. A fter April 28: M ontana D epartm ent of Environm ental Quality 
Involvement and Ongoing H ealth Problems
A public interest scientist recounting a conversation with an epidemiologist;
JVe both agreed that we should take the conservative approach only to fin d  out that in 
every case we disagreed on what the conservative approach was. To him, 
“conservative ” meant that we must be very cautious about concluding that Love 
Canal was an unsafe place to live. The evidence had to be compelling because 
substantial financial resources were needed to correct the problem. To me, 
“conservative " meant that we must be very cautious about concluding that Love 
Canal was a safe place to live. The evidence had to be compelling because the public 
health consequences o f  an error were considerable.
The “democratic paradigm  " starts from  the victims ’perspective, values safety over 
profit, requires less than conclusive p ro o f to take action, and provides those likely to 
be affect with an active voice in determining risk and making decisions.^^
The Alberton train derailment and mixed chemical spill incident was declared
officially over on April 28, 1996 when all evacuees were allowed to return home. All
remediation o f the site was done by Envirocon, Montana Rail Link’s contractor and
subsidiary. Beginning on April 28, the Montana State Department o f Environmental
Quality took over as the oversight agency. From that point on, the EPA was no longer
officially involved and the Memoranda o f Understanding between various agencies for the
period o f evacuation came to an end. Among other things, this resulted in the Mineral
County Health Department replacing the Missoula City/County Health Department as the
lead health agency. The Mineral County Health Department consisted o f one employee, the
County Sanitarian, who had not been involved with Incident Command or any decisions
regarding health and safety during the incident.
Brown, Phil and Edwin J. Mikkelsen. 1990. No Safe Place: Toxic waste, leukemia, 
and community action. University o f California Press, Berkeley.
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Six days prior to the end of evacuation, on April 22, 1996, Envirocon had begun 
excavating the potassium cresylate stained soil from the ditch. The potassium cresylate 
stained soil was stock piled on site until May 18th. Soil samples collected from the 
stockpiles o f the excavated potassium cresylate stained soil were analyzed for benzene, 
toluene, ethylbenzene and xylenes (BTEX), volatile organics and semi-volatile organics. 
These soils were profiled and, when necessary, manifested by MRL and transported off site 
for disposal. 125 cubic yards o f the soil was deemed hazardous waste under federal law and 
had particular disposal requirements; that soil was shipped to Port Arthur, Texas for 
incineration. The remaining 1485 cubic yards o f soil did not contain toxic levels high 
enough to necessitate disposal at a hazardous waste incinerator; this portion was moved by 
rail and truck to be landfilled at the BFI site in Missoula..
The delay in removing contaminated soil until May 18 gave residents 20 days at 
home while remediation activities, including large scale earth moving of federally 
designated hazardous waste, was occurring. Residents living closest to the derailment site 
drove past the site daily in order to get to town or the main road. The delay in removing 
contaminated soil also went against the Missoula City/County Health Department’s 
recommendation that the bulk o f contaminated soils should be removed prior to re-entry. 
The presence o f the hazardous soils in proximity to a recently injured population resulted in 
a new spate o f health concerns in residents moving home. The insult is enormous to a 
previously exposed population then required to live adjacent to what was in effect a 
hazardous waste dump for three weeks.
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On May 6, 1996 the Mineral County Commissioners sent a letter to Tom Ellerhoff,
Administrative Officer o f the Montana Department o f Environmental Quality, expressing
their concerns to the lead agency for clean up and follow up to the incident.
We hope that as part o f the investigation and cleanup, MRL will work to make 
sure this type o f accident never occurs again, whether in Mineral County or 
anywhere else where there is a MRL rail line. We also hope that MRL will put 
great emphasis in removing the contaminated soils and wrecked rail cars as 
soon as possible so as to relieve the stress on Alberton area residents affected 
by the original spill. We believe that as long as the contaminated soils are 
present on the site, there is potential for local residents to experience some 
health affects, primarily due to the fact that those initially exposed could have 
heightened sensitivities to chemicals in general, and particularly to those 
chemicals involved in the original incident. Again, we would like to thank you 
for your responsible attitude and your work toward investigating and cleaning 
up the remains o f the Alberton Derailment spill. (Emphasis in original)^’®
Numerous residents complained and reported health concerns attributable to the soils. 
Garnering response to health complaints proved exceedingly difficult in the post­
evacuation phase, as the DEQ considered the health issues resolved and that the re-entry 
decisions had indicated the safety o f the area for residents. In addition, the MCCHD, the 
primary health department during evacuation, was officially no longer involved, due to the 
cessation o f the Memorandum of Understanding, despite the fact that the affected area 
straddled the county line. So people were now referred to Mineral County, with its single 
employee Health Department. Mineral County had not participated in the decision making 
regarding health issues nor been privy to re-entry consideration or relevant data. For 
victims, the pull-out o f all authorities with whom they had grown familiar created major
Letter from Mineral County Commissioners (Charles, E. Rock, James S. Wamken, and 
Judy A. Stang) to Dan Watts, MRL. 5/6/96.
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difficulties in getting community concerns heard and disparities in the treatment of 
residents and more powerful entities became apparent.
On May 7th, 1996, MRL applied for and received emergency exemption from the 
Department o f  Transportation, to move, clean, and repair the potassium cresylate car and 
the four chlorine tank cars. These tankers were loaded onto flatbed rail cars at the site and 
sidetracked in Lothrop, two miles east o f the derailment site. Lothrop, or South Alberton, 
is a small residential community along the track, and some Lothrop residents experienced 
an increase in their symptoms when these rail cars were sidetracked in front o f their homes. 
Hazmat crews in full gear decontaminated the potassium cresylate car while it was in the 
Lothrop siding, but residents were unprotected from the spray and fumes o f this clean-up 
process. These residents complained, and MRL moved the five cars east to the next siding, 
where again complaints were made, and this moving went on till these cars were 
sidetracked in Missoula in a residential neighborhood. Some residents of that area attended 
an ACE meeting in May 1996 and shared their concerns about these railcars. They 
described a  pesticide odor emanating from the tankers, and they were suffering from 
nausea, headaches, fatigue, and disorientation. Their skin was red and visibly burned from 
the exposure to the tankers.^'*
One woman remembers the pesticide smell coming from the rail yard at this time.
She purposefully would stay away from the track area to avoid exposure. Another family 
living adjacent to the tracks, became so ill from their exposure that they moved out of 
Missoula, leaving their home o f twenty-five years. This family went on to file a claim
ACE, 1996.
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against MRL. These accounts are noteworthy, as they illustrate how powerful even a 
minimal exposure to trace amounts o f the chemical mixtures from the derailment caused 
severe health effects in some people.
Residents in the previously evacuated area confronting the same residual chemicals 
trackside Missoula residents were exposed to, in the contaminated soils stockpiled on site 
near their homes in Alberton. Yet prior to soil removal from the site, not only spill victims 
complained (who were told by insurance claims adjusters that the smell was harmless and 
that they were particularly sensitive to all smells), but previously unexposed workers 
assigned to the area began to complain. This apparently warranted DEQ response, while 
residents’ concerns had not. On May 3rd, 1996, Plum Creek Lumber Company called 
Montana State Department o f Environmental Quality (DEQ), and complained o f the smell 
emanating from the derailment site. Plum Creek reported their loggers, who were working 
in the Adams Creek drainage north o f  the derailment site, were suffering ill health effects 
from the smell. DEQ Administrative Officer, Tom Ellerhoff replied in writing on May 9th, 
1996. His letter states, “After conferring with the Missoula County Health Department and 
MRL, Plum Creek decided to relocate the loggers until the contaminated soil has been 
removed from the site. The DEQ supports Plum Creek’s decision, and believes the 
temporary relocation would be in the best interest o f  all concerned'\emp\nas\'& added)^'^.
Alberton residents were never informed o f this situation, nor was the option of 
temporarily relocation offered or suggested to them during this time, despite the fact that
Letter to Dale Kerkvliet, Plum Creek Lumber Co. From Tom Ellerhoff, 5/9/96; Re. 
Relocating logging crews while cleanup occurs at the Alberton Derailment Site
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people were living in homes closer to the site than the area in which the loggers were 
working.
Ten days later, in response to questions from an Alberton resident concerning the 
contaminated soil on site and health problems associated with it, Tom Ellerhoff had this to 
say:
"The contaminated soil will not remain at the derailment site. The Montana Department o f 
Environmental Quality is working with MRL and its contractors to ensure the site is 
cleaned up and reclaimed to a level that meets appropriate state and federal standards. If 
you have any other questions about the cleanup, feel free to contact me at any time.”̂ *̂  Mr. 
EllerhofFs files reflect dozens o f calls from people complaining about the persistent odor 
and illness they were associating with the smell and the chemicals released. There are no 
notes reflecting that he recommended that any resident temporarily relocate.
The removal o f the soil finally began on May 18, 1996. The removal was delayed at 
the request o f the Alberton Public School so it would not affect school attendance. Instead, 
removal began the day after school was out, on graduation weekend. One Alberton family 
had fifty people attending a graduation party, and the hostess reported everyone having 
headaches, nausea, and fatigue. The hazardous soil was moved by rail car to Port Arthur, 
Texas. Residents who live along the tracks reported that the boxcars were not properly 
covered which allowed contaminated soil to blow out o f  the rail cars and dust their 
property, as well as pets and children who were outside that day. A Southside Road resident
2" Letter to David Stenberg, Alberton Resident, 5/13/96 from Tom Ellerhoff; Re; 
Clarification o f the Cleanup and Reclamation o f the Alberton Derailment Site).
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who was fishing along the banks o f the Clark Fork River, said he was knocked unconscious 
by the passing train. He suffered tremendous memory problems. Some area residents 
relapsed into illness from the soil removal, other residents got sick for the first time with 
this exposure. Those who complained loudly to MRL were sent to hotels in Missoula while 
the removal took place.
One evacuee who had not returned home and was still in a hotel at MRL's expense, 
reports that one o f MRL’s claims adjusters called her and told her specifically not to come 
to Alberton during the soil removal— she should stay at the hotel through the first o f June. 
An employee at the local restaurant in Alberton has related that this is when she first felt 
severe ill health effects. She reported that hazmat workers would come from the site for 
lunch and their presence, in gear worn on site, would make everyone in the cafe ill, and that 
the odor of pesticides was overwhelming for hours after the workers left. At some point, the 
restaurant offered delivery to the site rather than having the workers come in. The 
owner/operator o f a local hotel made similar observations. Some o f the clean-up crew 
stayed in his hotel and he was aware that some o f  his housekeeping employees became ill 
after cleaning up their rooms.
The site was remediated to the EPA residential exposure soil residual levels, which 
means that the level o f  cleanup process was considered to be o f a residential standard rather 
than o f a merely rural level, which was all that was actually required. The residual 
contamination that exists at the site is said to pose no current or future human health risk. 
According to the DEQ "contaminant levels found off site fall well within the range of
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risks” which DEQ considers acceptable for clean up levels or sites upon which no action
will be taken. In a June 4 memo to Tom Ellerhoff, DEQ employee Aimee Reynolds states;
based on sampling conducted by Olympus Environmental, Inc., an MRL contractor, 
some residual levels o f  phenolic compounds remain at the site..The MDEQ has 
performed a health evaluation on the levels o f chemicals still present at the site and 
has determined that the risks associated with these levels are negligible for several 
reasons ...The site is not a residential site, and will never see the type o f everyday 
usage that a residential site would.
One question does remain unanswered at this time. There is a slight possibility hat 
these residual levels could be transmitted to groundwater in the area. Therefore, to 
be protective o f the one residential well which is potentially located downgradient of 
the site, MDEQ has required MRL to install three monitoring wells at the site. '̂'* 
Ground water monitoring wells were placed on site; within the past year a resident
adjacent to the derailment site reported an unusual taste and smell in her groundwater, but
according to MRL’s contractor, no evidence o f above detect levels o f contamination were
found.
During the summer several small fires were reported on the site, and the Alberton 
Volunteer Fire Department reported they received calls that a white smoke was coming off 
the site. The Fire Department has said there never were actual fires, just smoke, and that 
their members would get ill after responding to one o f these calls.^^^
The calls from residents complaining o f persistent odor and illnesses associated with 
the initial and ongoing exposures to the contaminated soil, supposedly remediated site, and 
chemical residues in buildings, continued into the summer. Those complaining were treated 
differently by DEQ, depending on their perceived status and power, just as Plum Creek 
apparently warranted different treatment than ordinary residents. State Senate
^"Memo from Aimee Reynolds to Tom Ellerhoff re: Alberton Train Wreck- Evaluation 
o f Health Risks Associated with residual chemical levels 
ACCEH and King, 1997.
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Representative Spook Stang called Tom Ellerhoff on May 31, 1996, and complained o f the 
noxious odor detectable from the site as he passed by on the interstate. Mr. Stang's call was 
immediately referred to Randy Cox, the attorney representing MRL in the derailment.^*®
DEQ summarized its view of the situation in a Draft Press Release entitled 
‘Alberton Derailment Site Reclamation and Monitoring’ to be released over the summer. 
“The MDEQ and Missoula and Mineral county health officials continue to receive periodic 
complaints o f odor from mercaptans in the potassium cresylate... The odor is often 
characterized as smelling like a pesticide...People who are sensitive to the smell appear 
more apt to detect the odor than those who are not.”^”  This last statement was used 
repeatedly by the DEQ to minimize and marginalize the complaints o f residents. It is 
obviously undermined by the Plum Creek situation, but since residents were never 
informed o f that situation, this statement maintained the publicly disclosed status quo.
Chris Weis, EPA Regional Toxicologist was sent the draft for comments. He replied, 
"Tom, the odors which people may be reporting are more likely phenolics. They smell a bit 
like pesticides and the human nose is extremely sensitive to them. Mercaptans, which smell 
skunk-like, are very distinctive and are probably not a likely source o f odors. Both are a 
possibility given the situation.” (Edits to DEQ PR by Chris Weis) It is alarming that despite 
numerous complaints and reported illness attributed to the odor-producing substances, the 
DEQ was not yet sure o f this information, and furthermore, had not yet asked EPA for 
assistance in determining the root of the problems. Instead, DEQ and the two health
Tom Ellerhoff (DEQ) Notes. 10/16/96.
DEQ Draft Press Release ‘Alberton Derailment Site Reclamation and Monitoring’. No 
date. From placement in files and content, likely written May-June 1996.
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departments worked to minimize people’s complaints and advised them in various ways in 
an inequitable fashion, all in the absence of actual knowledge concerning the source of the 
odor associated symptoms, and health effects.
Despite the removal o f contaminated soils, according to DEQ's notes, the complaints 
o f illness continued throughout the summer. On May 31, 1996 State Senator Stang called 
and “1. Wanted to make sure the state had taken sampling results 2. Said he could smell 
pot. Crys.” That same day a female resident called to report that she was "still getting sick " 
On June 2, 1996 an Alberton resident called and reported that his family was sick 
and that he "hasn’t smelled mercaptans since he changed the carpet on his porch.” 
Residents’ complaints were never investigated by DEQ, and all of the residents complaints 
to DEQ support the theory that other chemicals besides chlorine became airborne in the 
initial cloud and were deposited throughout the town outside and in homes. The DEQ 
ignored all residents’ statements like that above and did not consult with the EPA or health 
departments to determine what could be causing such scenarios. Residents were never 
instructed to replace carpets, draperies or other household items which would have 
absorbed toxic chemicals from the cloud. On June 5 the same gentleman called back and 
Tom Ellerhoffs notes state “ l)Wife sick; 2) kids sick/he’s sick; 3) very ticked off'.
Also on June 5, a Missoula attorney representing property owners above the spill site 
told Tom Ellerfhoff that she had visited the site on Sunday, June 2, 1996 and "her husband 
and children said they could smell the mercaptans. She also talked about neighbors 
complaining that their water was tasting funny, I suggested that she work with the Mineral 
Co. Sanitarian to get their wells tested. Also said I had called the Mineral Co. and MCCHD
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and neither reported any large scale groups complaining about being ill.” This illustrates 
perfectly how residents’ complaints were ignored and marginalized, since in the officials’ 
eyes apparently not enough people were sick or complaining to warrant investigation.
Ellerhoffs meeting notes from a June 6, 1996 meeting with the head of the DEQ, 
Mark Simonich recorded "Two areas o f concern 1) remediation o f the accident site; 2) why 
does the place still s m e l l . W h i l e  DEQ did discuss these problems among themselves, no 
discussion with the community or attempt to remedy the problems ever occurred.
On June 13, an employee hired to clean some trailers used during the spill response 
and cleanup called Tom Ellerhoff with the following issues:
1) Wanted to know if  the 'white dust’ was harmful
2) He was asked to re-carpet a trailer that Rail Link used at the...site
3) Checked EPA report for 4/28/96 and talked to Chris Weis
A) Such in homes in town were analyzed an showed non-detectable for chlorinated 
phenols and cresols.
B) Suggested he take whatever precautions he deemed appropriate.
This lack o f information, guidance and accountability on the part of DEQ was 
incredibly damaging to evacuees. They were unable to get a response or assistance from the 
one agency still actively involved in the situation. Montana Rail Link’s friendliness to ill 
residents had waned and personal injury lawsuits were beginning to be filed to recoup 
losses in property value, health, employment, emotional well-being, and more. The railroad 
company was also proving uncooperative to state and local officials. On October 1, 1996, 
DEQ notes state that:
2'* Tom Ellerhoff, DEQ. Notes from meeting with Mark Simonich, Aimee Reynolds, and 
Bill Potts re: what else is the dept going to do. 6/6/96.
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Missoula County has outstanding expenses totaling an estimated $750,000 which 
Rail Link has not paid.... The agreement was that this bill would not be paid until 
Missoula County was paid by Rail Link, Rail link, has, to date, not paid the bill and 
is questioning the costs billed to Missoula County by the State...It is in the best 
interest o f the State to cooperate and assist Missoula County in convincing Rail Link 
o f its responsibility to reimburse Missoula County for their response, cost, which 
include the State’s costs.^’̂
Montana Rail Link was required under CERCLA to pay for costs incurred by the 
responders. “Recovery o f Costs. An emergency responder has the right to recover from the 
responsible party the emergency responder’s full costs directly related to a hazardous 
material incident.”
On October 16th, 1996 Jack Hunt, Safety Officer, for Missoula Electric Co-operative 
called DEQ. According to Ellerhoffs notes, "Jack said two o f the coop’s meter readers had 
headaches after reading meters in the Alberton, MT area last month....They reported it was 
a warm day, dry and there was some blowing dust....One person...reported a fertilizer scent. 
The other... said he didn’t smell anything out of the ordinary, [but] he did develop a 
headache ”
Like the Plum Creek situation, DEQ did not inform residents of this situation and the 
company was afforded a response far exceeding what any Alberton resident ever received 
for similar and worse complaints. Per DEQ’s recommendation and with their assistance,
Mr. Hunt was referred to MRL. MRL then hired Olympus Environmental Inc. to begin air 
monitoring in the area because o f the complaints o f the utility company. Ellerhoff has 
stated that the DEQ did not oversee the testing and has no knowledge of the results of the
Letter from Doug Booker, Administrator, Centralized Services to MG Prendergast, 
The Adjutant General. RE: Recap and Status o f Rail Link Train Derailment -Alberton.
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air monitoring. They, in effect, let the two companies, Montana Rail Link and the Missoula
Electric Co-operative, settle it between themselves. Once again, the plight o f resident
remained unchanged and they remained in the dark about ongoing chemical injury that was
creating the need for further testing and results. In the meantime, the Montana Department
of Environmental Quality protected the interests of businesses far greater than it protected
the health o f Montana citizens by providing Plum Creek and the Co-op preferential
treatment. DEQ also favored Montana Rail Link’s interests in minimizing liability by
failing to investigate or respond to ongoing health complaints in Alberton.
The correspondence between State Senator Stang and Tom Ellerfhoff continued on
October 17, 1996. Ellerhoff responded to Stang’s concerns with more assurance that not
many people were complaining. It is interesting that a visit to the Mineral county
Sanitarian, Denise Moldroski, by the Alberton Community Evacuees (ACE) did not merit
serious consideration. The group continued to be marginalized, despite the 100 or more
people it represented and was in contact with, and its wealth of information concerning day
to day life and health problems in Alberton. Officials never deemed this information
important enough to fully explore, and instead chose to assume it was false and not
credible. This attitude is shown in Tom Ellerhoffs notes o f a conversation with Sen. Stang:
After we talked, I called the state's Epidemiologist, Todd [Damrow]. and Ms. 
Moldroski [Mineral County Sanitarian] to find out if  they had been receiving calls 
from Alberton residents. Dr. Damrow said he had not. Ms. Moldroski said the only 
people who had contacted her recently were three persons from Alberton 
representing a public interest group...Since July 1, 1996 I received three or four calls 
from people identifying themselves as Alberton residents. They were concerned 
with health matters reportedly due to the release....
Tom Ellerhoff, DEQ. Notes from conversation with Sen. Spook Stang. 10/16/96.
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On November 7, 1996, Ellerhoffs notes state that a female “alleged Alberton, MT 
resident" called with health complaints. He “[t]old her how to get information on MSDS 
(Material Safety Data Sheets) sheets and said what we really needed was substantive 
information from people living in the area. She said she’d send it."^^‘ MSDS sheets on the 
chemicals spilled had been distributed during the evacuation. Alberton residents had 
already far exceeded the scanty information provided by MSDSs by virtue of their own 
research. Instead of DEQ taking control and meeting victims needs by investigating health 
concerns, meeting with the affected community for follow up or any other proactive, 
involved act, it continued to brush off residents and put the onus on them to prove health 
effects and educate themselves about health problems which no official would 
acknowledge as actually existing. The residents had already begun this work. The 
community group (ACE) conducted a health survey to record symptoms and compiled all 
available information on the chemicals they were exposed to. They reached out to national 
environmental health experts for assistance, including Linda King o f the Environmental 
Health Network.
On November 7, Ellerfoff also talked with MRL employee Jacquie Suhame. 
Ellerhoff “explained Jack Hunt’s (MEC) concerns. 1 asked if  MRL would 1) call Mr. Hunt
Tom Ellerhoff, DEQ. Notes from conversation with Beverly Ridenour. 11/7/96.
Environmental Health Network is a non-profit organization based in Norfolk, 
Virginia. Linda King, chemically injured herself, advocates for communities affected by 
toxic chemicals. EHN has published several reports documenting the trends and patterns 
in the impact o f toxic incidents on communities. King has also been heavily involved in 
efforts to reform the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR).
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2) Interview the MEC employees and 3) consider having someone accompany them when 
they read meters again. This follow up to the Electric Co-op employees health 
complaints far exceed anything offered to Alberton residents.
On November 15, 1996, Ellerfhoff spoke with the EPA toxicologist, Chris Weis. 
According to E llerhoffs notes:
1 ) Said he was receiving calls from Alberton Public Interest people
2) I explained:
a) What was happening w/ MEC and MRL
b) Indicated we also were receiving similar calls and checked with MCCHD and 
Mineral Co. Sanitarian.
D) Also advised to do as the speaker Linda King advised and record all alleged 
problems.
3)1 said we wanted to see MRL’s final report before doing anything further.
Chris said EPA would also wait.^^“
On November 20, DEQ participated in an "Alberton Derailment Conference Call."
The concerns o f  Missoula ophthamologist Dr. Neumeister were discussed, as were the
characteristics o f active members o f the community group (ACE), such as Lucinda Hodges.
Concerns o f Dr. Rick Newmeister(sic)- May be seeing some long-term effects of 
exposure. Has some medical questions, however, doesn’t seem to think anybody 
can help him with them... [he said] 'they’re the kind of questions that don’t have 
answers’
Linda King
a) Who contacted her-what do we know about her involvement???
b) What do we know about Lucinda Hodges-article provided by Todd Damrow
1) Best guess says she contacted Linda.
2) What do we know about her group?
DHS follow up with Dr. Newmeister-he thinks he is seeing evidence o f long­
term effects from the chlorine exposure (maybe other substance???he doesn’t 
know)
Other Topics??
“̂ Tom Ellerhoff, DEQ. Notes from conversation with Jacquie Suhame, MRL. 11/7/96.
Tom Ellerhoff, DEQ. Notes from conversation with Chris Weis, EPA Region 8 
Toxicologist. 11/15/96.
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A) Lack o f information about the caustic solution potassium cresylate.
These notes indicate that DEQ and the other agencies involved (including EPA and 
ATSDR) were aware of the incompleteness of information regarding health effects and the 
chemicals responsible for those symptoms, notably potassium cresylate. This conversation, 
which acknowledges a “lack o f information” about potassium cresylate and reports by a 
local doctor o f unexplained symptoms, is remarkable in that it occurred seven months after 
the same government agencies determined the Alberton area safe to re-enter and all health 
symptoms to be attributed to chlorine and likely to resolve quickly. The agency officials 
acknowledge these looming uncertainties critical to the health of affected residents. But the 
officials dedicate as much time to investigating the coordinator of the local community 
group, Lucinda Hodges, and one of the few experts who had offered to help residents with 
health problems, Linda King. The suspicion leveled at these two women, coupled with the 
lack o f respect and credence given Alberton residents by DEQ during the aftermath, 
demonstrates the level confidence these agencies had in the resolution of the Alberton 
disaster and how much there was to hide.
The summer and fall months following the re-entry of the evacuated area were 
characterized by a constant stream of health complaints by residents and newcomers to the 
area alike. These reported symptoms were taken seriously in an inequitable fashion, with 
vocal Alberton residents active in the community group (ACE, then ACCEH) receiving the 
least attention and credence for their complaints. The DEQ, as the lead agency for the 
remediation, and the state agency in charge o f environmental and human health concerns.
^  Tom Ellerhoff, DEQ. Notes from conference call re; Alberton Derailment. 11/20/96.
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was responsible for all Alberton related issues in the absence o f federal involvement after 
April 28, 1996. Unfortunately, although DEQ was the recipient o f much information and 
countless reports of illness in Alberton which demonstrated the lingering effects of 
chemicals other than chlorine, they did next to nothing. DEQ assisted some people with 
complaints (most notably, businesses) while it counseled locals to contact local health 
departments. After dissipating the concerned public through bureaucratic inaction, DEQ 
would then dutifully ask local health departments if  they were receiving complaints and 
then time after time conclude that simply not enough people were complaining to warrant 
concern or action. Residents and their complaints disappeared into what they often called a 
black hole, between agencies. There was no one to turn to who was accountable, and no 
official or agency had any answers to even the most basic of residents’ questions regarding 
the cause o f their symptoms and what Montana Rail Link and the government were going 
to do to remedy the situation.
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C hapter 5. The Challenge of Hazardous M aterials Transportation: Solutions for 
Accident Prevention
Another conspicuous feature o f  the law on the transport o f  hazardous substances is 
its failure to achieve the primary goal o f  risk reduction. [Unfortunately], 
alternative sources o f  law only partially have filled  the vacuum. The role o f  the 
states is not well defined and perpetually at issue. Even the tort remedy fo r  injured 
parties and the environment is imperfectly established.
The regulatory framework of hazardous materials transportation largely fails to 
offer the means to achieve disclosure or gain assurance o f safe practices or accident 
prevention goals. Hazardous materials transportation is a large, risky business in which 
"safety records are unimpressive and show few signs of improvement.”^̂ ’ The body of law 
regulating hazardous materials transport is complex and confusing and has failed “to 
achieve the primary goal of risk reduction.” It is described even by practitioners as "ill- 
fitting" and "ramshackle" and "so complex that no one understands it at all" and "a source 
o f regulations so byzantine that some firms do not even try to comply with them"'.“ ^
A main reason for the complexity of hazardous materials transportation law is the 
variety of authorities acting at different times in different contexts. These include
William H. Rodgers. 1992. Environmental Law: Hazardous Wastes and Substances. 
Chapter 7. West Publishing Company. Note: The tort cases arising from Montana Rail 
Link’s toxic spill at Alberton are underway. The Missoula Independent 
(www.everyweek.com) has been covering the cases well. A case decided in the spring of 
2001 found no negligence by MRL because they had not broken any Federal Railway 
Administration safety regulations. As a result, MRL was not held responsible for causing 
the toxic spill or the resulting injuries. The derailment and chemical spill were then 
considered an accident, which prevented victims from receiving punitive damages from 
the railroad.
Id.
Id
229 I d
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transportation laws, specific railroad lawŝ ^® and solid waste laws. Further confounding 
matters is the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution which can preempt state and 
local attempts to improve safety of hazardous materials transportation.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) : Placards, Manifests and Tracking 
RCRA^^‘ calls for the promulgation o f standards "applicable to transporters of 
hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter, as may be necessary to protect 
human health and the environment. EPA defined "transporter" as any person "engaged 
in the offsite transportation o f hazardous waste by air, rail, highway, or water.
Subsection 3003(a) o f RCRA created so-called "cradle-to-grave" monitoring of the 
vast network o f  hazardous waste exchange between facilities via transporters by requiring:
(1) recordkeeping concerning such hazardous waste transported, and their source 
and delivery points;
(2) transportation of such waste only if  properly labeled;
(3) compliance with the manifest system...; and
(4) transportation of all such hazardous waste only to the hazardous waste 
treatment, storage or disposal facilities which the shipper designates on the manifest 
form to be a facility holding a permit...
Railroad safety is regulated by a number o f laws, the major ones being the Railroad 
Safety Act o f 1970, revised by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1988 and the Federal 
Railroad Safety Act.
42 U.S.C.A. §6951 et seq.
232 42 U.S.C.A. §6951 et seq.
233 Rodgers, William H. 1992. Environmental Law: Hazardous Wastes and Substances. 
Chapter 7. West Publishing Company.
234 42 U.S.C.A. §6293(a)
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The key component of RCRA transportation rules is the placarding and manifest 
system, which allows EPA to track all waste t r a n s p o r t . T h e  problem of multiple laws was 
addressed in RCRA by a call for EPA to “coordinate” with the Department of 
Transportation, and insistence that the RCRA regulations "be consistent" with the 
requirement of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act and its implementing 
regulations. EPA stated that for the purpose of all other components of transportation 
safety it had "expressly adopted certain regulations of the Department of Transportation 
(DOT). ... These regulations concern, among other things, labeling, marking, placarding, 
using proper containers, and reporting discharges.
Under RCRA, transporters are required to take several actions in the event of a spill
or discharge o f hazardous waste. First, the transporter must notify the National Response
Center o f the hazardous release, take “appropriate immediate action to protect human
health and the environment”, follow direction to initiate “necessary” removal actions, and
report in writing about the incident. The clean up standard is simply stated;
A transporter must clean up any hazardous waste discharge that occurs 
during transportation or take such action as may be required or approved by 
Federal, State, or local officials so that the hazardous waste discharge no 
longer presents a hazard to human health or the environment.
Each train presents a different assemblage of hazardous materials. And that 
assemblage changes as the train adds and removes cars at stops. For example, the 
manifest from the Alberton incident provided the comprehensive information on what 
the train was carrying, destinations and ownership of each cargo, and the order of cars on 
the train. Citizen activists warn that manifests are not updated as frequently as they 
should be during the course o f cargo loading and unloading throughout a trip. As a result, 
the information most critical to emergency responders is sometimes wrong, making 
determinations of materials involved in derailments difficult.
^  45 Federal Register 33149, 33151 (May 19, 1980).
2)7 40 CFR §263.31.
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1975 Hazardous Material Transportation Act (HMTA)
The first broad legislation aimed at reducing hazardous materials transportation
risks came in the mid-70s as environmental concerns grew.
Social concern is gathering more over a transient peril to public safety in the 
transportation o f hazardous materials...Citizens are becoming less tolerant o f the 
toxic traffic rumbling through their towns and competing for space on their 
highways. With ebbing confidence, the public is peering past the innocuous 
appearance o f trucks and trains hauling chemical cargoes to perceive them as 
rolling bombs.
This characterization was based on the fact that lives are at risk daily by 
transportation covered by the HMTA. Crashes involving HMTA-regulated substances kill 
more than 100 people in a typical year- more by an order o f magnitude or two than die as a 
result o f RCRA or CERCLA related activities. Congress addressed the increasing challenge 
presented by dangerous commodities in transit by enacting the Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Act o f 1974 (HMTA)^^^. Congress declared the purpose of the HMTA “to 
improve the regulatory and enforcement authority o f the Secretary o f Transportation to 
protect the nation adequately against the risks to life and property which are inherent in the 
transportation o f hazardous materials in commerce.” '̂*®
The HMTA vests broad authority in the Secretary of Transportation to adopt 
measures necessary to secure protection from hazardous materials. Uniformity of these 
measures with other laws was a major goal. Legislative history of the HMTA reflects
Stuart C. Thompson, 1987. The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act: Chemicals at 
Uncertain Crossroads. Transportation Law Journal 15:411-433.
23» Pub. L. No. 93-633, title I, 88 Stat. 2156 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§1801-1812 (1982)). 
2̂® Pub. L. No. 93-633, title I, 88 Stat. 2156 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§1801-1812 (1982)).
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Congressional concern that the fragmented state or federal hazardous materials law prior to 
the Act failed to address many risks critical to safe movement o f these goods. A primary 
motivation in passage was to close this gap by charging a single federal agency with 
overseeing hazardous materials safety to “ ...preclude a multiplicity o f state and local 
regulations and the potential for varying as well as conflicting regulations in the area of 
hazardous materials transportation."^^* Unfortunately, the HMTA did not rectify the 
problems of hazardous materials transportation sufficiently; public concern grew and it 
became necessary for Congress to act again
1990 Hazardous Material Transportation Uniform Safety Act (HMTUSA)
After fifteen years o f mounting public concern and Congressional hearings 
concerning hazardous materials transportation since its passage, the HMTA was amended 
in 1990 and renamed the Hazardous Material Transportation Uniform Safety Act o f 1990 
(HMTUSA).^'*^ A Amended again in 1994,^“*̂ HMTUSA was designed “to provide adequate 
protection against the risks to life and property inherent in the transportation o f hazardous 
material in commerce by improving the regulatory and enforcement authority of the 
Secretary o f Transportation."^'*^
-̂** Id.
Pub. L. 101-615, Nov. 16, 1990, 104 Stat. 3244 (recodified at 49 U.S.C. as ch. 51- 
Transportation o f Hazardous Material, §5101 et seq.).
2'*̂ Pub. L. 101-615, Nov. 16, 1990, 104 Stat. 3244 (recodified at 49 U.S.C. as ch. 51- 
Transportation o f Hazardous Material, §5101 et seq.).
Frank P. Grad, 1995. Hazardous Material Transportation Uniform Safety Act o f 1990. 
American Law Institute- American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education. 
February 16. Columbia University School of Law.
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The Congressional findings for the 1990 amendment gave clear indications of the
intent to provide broader, more effective protections from the dangers presented by
hazardous materials transportation, and to create a body o f law tending toward national
uniformity. The findings noted that:
approximately 4 billions tons of regulated hazardous materials are transported each 
year and that a half a million movements of such materials occur each year; that 
accidents involving the release of hazardous materials are a serious threat to health 
and safety ; that many states and localities have enacted laws and regulations which 
differ from the federal requirements, creating a potential for unreasonable hazards 
in other jurisdictions and "confounding" shippers and carriers who try to comply 
with multiple and conflicting regulatory requirements; because of the potential risks 
to life, property and environment posed by unintentional releases of hazardous 
materials, "consistency in law and regulations governing the transportation of 
hazardous materials is necessary and desirable" in order to achieve greater 
uniformity and promote public health, welfare and safety at all its levels; federal 
standards are necessary and desirable to regulate the transportation of hazardous 
materials in intrastate, interstate and foreign commerce;
As revised, HMTUSA constitutes a nationwide code governing transportation of 
hazardous material. In regulating hazards arising out of transportation, the Secretary of 
Transportation is granted authority to act proactively to bring civil action and “issue orders 
in situations which represent a substantial likelihood that death, serious illness, severe 
personal injury or a substantial endangerment to health, property or the environments 'may 
occur before the reasonable foreseeable completion date o f a formal proceeding begun to 
lessen the risk o f that death, illness, injury or endangerment'".^"^ Unfortunately, such 
proactive action has been rare and, as a result, states and localities have found it necessary
Pub. L. 101-615, §2, Nov. 16, 1990, 104 Stat. 3244 as discussed in Grad, 1995.
Frank P. Grad, 1995. Hazardous Material Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990. 
American Law Institute- American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education. 
February 16 .Columbia University School o f Law.
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to enter the fray of hazardous materials transportation regulation.
Prevention Solutions fo r  Communities: The Problem o f  Preemption
As states and lesser jurisdictions continue to realize the inadequacy of the 
federal scheme to meet their needs, they become more proactive enacting 
laws and regulations to shield their constituents from the ills perceived in 
hazardous materials transportation. The issue further is joined by industry, 
which contends unilateral local efforts place an onerous burden on 
commerce, often in conflict with the Constitution and federal statutory 
law.""’
Limited, but still effective, options are available to a locality desiring to minimize 
risk and prevent accidents involving hazardous materials transportation. All hazardous 
materials transportation law is federal, any state or local action can be preempted by 
superseding federal law. The Constitutional framework for federal preemption is found in 
the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause. Congress has the power to 
regulate commerce between states, nations and Indian tribes, and the Constitution and the 
laws of the land [federal laws] are given supremacy over all other laws.""® Accordingly, 
under the Supremacy clause, when state police powers conflict with federal commerce, the 
state laws may be nullified, or "preempted".
In addition to Constitutionally provided preemption, some federal transportation 
laws address preemption in more detail. HMTA, and then HMTUSA, directed that a state 
or local provision will be preempted by federal law if  compliance with both the state/local 
requirement and any requirement o f federal law is not possible, or if the state/local
Stuart C. Thompson, 1987. The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act; Chemicals at 
Uncertain Crossroads. Transportation Law Journal 15:411-433.
U.S. Constitution. Supremacy Clause. Article VI, Clause 2.
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requirement as applied or enforced creates an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of federal law.̂ '*®
HMTUSA specifically preempts five covered subjects which include the placarding
and manifesting of hazardous materials. Explicitly preempted are; (i)designation,
description and classification of hazardous materials; (ii) packing, labeling, and placarding;
(iii) shipping documents; (iv) written notification, recording and reporting o f unintentional
releases in transportation; and (v) packages and containers.
This direct statutory preemption reflects the judgment of Congress that the
requirements o f uniformity are sufficiently compelling to warrant eliminating the statutory
processes for determining preemption. In the interest of procedural efficiency, this
approach was widely accepted during drafting and hearing of the bill.
The natural impulse within the locality is toward regulations calculated to reduce 
the apparent risks and amounts of HazMat transport. ..Here the role o f preemption is 
to maintain regulatory ceilings (rather than floors) which best balance legitimate 
local concerns against broader societal impacts. The question is to what extent 
should a state or locality be able to serve its own welfare by detracting from the 
broader general welfare?
HMTUSA went further than HMTA in elevating the cause of uniform national 
regulations. Nonetheless, a variety o f preemption cases have been brought to the courts.
Jordan Jay Hillman, 1992.Federal Preemption Under the Hazardous Materials 
Transport Act: Assessing Standards and Procedures. Transportation Law Journal 20:293- 
338.
HMTA §4. See also § 104(a)(4).
Jordan Jay Hillman, 1992.Federal Preemption Under the Hazardous Materials 
Transport Act: Assessing Standards and Procedures. Transportation Law Journal 20:293- 
338.
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When a state or locality considers a mechanism to regulate hazardous materials 
transportation, that measure must be permitted by the DOT under HMTUSA. Approval 
occurs only if  the state or local action is not preempted by federal law. Any state or locality 
or any person "affected by any [state or local requirement]" may apply to DOT for a 
determination o f preemption. DOT must provide notice of the application by publication in 
the Federal Register. Following publication, the applicant is barred from seeking judicial 
relief on the same issue until DOT's final action, or 180 days after filing the application, 
whichever comes first. Any party authorized to apply to DOT for a preemption 
determination may also seek a preemption determination in court. Thus, the only restriction 
is the 180 day delay. Finally, a state or locality always retains the right to challenge a DOT 
preemption finding in court.
DOT can waive preemption if: (1) the requirement in issue affords public protection 
equal to, or greater than, that afforded by the Act or DOT's regulations, and (2) it does not 
unreasonably burden interstate commerce.^^^ Whether a state /local requirement affords "an 
equal or greater level o f protection" than that afforded by federal regulations is largely 
factual. Conversely, whether a requirement "unreasonably burdens" commerce (as 
compared to whether it simply "burdens" commerce) almost always involves a subjective 
judgment. This subjective judgment includes a balancing between the benefit of the 
state/local requirement and the costs and loss to efficiency caused by the requirement. DOT
Jordan Jay Hillman, 1992.Federal Preemption Under the Hazardous Materials 
Transport Act: Assessing Standards and Procedures. Transportation Law Journal 20:293- 
338.
Todd Wallace. 1986. Preemption o f Local Laws by the Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Act. University o f  Chicago Law Review  53:654-681.
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then considers the balance in relation to "the need for uniformity" and the prevalence or 
absence o f the requirement in other jurisdictions.
Among the more contentious preemption issues have been those involving local 
routing bans or constraints on radioactive materials based on population density. The City 
o f New York asked the Department o f Transportation to utilize the safest alternative mode 
o f transportation for moving nuclear materials through the city. New York asked DOT to 
barge nuclear materials, rather than use the city’s highways that run directly through highly 
populated areas. The court denied the city’s request as an unacceptable preemption of 
federal authority.^ '̂* Other cases asserting state and local regulations prior to HMTUSA 
fared better.^^® Cases under HMTUSA have faced a stricter preemption standard in which 
the court notes the major purpose of HMTUSA to be development of a uniform, national 
method of regulation o f hazardous materials t r anspor ta t ion. In a noteworthy exception to 
the case law, Massachusetts sought to establish a bonding requirement of at least $10,000 
per hazardous materials transporter operating within the state. The court allowed the bond 
to stand, for among other reasons, that bonding was not one of the categories explicitly 
triggering preemption.^^’
City o f  New York v. Department o f  Transportation, 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983); cert, 
denied (for lack o f jurisdiction), 465 U.S. 1055, 79 L.Ed.2d 730, 104 S.Ct. 1403 (1984).
See New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass 'n. v. Flynn, 751 F.2d 43 (CANH 1984); City 
o f New York v. Ritter Transp, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 663, a f f d  677 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1982).
See Public Service Co. o f  Colorado v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 30 F.3d 1203, 24 
ELR 21286 (9'*' Cir. 1994); Chlorine Institute v. California Highway Patrol, 29 F.3d 495, 
24 ELR 21273 (9^ Cir. 1994); Northern State Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton 
Sioux Indian Community, 781 F. Supp. 612 (D.Minn.l991), afTd 991 F.2d 458, 23 ELR 
20944 (8* Cir. 1993).
Commonwealth o f  Massachusetts v. United States Department o f  Transportation, 320 
U.S. App. D C. 227; 93 F.3d 890 (1996).
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In conclusion, the onus is clearly on states and localities to navigate the intricacies 
o f preemption by devising measures that satisfy the requirements. While burdensome, it is 
incumbent upon states and localities to discuss options with experts in this field to 
determine and pursue measures protective of human health and safety.
Railroad Preemption: More stringent requirements
State and local regulation of railroad safety involves even greater obstacles. DOT 
regulates general railroad safety under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA)^^*. The 
FRSA preemption differs from the HMTUSA standard and reflects the traditionally greater 
concern for national uniformity in rail safety regulation as compared to highway safety 
regulation. As a result, a state rail safety regulation becomes ineffective upon DOT’s 
issuance o f a regulation "...covering the subject matter o f such state requirement." More 
stringent state requirements are allowed when “necessary to eliminate or reduce an 
essentially local safety hazard, and when not incompatible with any federal law, rule, 
regulation, order or standard, and when not creating an undue burden on interstate 
commerce.
Where state or local requirements afford "equal or greater" protection, HMTA 
exceptions are available for those that "[do] not unreasonably burden commerce." Under 
the FRSA, an otherwise preempted "more stringent" state requirement remains effective if.
45 U.S.C. §§421-441 (1983 and Supp. Ill 1985). It has been recommended that the law 
be revised to provide that all federal preemption for hazardous materials transportation 
be subject to HMTA, not vary by mode. See Hillman, 1993.
Steven C. Goldberg, 1987. State and Local Nuclear Transportation Permit and Fee 
Requirements. Transportation Law Journal 15:389-410.
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as a first condition, it is "necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local hazard. 
Regardless o f the severity of that hazard, the state must then run two further gauntlets on 
the path to an exception. It must demonstrate that its requirement is "not incompatible" 
with any federal requirement and does not create " an undue burden on interstate
commerce.
FRSA preemption is a more difficult test. Putting aside the possible ambiguities of 
"to the extent practicable", the fact is that FRSA preemption literally covers the entire field 
o f railroad safety. Does this mean that FRSA preemption extends to railroad safety laws 
governing the rail transport of hazardous materials? Conversely, does it mean that in regard 
to rail transport, HMTA preemption is superseded by the FRSA? Under current case law, 
the answer to both questions is "Yes".^^*
Jordan Jay Hillman, 1992.Federal Preemption Under the Hazardous Materials 
Transport Act; Assessing Standards and Procedures. Transportation Law Journal 20:293- 
338.
Jordan Jay Hillman, 1992.Federal Preemption Under the Hazardous Materials 
Transport Act: Assessing Standards and Procedures. Transportation Law Journal 20:293- 
338.
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Chapter 6. The Right-to-Know in Theory, Law and Practice
Indeed, knowledge makes a difference. One large population survey 
determined that the level o f  concern fo r  environmental toxics rose with the 
number o f  information sources. Another study found a positive correlation 
between information about [a] nuclear plant and the opposition to licensing
i t  262
Full disclosure of risk has been recognized as crucial to improving safety and 
reducing risk and is known as community right-to-know. Right-to-know begins with 
citizens gaining access to information previously held secret by industry. A feedback loop 
is created, beginning with citizen acquisition o f information and leading ultimately to 
accident prevention and safer industrial practices through public pressure on government 
and corporations
The crucial role o f community right-to-know in preventing toxic releases through 
citizen access to information has been written into law. Right-to-know law is based on the 
premise that in order to advocate for accident prevention and improved corporate conduct, 
the public first must know what the dangers are. Right-to-know (RTK) provides the public 
with the information necessary from which to build demands for improved operations, 
hazard reduction, and accident prevention. Information regarding risk is necessary for 
concerned citizens to form arguments for prevention and improved safety. Reluctance or 
refusal to share such information with the public jeopardizes public safety and hobbles 
attempts to prevent accidents. Only under public scrutiny and pressure will companies 
undertake changes not motivated by profit. And right-to-know information is the tool with
Brown, Phil and Edwin J. Mikkelsen. 1990. No Safe Place: Toxic waste, leukemia and 
community action. University of California Press, Los Angeles.
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which to create public pressure, an essential link in the feedback to accountability.
Unfortunately, transporters are exempt from most o f right-to-know law.
Government bodies responsible for upholding the right-to-know, notably Local Emergency 
Planning Committees (LEPCs), often fail to enhance the application of the spirit of right-to- 
know laws to transporters in the through creative means. This chapter will discuss the right- 
to-know in U.S. law, the omission of hazardous materials transporters from that law, the 
inadequacy of transportation regulations to improve safety and reduce risks, and methods 
for communities to improve the right-to-know for hazardous materials transporters and gain 
access to key information which leads to accident prevention.
Bhopal: Catalyst fo r  Disclosure
The concept o f community right-to-know was first included in U.S. law following a 
series of toxic disasters. On December 4, 1984, a deadly cloud o f methyl isocyanate, used 
in pesticide manufacture, settled over the 800,000 sleeping residents of Bhopal, India. More 
than 2,500 people died, and over 200,000 were injured, with 17,000 of those permanently 
disabled by exposure to the toxic chemical. The toxic cloud was released from a storage 
tank at a Union Carbide plant. Nine months later, another toxic chemical used to make 
pesticides, aldicarb oximine, was released by another Union Carbide facility in Institute, 
West Virginia, exposing thousands of people. Fortunately, the Institute release resulted in
Sidney M. Wolf. Fear and Loathing about the Public Right to Know: the Surprising 
Success of the EPCRA. Journal o f  Land Use & Environmental Law, Spring, 1996.
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no fatalities, but the similarities between the two disasters served as a wake-up call for 
citizens and lawmakers.
In both accidents local authorities were uninformed about what was happening and 
what chemicals were involved. Authorities were confused about how best to protect 
citizens. In Bhopal, the Union Carbide facility had an abysmal safety record, poorly trained 
employees, and local residents had no information regarding what was produced or used at 
the site. The alarm system that should have been set off by the release had been deactivated 
several years earlier, so as not to cause panic. When the alarms finally sounded, panicked 
workers fled the plant, running past buses parked for use in the event o f an evacuation. At 
the same time, local residents ran towards the plant, thinking that assistance was needed 
there to put out a fire. Local Bhopal authorities were not formally informed of the leak for 
two hours, and plant managers initially denied any problem. When a toxic release was 
finally admitted, plant officials gave no information concerning the content, location, or 
movement o f the poison cloud.^^
In Institute, West Virginia, residents smelled the release before they were informed 
of any problem. The alarm did not sound until a full twenty minutes after the initial release. 
When it did, people were unsure how to r e s p o n d . T h e r e  are numerous other examples of 
toxic chemical releases onto unsuspecting communities which are injured as a result. A 
1985 EPA survey estimated that over 7,000 toxic chemical releases had occurred in the US
Rebecca S. Weeks. 1998. The Bumpy Road to community preparedness; the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know Act. Environmental Lawyer.
Sidney M. Wolf. Fear and Loathing about the Public Right to Know: the Surprising 
Success o f the EPCRA. Journal o f  Land Use & Environmental Law, Spring, 1996.
153
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
in the previous five years, with 139 people killed, 1,478 injured, and 217,000 evacuated 
from their homes/*^ In the mid-1980s, with the recent disasters and survey information 
fresh in the public mind, Americans became increasingly concerned about the presence of 
chemical facilities near their homes.
Americans were hungry for information about chemical plants in their towns, but 
found it nearly impossible to obtain information from corporations. The chemical industry 
was reluctant to inform even government officials about chemicals used on site. In Camden 
County, Georgia, "the local Union Carbide plant did not tell county officials that the plant 
used methyl isocyanate even after an official updating emergency plans had specifically 
inquired about hazardous materials at the site. In addition to lacking information about the 
types o f chemicals used at the plant, neither Camden County nor Union Carbide had an 
evacuation plan in place for nearby residents. This scenario repeated itself across the 
country.
As citizens and officials became increasingly frustrated with the dearth of 
information on toxic chemical use at facilities, grassroots pressure resulted in numerous 
state and local laws designed to provide workers and communities with necessary 
information on chemical hazards. Worker protection laws, such as the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act (OSHA)^^* were designed to inform workers of the types of hazards to 
which they might be exposed in the workplace. New Jersey passed a Toxic Catastrophe
=“ EPA, 1985.
Rebecca S. Weeks, The Bumpy Road to community preparedness; the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-know Act. Environmental Lawyer, June 1998.
29 U.S.C. §651 et seq.
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Prevention Act in 1985, which required facilities using over a threshold amount of 
hazardous substance to submit information concerning risk management and hazard 
reduction.^^® EPA established the Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program (CEPP) to 
raise community “awareness of the potential for accidents involving extremely hazardous 
substances, and to foster development o f state and local emergency plans." The 
chemical industry joined in by developing the Community Awareness and Emergency 
Response (CAER) program to encourage “planning and information exchange between its 
member companies and their surrounding communities.
Congress was influenced by these efforts and incorporated portions of each into its 
remedy for problems in emergency planning and accessibility to information concerning 
toxic chemicals: the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). 
Although passed as Title HI of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 
1986 (SARA), EPCRA was designed to be a free-standing law apart from CERCLA and its 
amendments.^^^ The purpose o f EPCRA is to “establish programs to provide the public 
with important information on the hazardous chemicals in their communities and to 
establish emergency planning and notification requirements which would protect the public 
in the event o f a release o f hazardous chemicals.
Van R. Delhotal, The General Duty to prevent accidental releases of extremely 
hazardous substances: The general duty clause of Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act. 
^™U.S. EPA. 1988. Chemicals in your community: a guide to the emergency planning and 
community right-to-know ac t EPA Doc. 550-K-93-003.
Id.
Sidney M. Wolf. Fear and Loathing about the Public Right to Know: the Surprising 
Success of the EPCRA. Journal o f  Land Use & Environmental Law, Spring, 1996.
:^H.R Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, at 281 (1986), reprinted in, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.2835, 2895.
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The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
True to its name, EPCRA has a two-parted mandate: to improve planning for 
response to emergencies and to enhance the community right-to-know about risks.
Fulfilling each segments of the mandate relies on information disclosure. The effectiveness 
of response to emergencies increases with the amount and specificity of information 
provided to emergency responders. The public’s understanding of risk and ability to 
encourage safer practices is dependent upon access to information about industrial 
practices in their communities.
To protect the public through information disclosure, EPCRA focuses on four major 
areas: 1) planning for chemical emergency responses (§301); 2) providing emergency 
notification of chemical accidents and releases (§304); 3) reporting of hazardous chemical 
inventories (the Right-to-Know provisions) (§311-312); and 4) reporting of toxic chemical 
releases (§313). Public access and enforcement are additional areas of concern. EPCRA 
left most o f the details for emergency planning to state and local governments, but 
established an infrastructure for doing so. EPCRA mandated that each state form a State 
Emergency Response Commission (SERC), which in turn was to delineate emergency 
plaiming districts and appoint Local Emergency Planning Commissions (LEPCs). These 
state and local bodies were tasked with assembling emergency response plans as well as 
gathering and disseminating information on risk and response.
EPCRA focuses on facilities and transporters using certain toxic chemicals over 
thresholds set by EPA . Section 302 describes a list of 366 "extremely hazardous
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substances".These "threshold planning quantities" are defined and facilities exceeding these 
limits are subject to the provisions of EPCRA. Section 311 requires the dissemination of 
Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) to emergency responders, SERCs and LEPCs to 
increase knowledge of chemicals used in and being transported through communities. 
Perhaps the most wide-reaching program instituted by EPCRA is found in Section 313, the 
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). TRI requires facilities to account for toxic chemicals 
produced, disposed of and transported on and off-site. TRI is a powerful tool which gives 
citizens the opportunity to know the cumulative pollution and risk affecting their 
communities At the release o f the TRI data each year, community groups use the 
information to show which industries are the dirtiest, where improvements have been, and 
geographical variations in pollution. Mining operations were recently required to submit 
data to the TRI, making metals-rich western states such as Montana soar up the list because 
of heretofore uncounted tonnages of mining waste and pollution. Finally, EPCRA Section 
326 includes a citizen suit provision which allows citizens to sue SERCs, states and 
facilities for failing to abide by the law. An example of a citizen suit targeting EPCRA 
notification under Section 304, the only portion not exempting transporters, in Montana 
Rail Link’s toxic spill in Alberton will be discussed later in this chapter.
In sum, EPCRA deputizes state and local decision makers with the knowledge and 
the means to mitigate and help eliminate the impacts of chemical releases. By transferring 
information from industrial facilities and other businesses to local governments and 
citizens, EPCRA serves as an essential tool for communities to control the risk associated 
with the production and use of hazardous chemicals. Unfortunately, transporters of
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hazardous materials are exempt from all sections of EPCRA except for Section 304, 
emergency notification. In the case of the Montana Rail Link chemical spill at Alberton, 
local community groups pursued Section 304 compliance.
Enforcing EPCRA: Citizen Suit alleging Montana Rail L ink’s failure to notify under §304
Transporters are exempt from all right-to-know legislation, save §304 of EPCRA, 
the notification requirement. During the Alberton derailment incident, Montana Rail Link 
failed in their duty to comply with §304. The omission of information required by that 
section including identification o f the chemicals released and potential acute and chronic 
health effects, led to ongoing problems for spill victims in their quest for medical diagnosis 
and treatment.
Section 304 requires emergency notification and written follow-up to the SERC and 
LEPC o f a release into the environment of a reportable quantity o f either an "extremely 
hazardous substance” under §302 of EPCRA, or a CERCLA "hazardous substance subject 
to the emergency notification requirement of §103 (a) of CERCLA, of "EHS' or a 
"hazardous substance" under CERCLA from facilities and transporters. This notice is 
required immediately via telephone, radio, or in person to 911 or the community response 
coordinator. §304 §11004(b)(1). In addition to notifying the SERC and the LEPC, if  the 
substance is a CERCLA “hazardous substance, the facility must notify the National 
Response Center, which may be made by telephone. A follow-up written notice to the 
SERC and LEPC is also required "as soon as practicable" after the release. §11004(c). This 
is the only section o f EPCRA which does not exempt transportation of substances subject
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to the requirements of the law.
Notice o f a release must include:
the name of the chemical 
whether the chemical is extremely hazardous 
the location, amount, time and duration of the release
whether the chemical was released into the a i r , water, soil, or a combination of the 
three
the acute or chronic health effects of the substance 
advice on proper medical attention 
precaution, such as evacuation
the name and telephone number o f the facility contact
On April 19, 1996, eight days after the initial release during which time residents
had been allowed into the evacuated area to feed animals without any disclosure
concerning chemicals other than chlorine or by-products, a Missoula community group sent
the following notice to the Montana SERC, Department of Emergency Services Office:
Re: Request for public information concerning the Montana Rail Link derailment 
near Alberton, Montana and release o f chemicals
Under Section 324(A) of EPCRA, MRL is required to provide notice of the 
accident.. .Pursuant to this request, the notice information requires that the 
following be disclosed:
1) The time and date when your office was contacted by Montana Rail Link or other 
responsible party concerning the train derailment as required by section 304(b) of 
EPCRA
2) The amount, estimated or known, of chemicals released from the derailment;
3) The chemical name, estimated or known quantity involved in the release;
4) Time and duration for chemical release, and the known media that the chemicals 
were released to;
5) The known and anticipated health effects, acute and chronic health effects, 
resulting from the release of chemicals, and advice regarding medical attention 
necessary for exposed individuals;
6) Proper precautions to take as a result of the release; and
7) The name and telephone number o f the person or persons to be contacted for 
further information.
Notice of Intent to Sue Montana Rail Link for violation of EPCRA §304. Cold 
Mountain Cold Rivers. 4/24/96.
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When the §304 notification information was not provided as the end o f evacuation 
drew nearer with no sign o f full disclosure, formal notice was given on the intent to file an 
§304 EPCRA lawsuit. The suit was brought by a local environmental group. Cold 
Mountain, Cold Rivers, and an attorney, from the Western Environmental Law Center in 
Eugene, OR, who had previous experience in EPCRA litigation. The lawsuit was brought, 
according to the attorney, because "Without this information neither the public nor the 
agencies responsible for protecting the public health have the information necessary to fully 
determine the extent o f this catastrophe”̂ ’^
More specifically, the community group’s goal was “...to get the company to 
disclose the extent o f ecological contamination and health risks associated with the spill of 
toxic chemicals near Alberton, Montana.” The notice of intent to sue alleged that 
“..Montana Rail Link has failed, and continues to fail, to comply with section 304(c) of 
EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. section 11004(c). CMCR is informed and believes that Montana Rail 
Link has released large quantities o f extremely hazardous substances, including, but not 
limited to. Chlorine...in excess of statutory thresholds and subject of the emergency 
notification requirements of EPCRA”.̂ ”
The response from the SERC indicated a lack of understanding of the intent of §304 and its 
crucial importance for right-to-know.
Charlie Tebbutt, Western Environmental Law Center. 4/24/96. Press Release. Group files notic 
sue Montana Rail Link to disclose information on chemical spill in Alberton, MT.
Darrell Geist, CMCR 4/24/96. Id.
4/24/96 Notice o f Intent to Sue, Cold Mountain, Cold Rivers and Western Environmental Law 
Center.
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Written report o f ‘Followup Emergency Notice” (EPCRA subsection 304(c) is to be 
made ‘as soon as practicable after a release...” “Since CMCR and WELC were 
notifying of intent to file suit even before the incident was over (the WELC letter is 
dated April 24, 1996) it seems rather obvious that the intent o f their “intent to file 
suit” is not consistent with the intent o f the law and subsequent regulations. 
Furthermore, relief in this matter would see...to be nothing but data, which should 
be forthcoming “as soon as practicable after a [the] release” incident is over. I see 
this as a non-issue for the SERC, certainly worth no one’s effort at this point.
This response is flawed for several reasons. First, the seven pieces of information 
outlined in the letter to the SERC are required in the initial notice which may be given 
verbally immediately following a release. The written follow-up notice is then to occur “as 
soon as practicable after a release.” This memorandum demonstrates the confusion 
between the “release” and the “incident”. The chemical release, to which EPCRA refers 
and addresses in Section 304(c), occurred on 4/11/96 for all three chemicals of concern, 
and continued intermittently for chlorine and perhaps byproducts. The Alberton “incident” 
was not declared over until residents were back in their homes. This is exactly why CMCR, 
WELC, and numerous citizens advocated for full disclosure of chemicals spilled as soon as 
possible following the release of those chemicals and prior to the end of incident, then 
evacuation.
This information was integral to the any decision making pertaining to the health 
and safety issues of re-entry. The argument that Montana Rail Link and responders were 
too busy with the technical aspects of halting further release of chlorine and cleaning up the 
site to provide relevant information was baseless, but somehow succeeds. Evacuees were 
allowed to re-enter without full disclosure under EPCRA ever occurring, particularly as
4/30/96 To Tom Ellerhoff, SERC Co-Chair From; Fred Cowie, SERC Staff
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related to potassium cresylate, its components, and by-products in reaction with chlorine. 
Long-term health effects information was never provided for any of the chemicals, and 
short term information was provided only for chlorine.
The legal action to enforce Section 304 of EPCRA is an important tool which, if 
successful, makes clear the responsibility Montana Rail Link had to inform spill victims, 
the public and government agencies about all chemicals released in its April 11 derailment. 
With limited right-to-know tools available for enforcing hazardous materials transporters, it 
becomes critical that citizens hold transporters accountable to the few right-to-know 
provisions which explicitly apply to them.
The Risk Management Program: Oll2(r)
The other major piece of right-to-know legislation is §112(r) of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments o f 1990, know as EPA’s Risk Management Program (RMP)^’ .̂ The 
framework for the Risk Management Program is found in OSHA’s safe workplace 
standards, the general duty clause in the Clean Air Act Amendments (1990) which “directs 
owners and operators of stationary sources to identify hazards that may result from 
accidental releases, to design and maintain a safe facility, and to minimize the 
consequences o f releases when they occur” ®̂° , and the mandate of EPCRA. The Risk 
Management Program(RMP) goes further to combine these measures in a program 
requiring facilities to extend safe workplace goals to the surrounding community. Under
Clean Air Act Amendments o f 1990. PL 101-549, Nov. 15, 1990, 104 Stat 2399.
280 Yj
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§112(r), facilities must assess their potential impact on surrounding communities, disclose 
that information to the affected community and address how risks will be reduced. The 
RMP is comprised of four main elements: 1) hazard assessment with off-site consequence 
analysis; 2) accident prevention program; 3) emergency response plan; and 4) risk 
management plan
The final rule and notice o f the Risk Management Program was given on June 20, 
1996^** and the first plans were due from facilities by June 20, 1999. Facilities must submit 
the plans to Risk Management Plans to both the EPA and the LEPC. The RMP applies only 
to stationary sources, so once again transporters of hazardous materials are exempt from a 
key right-to-know provision. Other exemptions include explosives or naturally occurring 
hydrocarbons such as oil or gasoline. There are an estimated 66,000 facilities nationwide 
which must comply. The rule applies to a list o f 140 chemicals, including 63 flammable 
substances and 77 toxic substances with threshold limits for each listed substance. The four 
chemicals which force most facilities to comply with the RMP are chlorine, ammonia, 
sulfur dioxide, and propane. The majority o f facilities must complete the following to 
comply with the RMP: 1) register to the program; 2) conduct a hazard analysis; 3) compile 
a five-year accident history; 4) prepare an accident prevention program; 5) prepare an 
emergency response plan; and 6) submit a risk management plan. ^
A facility must conduct a hazard analysis for each chemical on the list it has on-site
40C.F.R. 68§112(r)(7).
Printed Materials, American Water Works Association Teleconference: How to 
comply with the USEPA’s Risk Management Rule, 10/22/98.
2“  Peterson, Jim; Glenn Ford, Jennifer Blair-Cockrum, USEPA RMP training for 
Missoula LEPC and facilities, Missoula, MT, June 9, 1998.
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above the threshold level. The hazard analysis includes a worst-case release scenario which 
involves the total quantity o f the largest single vessel, container or pipe released over ten 
minutes in weather conditions with maximize the off-site impacts. A more likely to occur 
alternate case scenario based on accident history data and more typical meteorology must 
also be modeled. For each release scenario, facilities must complete an off-site 
consequence analysis outlining how far the chemicals released would go and what 
vulnerable sites such as hospitals, schools, residences, waterways, and natural areas would 
lie in the path of the toxic cloud.
The prevention program requires facilities to outline tools for prevention in order to 
identify problems and opportunities. The goal with accident prevention is to encourage 
companies to look at the root cause o f accidents, and view every accident as not an isolated 
incident, but rather a symptom of larger, more fundamental problems that must be 
rectified. The five-year accident history provides additional data to examine for trends in 
performance. To improve accident prevention, industries are required to describe safety 
information, operating procedures, training for emergency situations, maintenance, 
compliance audits, and incident investigations. All of this information can then be assessed 
in sum to identify areas to be focused on for improvement.
The RMP requires the emergency response program to include procedures to be 
used on-site by employees in case o f a chemical release, a notification system to inform the 
public and emergency responders of an incident, opportunities to practice response 
procedures and test knowledge of them, coordination with local emergency responders, and 
appropriate medical procedures in case o f an accident.
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Finally, the risk management plan submitted to the EPA and Local Emergency 
Planning Committee (LEPC) incorporates all elements o f the program. It includes the off- 
site consequence analysis, the five-year accident history, the prevention program, and the 
emergency response plan. These risk management plans are the final products and form the 
basis for public discussion and risk communication. The crucial role o f LEPCs to play as 
the only local recipients of the plan will be discussed further, along with opportunities to 
apply risk management planning to transporters.
Much of the power o f EPCRA and Risk Management Planning rests with the Local 
Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs). Fortunately, LEPCs have the ability to redress 
transporter exemptions by requesting voluntary participation from transporters in a number 
of efforts to enhance emergency response and public safety. The functions, successes, 
failures and opportunities for LEPCs are discussed in the next chapter.
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C hapter 7. Local Emergency Planning Committees: Im portant Tool for Right-to- 
Know
I f  the “regulation through information " strategy o f  Title 111 (EPCRA) is to be 
effective in reducing chemical risks, the LEPCs must succeed in alerting the public 
to chemical hazards and in providing them with the information they need to hold 
industry and its public sector regulators accountable.
The overall objective o f  these changes is not only to increase the capacity o f  the 
LEPCs to fu lfill their risk communication role, but, more importantly, to make the 
LEPCs genuine community organizations that can serve as mechanisms through 
which the public can help make decisions about how to respond to the chemical 
risks that exist in their community.
In the face o f preemption and a complex web of hazardous materials transportation 
law and regulation, creative approaches to prevention and right-to-know are necessary and 
LEPCs are the venue to accomplish this work. It is clear from the legislative history that 
Congress viewed public participation as an integral component in planning and 
enforcement o f EPCRA: “Congress relied on strong public action to 'ensure prompt actions’ 
by state and local governments." By transferring information from industrial facilities 
and other businesses to local governments and citizens, EPCRA serves as an essential tool 
for communities to control the risk associated with the production and use of hazardous 
c h e m ic a ls .M iic h  of the power of EPCRA at the local level, however, rests with the 
Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs). Formed under §310 of EPCRA, Local
Rich, Richard, W. David Conn, William L. Owens. 1993. “Indirect regulation” of 
environmental hazards through the provision of information to the public: the case of 
SARA, Title III. Policy Studies Journal 21 ( 1 ): 16-35.
^«Weeks. See H R. Rep. No. 99-253, at 113, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C A N. 3276, 3375.
Gottlieb, Robert ed. 1995. Reducing Toxics: A new approach to policy and industrial 
decisionmaking. Island Press, Washington, D C.
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Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) are well equipped to research and implement a 
variety o f tools to educate the public about risk, encourage transporter cooperation in 
accident prevention and improve public safety. LEPCs nationwide have been examined for 
their compliance with EPCRA and effectiveness at implementing community right-to- 
know. LEPCs come up short throughout the country, and Missoula’s LEPC is no exception.
This section will explore what LEPCs must do, what they can do, and what they 
should do. How LEPCs can attain the goals set forth in the recommendations will be laid 
out in detail. To date, many LEPCs have undertaken the emergency planning segment of 
their mandate and ignored the community right-to-know component. This was 
understandable in the time immediately following passage of EPCRA when LEPCs were 
tasked with drawing up emergency response plans. Today, LEPCs that complied with 
EPCRA deadlines for completion and revision of emergency response plans face the 
challenge o f fulfilling their right-to-know mandate, which is less straightforward than 
drafting a response plan, but equally important. There are numerous resources available to 
LEPCs once they decide to fulfill their right-to-know obligations.^*^ Identifying and 
specifying risks is necessary to fine tune emergency response, prevent accidents and 
educate the public.
These include: The Right-to-Know Network at www.rtknet.org; the resources of the 
Jefferson County LEPC and guidelines for § 112(r) compliance at www. gablehouse- 
epel.com; EPA’s Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office’s extensive 
resources on accident prevention, right-to-know and the Risk Management Program at 
WWW. epa. go v/s wercepp.
Finally, Many LEPCs have their own webpages which outline their efforts to increase 
community right-to-know. For example, see Deer Park County, Texas and Harford 
County, Maiyland.
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LEPC Responsibilities Under EPCRA
LEPCs were formed by EPCRA to devise emergency response plans for accidents 
involving facilities and transporters handling hazardous materials in the local area. 
Facilities are directed, upon request, to provide LEPCs with information necessary to 
complete response plans, including Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS). Under Section 
312, LEPCs annually compile an inventory of facilities using hazardous materials; these 
inventories describe the hazardous chemicals used by the facility. Facilities must submit 
information on chemicals used including type, maximum and average amounts of the 
chemical, storage information and location of the chemical on site.
EPCRA directs each LEPC to include representatives from the facilities covered by 
EPRA, media, elected officials, law enforcement, civil defense, fire fighting, community 
groups, first aid, health, local environmental, hospital and transportation personnel. LEPCs 
fail to cast the net wide for membership and the limitations caused by narrow membership 
have adversely affected public disclosure because the direction o f a LEPC is determined in 
large part by its membership. For example, the Missoula County LEPC historically 
included few to no representatives of the public interest or non-profit environmental 
sector.^** The Missoula LEPC added four “at large” citizen representatives, but did not 
specify that any of those citizens be from a community or environmental group, despite 
direction from EPCRA to do so.
Annie Szvetecz. 1996. EPCRA as a tool for community involvement in environmental 
management o f polluting industries. Univereity of Montana, Missoula.
168
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LEPCs must appoint a chairperson to establish rules for the committee to follow, 
give public notice o f its activities, and establish procedures for handling public requests for 
information. The LEPC is also required to publish an annual notice of the public 
availability o f its emergency response plan and other data, such as inventory forms, in local 
newspapers. Emergency plans were due by October 17, 1988, and must be reviewed 
annually.
EPCRA Section 303 requires LEPCs to gather appropriate information to develop 
and update emergency response plans. "Upon request from the emergency planning 
committee, the owner or operator of the facility shall promptly provide information to such 
committee necessary for developing and implementing the emergency plan”.̂ ®̂ This 
statement designates authority and responsibility to the LEPC to collect any and all 
information, including but not limited to, that which is required by EPCRA. The 
assumption is that the LEPC cannot adequately develop and implement the emergency 
response plan without all of the information regarding chemical storage and release from 
these facilities.
The information gathered for emergency plans and the ability of LEPCs to update 
and augment that information for accident prevention and public education is too often 
underused.
Facility compliance with reporting requirements and LEPC compliance with public 
education and emergency planning is essential to the health and safety of industrial 
workers, emergency responders, and citizens o f the community. Many facilities still present
2^ EPCRA. 42 U.S.C. §11003(d)(3).
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unnecessary risks of a chemical accident by not providing the required information on 
chemical production, storage, use and release.^^” LEPCs also may be compromising the 
quality o f emergency response planning and implementation by failing to obtain missing 
information. A facility or LEPC that refuses to fully comply with EPCRA denies citizens a 
legal right to that information. There is debate about how effective LEPCs are and many 
ideas about how they can better do their job. In the next section, the Missoula LEPC is 
examined in light o f Montana Rail Link’s toxic spill at Alberton and ensuing questions 
about the risks presented by hazardous materials transport through the region.
LEPCs in Action: A Case Study o f  the Missoula County LEPC's coverage o f  transportation 
and risk management
Since transporters are exempt from the two main and strongest right-to-know 
provisions in existence, innovative strategies to reduce hazardous materials transportation 
accidents and increase public disclosure of risks are necessary. LEPCs are the logical place 
for such work to start in local communities. Unfortunately many LEPCs, including 
Missoula's, are unclear about right-to-know issues and their relevance to risk reduction.^^' 
The author joined the Missoula LEPC as a city at-large representative in the spring of 1997. 
In the first year following the Alberton train derailment, the LEPC had taken no action to 
reduce risks posed by Montana Rail Link by initiating discussion or requesting information 
to assess risks and develop accident prevention strategies. In November of 1997, Montana
EPA 1990.
Sandberg, Stephen and Monika Heinbaugh. 1997. What you don't know can hurt you: 
A perspective on Missoula County’s right-to-know efforts. The Environmental 
Organizing Semester, University of Montana.
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Rail Link intentionally derailed a runaway train just 20 miles east of Missoula in Clinton, 
MT. There was a 45 minute time span during which the train, laden with hazardous 
substances including several chlorine tankers, was hurtling backwards towards Missoula 
with no crew member on board. During that time, responders, law enforcement, and 
government officials, including the health department, were not kept apprised of the 
situation by the railroad in a manner which allowed them to make any decisions concerning 
how to best protect the public. This incident, while luckily involving no release of 
hazardous materials, clearly illustrated the disorganization surrounding response to 
potentially large scale rail disasters in the greater Missoula area.
In December of 1997, the author wrote a memo to the LEPC suggesting means to 
improve Montana Rail Link’s accountability to the LEPC and public, with the goal of 
improving safety and preventing accidents, by asking MRL to disclose information useful 
for emergency response before or at an upcoming January meeting with the LEPC. The 
memo suggested that the Right-to-Know Subcommittee of the LEPC work to identify 
hazards, convey information to the public and prevent future accidents by:
1) Requesting MRL to identify hazardous chemicals and volumes of those 
chemicals transported through Missoula City and County on a monthly basis, with 
breakdowns by week, season, and time of day when possible.
2) Revisit the Missoula County Hazardous materials Response Plan and amend the 
“Severe Case” transportation hazard analysis to reflect a derailment on the scale of the 
Alberton derailment.
3) Create and publicize the evacuation plan for Missoula City/County in the event 
of a “Severe Case” transportation incident. If such a plan is untenable, explain why.^^^
292 sieck, Hope. 12/3/97. Memo to LEPC Right-to-Know Subcommittee re: Montana Rail 
Link safety history and proposed LEPC activities.
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The memo suggested that Montana Rail be requested to provide the LEPC with the 
following information:
1 ) History o f rail accidents and root causes for those accidents for entire company
history.
2) Current status o f operations. Including volume of rail traffic through Missoula 
City/County per time period and quality and type of hazardous materials transported 
(including radioactive materials).
3) Accident mitigation measure undertaken. Including employee training, safety 
inspections, etc.
4) Plans to improve performance and means to rebuild public confidence in 
operations.
The LEPC was reluctant to ask Montana Rail Link for such information. Instead, at 
the January 1998 meeting to discuss the Clinton runaway train incident and how to improve 
safety and response, responders and government officials spoke of a lack of communication 
on the part o f the railroad company and an utter lack of information. This poor 
communication resulted in an inability to proceed with population protection measures 
such as evacuation, road blocks or even aimouncements via the media with pertinent 
information and likely scenarios. Responders were frustrated and dismayed by the problems 
and difficulties presented by rail disasters. Govermnent officials and citizens present were 
stunned by the lack of information provided by the railroad company in light o f the 
enormous risks posed by their business. The attitude of deferral to Montana Rail Link 
continued even after this second major derailment, as some officials and responders acted 
as if  Montana Rail Link would be doing them an enormous favor to cooperate with them
Sieck, Hope. 12/3/97. Memo to LEPC Right-to-Know Subcommittee re: Montana Rail 
Link safety history and proposed LEPC activities.
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and provide them with basic, up to the minute information in the event of an emergency. It 
became clear that no procedure was in place for informing local responders or the health 
department about a potential disaster and that the LEPC did not comfortable actively 
pursuing accident prevention or increased right-to-know.
As a result, work began between concerned community members, Alberton spill
survivors, and several City Council members, some of whom also sat on the LEPC. The
LEPC reported to the City Council Committee on Public Health and Safety and several
members o f that committee took an active interest in the LEPC’s shortcomings with
Montana Rail Link. Citizens drafted a resolution addressing hazardous materials
transportation to address many of the points raised in the LEPC memo in hopes o f creating
LEPC accountability. The resolution outlined the risk from hazardous materials
transportation to citizens of Missoula: nineteen derailments involving hazardous materials
by Montana Rail Link between 1991 and 1997, the numerous near and actual releases in the
area from petroleum pipelines, and the costs of hazardous materials response to citizens
and local government. The resolution noted that the study of root causes of accidents and
the lessons learned, “termed prevention, can avoid all these costs to health, welfare and the
environment.” The final whereas stated that “prevention activities incidentally inform and
benefit emergency response, lowering the cost and consequences of such emergencies.”
The resolution went on to conclude;
Now, therefore, we the Missoula [City Council, Board of Health] call on our 
agencies and staff to actively promote prevention; and specially call on the 
Missoula LEPC to:
1) exercise its authority under section 303(d)(3) of the federal Emergency 
Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA, codified at USC
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110039(d)(3)) to receive such information from facilities as those mentioned 
above as is necessary for developing and implementing the local 
Comprehensive Emergency Response Plan in a manner that will help 
PREVENT such accidents as those mentioned above. The information 
received from these facilities should include such things as the identity of 
hazardous chemicals and their amounts stored or used in or transported into 
or through the County in a period of time; root cause accident investigations; 
risk analyses, accident reports, inspection records, investigation and 
enforcement files, correspondence between the carriers and facilities and 
regulatory agencies regarding accidents, derailments and chemical spills 
involving hazardous materials; and accident mitigation measures considered 
or undertaken, including inherently safer technologies and relevant 
equipment repair and maintenance and employee training records;
2) Use its moral authority on transportation and other organizations not 
covered by EPCRA 303(d) information collection authority;
3) Revise the Missoula County Hazardous Materials Response Plan and 
amend the “severe Case” transportation hazard analysis to reflect an 
accident o f the consequence o f the 4/11/96 Alberton MRL derailment, create 
and publicize the evacuation plan for Missoula City/County in the event of a 
“Severe Case” transportation incident. If such a plan is untenable, explain 
why.
4) Fully carry out its other explicit or implied responsibilities for community 
Risk Management Planing (to handle the risk of chemical releases from 
major stationary facilities in the County, under the 1990 federal Clean Air 
Act Amendments), including the effective communication of risk to the 
public.̂ '̂*
The resolution was not passed through City Council and frustration grew among 
victims of Montana Rail Link’s toxic spill and concerned citizens. Even ’with the 
momentum of a major rail disaster and a near miss, the culture of the LEPC and local 
government continued to prefer to cultivate “relationships” with industry. The public and 
government inevitably lost out in this “relationship” as the result of an uneven power 
dynamic. Thus, the public was left with a dearth of information and no commitment or
Montana Coalition for Health, Environmental and Economic Rights, Cold Mountain, 
Cold Rivers, Alberton Community Coalition for Environmental Health. 1998. Proposed 
Missoula City-County Resolution on community right-to-know.
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action from local government or the LEPC to rectify the situation or work to reduce risks. 
Montana Rail Link and the LEPC created an atmosphere where any discussion of Montana 
Rail Link’s safety problems was considered an unfair allegation betraying an anti-railroad 
agenda. LEPC members and government officials trod lightly around the company, never 
asking for anything specific, and always resting happily on the laurels that the current 
“relationship” with the company was much improved from the time when MRL did not 
even notify the local government or responders of accidents and failed to reimburse the 
county for expenses incurred in the Alberton derailment.
Section 303 Authority. Moral Suasion and Hazardous Materials Flow Studies
The LEPC has the authority to do considerable work toward accident prevention in 
the realm o f hazardous materials transportation. Under §303 of EPCRA they have the right 
to ask for any and all information to construct emergency plans. The current Emergency 
Response Plan consists only of general information concerning hazardous materials 
transported by rail through Missoula.^^^ Although transporters are exempt from most 
portions o f EPCRA, LEPCs have the authority to ask for information they feel necessary to 
devise comprehensive response plans. The Missoula LEPC should use its authority fully to 
gather specific information from hazardous transporters regarding amounts, timing, and 
frequency o f shipments. This detailed information can greatly assist emergency planning. 
LEPCs have considerable moral suasion when working on behalf on public health and 
safety. Industry generally does not find it in its best interest to obstruct the work of LEPCs,
Missoula County Office o f Emergency Management. 1996. Missoula County 
Hazardous Materials Response Plan.
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particularly when the public is supportive of those endeavors. If hazardous materials 
transporters are unwilling to share information with LEPCs in the name of improved 
emergency planning and enhanced community right-to-know, funding is available from the 
Department of Transportation for LEPCs to compile that information.
LEPCs are eligible for hazardous materials emergency planning grants from the 
Department o f Transportation under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform 
Safety Act. These grants often fund “hazardous materials flow studies” ®̂®. A flow study 
collects data on shipments of hazardous materials that originate from, are destined to, or 
pass through the county. A flow study also identifies the transportation routes likely to be 
used for the transportation of hazardous substances to and from facilities and the time of 
transportation. The information gained from hazardous materials flow studies assists 
emergency planning efforts by providing additional detail. The information also furthers 
accident prevention by disclosing to the public the level of risk in their community. LEPCs 
conduct these flow studies using volunteers or paid staff stationed at weigh stations, 
railroad crossings and yards. The placard number of each truck and train car passing is 
recorded along with the time and place of movement. A database is compiled which 
provides a comprehensive picture of what hazardous materials are moving through the 
community, by what mode of transport, and when.
Information on and applications for USDOT-HMEP Grants are available from the 
State Emergency Response Commission offices. In Montana, several counties including 
Butte-Silver Bow and Fergus County have conducted flow studies. See Appendix B An 
example of an application for a flow study in Missoula County.
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Trends for time of day, week, season and year are able to be determined, a level of 
detail which allows emergency responders to plan better. For example, a community may 
have heavy flow of hazardous materials, particularly chlorine and sulfur by train on 
weekday evenings but not on weekends. Radioactive materials may pass through by truck 
every second Wednesday of the month. This type of information allows responders to chart 
out the likelihood of certain risks at certain times, yielding a level of knowledge for a truck 
accident with hazardous release on a second Wednesday or a Monday evening train 
derailment which was not possible before. Furthermore, any level of detail about type, 
pattern and volume of hazardous material transport is an improvement over the current lack 
of information and greatly improves response. Finally, before undertaking a flow study, 
LEPCs first should ask transporters to voluntarily provide the information sought. If 
transporters are willing, the LEPC may not have to collect data, but instead only compile 
and analyze it.
The Role o f Local Government
The Missoula City and County governments can play a role in reducing risk by 
encouraging the LEPC to follow through on its mandate and the outlined measures to 
insure voluntary compliance with laws and programs which will provide much needed 
information to the public and responders. Resolutions like the one discussed can provide 
solutions and guidelines which are specifically suited to Missoula’s needs. Formation of an 
Accident Prevention Task Force, which would have the authority to call in industry and 
transporters and ask for updates on safety improvement and risk reduction, and would work 
closely with the LEPC and compile and analyze information collected by the LEPC. This
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task force could undertake the risk communication for Risk Management Planning and in 
general. A staff member would be necessary and could be shared by the LEPC and task 
force. Currently, the infrastructure is lacking for the LEPC to utilize and make public the 
information it receives. Once RMPs arrive at the LEPC, this will be exacerbated. There is a 
lack of funding and a lack o f cooperation among those charged with protecting the public 
and reducing risk. There is a great need for a liaison to assist with communication between 
those working on these issues, and to insure that overlap does not occur. It is not for lack 
o f ideas that the LEPC has not acted on this, it is due to inertia, the slow to change culture 
of LEPC and local government, lack of funding, and entirely volunteer composition with 
limited time to implement ideas.
Recommendations for Enhancing the Right-to-Know and Accident Prevention Functions of 
the Missoula LEPC
The Missoula LEPC can do several easy things to establish an infrastructure which 
will allow it to do better at risk communication, work towards accident prevention, and act 
as a liaison between industry and the public, and convey information more effectively to 
the government and the public.
• create a website describing the LEPC and what it does, including subcommittees;
• include on the website Tier I and Tier II, TRI, RMP information, along with 
summaries of what each means;
• develop an educational outreach module which LEPC members can take to schools, 
churches, public groups, events, and fairs to let the public know what the LEPC 
does;
• produce an updated LEPC manual for new members and interested persons, 
describing in more detail EPCRA, what LEPCs can do, what the LEPC is doing, 
RMP, etc;
• create a plan by which the LEPC will review and follow up on Risk Management 
Plans upon receipt.
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Clearly, with infrastructure building and a dedicated staff person to accomplish 
these goals to establish an infrastructure to assist LEPC members, the Missoula LEPC not 
only can fulfill its mandate but also work beyond its mandate to insure risk reduction and 
accident prevention, and full disclosure for Missoula County. Despite its shortcomings, the 
Missoula LEPC is considered to be one of the best in Montana, a state where few counties 
have active LEPCs. Any work by the Missoula LEPC could be shared and imported to other 
counties, with great results for the public and responders throughout the state.
LEPCs' Important Role in 112(r) Risk Management Plans
Another source of information for LEPCs to use in emergency planning and 
accident prevention are the Risk Management Plans submitted by local industry. Local 
emergency responders will greatly benefit from the level of detail contained in the Risk 
Management Plans, and the Missoula LEPC should work to involve and educate them. It is 
likely that responders and other LEPC members will have questions and ideas of how 
facilities can improve upon their plans in the next version, due three to five years later. 
LEPCs should take action to educate themselves about the Risk Management Program in 
order to better comment on the received plans. It makes sense for LEPCs to take a 
leadership role in assisting facilities to comply and the public to understand the meaning of 
the information and implication contained in the Risk Management Plans.
The Risk Management Program presents LEPCs with new opportunities to deal with 
accident prevention and risk communication. An advocate for LEPC leadership in RMP 
discussions says this;
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[M]any communities will be surprised, if not horrified, by the number of 
overlapping circles [representing the off-site consequences of a toxic release] that 
are present, especially when some groups will characterize these as "death zones" in 
the case of an incident.... Worst case scenarios present obvious opportunities and 
problems for facilities and LEPCs. LEPCs are reasonably expected to have some 
view of the risks in the community. As soon as these worst case scenario maps are 
publicized, which is guaranteed to occur, elected officials and members of the 
public are likely to be concerned and want to know what sorts of plans exist to deal 
with this threat.
It is at this point that LEPCs can rise to the occasion and act in the public interest to 
use this newly available information to encourage accident prevention and continued 
disclosure on the part of industry. Gablehouse continues:
LEPCs can use these scenarios to demonstrate to the public and elected 
officials that risks are present and that resources should be devote to planning for 
these risks. LEPCs can use the scenarios to increase awareness among the public 
and other regulated facilities that EPCRA exists and that the program is useful to 
eliminating risks in the commimities.^’®
For facilities, the RMP process may be threatening, since for the first time they are 
required to disclose specific information about the risks their companies present to the 
neighboring community. For the first time, facilities will admit to and discuss in detail the 
risks presented. Most importantly, facilities can, for the first time, be held accountable for 
reducing those risks through implementation and continued improvement of their risk 
management plans. LEPCs have an important role to play and should assist in 
communicating risk to the public and acting as a liaison between the concerned public and
Gablehouse, Timothy. 1998. What to Expect from Your LEPC and What It Will Expect 
o f  You. Presented as part of: How to Comply with the USEPA’s Risk Management Rule. 
American Water Works Association Satellite Teleconference.
Gablehouse, Timothy. 1998. What to Expect from  Your LEPC and What It Will Expect 
o f  You. Presented as part of: How to Comply with the USEPA’s Risk Management Rule. 
American Water Works Association Satellite Teleconference.
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accountable corporations to insure that risk is reduced via accident prevention. Although 
hazardous materials transporters are exempted from the Risk Management Program, there 
are components of the RMP which the LEPC should ask for voluntary compliance with. 
Transporters should supply five year accident histories, root cause analysis, safety training 
plans and other information specific to the situation covered by the RMP. Here again, like 
with EPCRA section 303, LEPCs have an enormous amount of moral suasion to hold sway 
over transporters in the name of improving public safety. All of the information required by 
the Risk Management Program will greatly assist emergency planning and ultimately lead 
to accident prevention through increased community right-to-know.
The problem presented by hazardous material transportation to a locality 
necessitates creative solutions. The LEPC plays a large role in any creative solution, since it 
bears the greatest power under law to access transportation information. Beyond the LEPCs 
actions to gain more information, share it with the public and responders, and pressure 
transporters to increase preventions and safety measures, there exist voluntary and moral 
suasion methods to enhance community right-to-know and public safety.
Many LEPCs throughout the county are working to enhance community right-to- 
know and prevent accidents. The City of Deer Park, Texas LEPC has a Transportation 
Subcommittee which did a pipeline and commodity flow study with funding from US- 
DOT. They found “an average o f one hazardous materials vehicle every three minutes” on 
the highways through their town. From the study they were able to get information on the 
materials most likely to be shipped and days of heaviest shipments. The Harford County, 
Maryland LEPC’s web site includes a page entitle “You have the right-to-know” which
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describes how citizens can obtain information from the LEPC concerning chemical risks in 
the community. The Chester County , Pennsylvania LEPC describes the role of LEPCs to 
“Collect, manage and provide access to information on hazardous chemicals; educate the 
public about risks; work with facilities to minimize risks.” The concept of right-to-know is 
already well developed and widely implemented widely by many LEPCs nationwide. The 
Missoula LEPC should follow this lead and take action to get information about 
transportation risks relevant for planning, provide the public better access to this 
information and use the information to reduce accidents in the Missoula valley.
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Conclusions. A Transformed Community and an Ongoing Search for Answers
Closure cannot be achieved until EPA can actually tell me and list exactly 
what my fam ily and I  were exposed to on April II, 1996 and the years 
following while we lived in Alberton, and hold the polluter- Montana Rail 
Link- accountable and responsible.
Debra Griffin, Montana Rail Link chemical spill victim
I  want to know exactly what was spilled, exactly how much, what mixed and 
what the after effects are going to be fo r  me and my family. I  am tired o f  
hearing about short-term health effects because it has been almost five years 
and we are still sick.
Beverly Ridenour, Montana Rail Link chemical spill victim
As we near the 5 th Anniversary I  keep thinking o f  the gifts MRL has 
given me and somehow it is the little things I  think about like 
trifocals, gray thinning hair, those hard to lose pounds, the ache in my 
hip, and that basket o f  mending in Alberton that is sitting by my sewing 
machine as i f  we will really come home and I  will mend our clothes. The 
big things, I  guess, are too big fo r  the mind to dwell on; losing our 
home, Jesse's health, Mark's brain. Trask's education, the friends and 
fam ily I will never know again, the community that will never be whole 
again. Alberton fo r  me will eternally be the town that sits just south 
o f  Paradise in more ways than one, and chemical injury is truly the gift 
that keeps on giving.
I  think that sums up why we are still here working so hard after all 
these years.
Lucinda Hodges, Montana Rail Link spill victim and coordinator of ACCEH
Five Years Later in Alberton, the Town Just South o f  Paradise
Five years after Montana Rail Link’s toxic spill in Alberton, Montana all is not well. 
The community group, ACCEH still works tirelessly to gain justice for spill victims. Five 
years later, they are still seeking the truth about what they were exposed to, at what levels 
and for how long. They are still asking whether toxic materials linger in Alberton and still 
make people sick. They are still wondering what the future will bring for them and their 
children. They still are plagued by fear of what poisons affected their bodies and what
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impact is still to come.
Five years later, these questions remain. They remain because Montana Rail Link 
failed to inform government officials about what was spilled. They remain because the 
EPA failed to enter the hot zone and test the spilled chemicals until four days after the 
derailment. These problems remain because no one with power was asking the right 
questions or acting in the public interest.
The Alberton Community Coalition for Environmental Health has waged a 
campaign for answers for all five years. Members of this group have worked through 
illness, relocation, lawsuits, frustration and anger. They have worked diligently, fueled by a 
need to understand what happened to them and a desire to make sure that the same fate 
never befalls another community. ACCEH is powered by the passion to prevent others from 
having to go through what they and other Alberton survivors did. ACCEH endeavors to use 
the information and experience gained by the Alberton community to teach, warn and 
instruct others about the risks of toxic chemicals moving through their communities.
ACCEH has struggled with local, state and federal agencies for answers. Its files 
bulge with countless letters to the EPA, Montana Department of Environmental Quality, 
members of Congress, the Agency for Toxic Substance Disease Registry and others. These 
letters reiterate the basic questions: What chemicals were we exposed to and what are the 
possible health effects?
The example of ATSDR was not treated in this paper, although the experience
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spanned nearly the entire five years and numerous information and documents e x i s t I n
brief, ACCEH worked to ensure that the Agency of Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(ATSDR) completed health studies that addressed these questions. Like the other examples
of how a lack o f disclosure set in motion a cycle of actions which denied spill victims
adequate information and health care, ATSDR based its health studies on the officially
sanctioned “chlorine only” assessment of the Alberton disaster. As a result, ATSDR studied
respiratory, dermal and ocular effects of chlorine on Alberton victims. In doing, the federal
agency charged with investigating toxic incidents ignored the myriad other symptoms and
data indicating that chemical injury from chemicals other than chlorine was rampant. A
letter to ATSDR summarized the situation:
The fact that ATSDR is limiting its scope of possible chronic health effects 
attributable to chlorine is alarming, but more inexcusable is the fact that 
ATSDR ignores evidence of non-chlorine health effects entirely. Time after 
time, your agency has heard from residents of other health effects which 
cannot be traced to simple chlorine exposure. You have received complaints 
o f memoiy loss, fatigue, joint pain, chronic pain, weight fluctuation, 
multiple chemical sensitivity, lupus, fibromyalgia and other auto-immune 
disorders and immuno suppressive conditions. Your agency has turned a 
deaf ear and a blind eye to what are clues to what really happened at 
Alberton: it was a mixed chemical spill with far greater health implications 
than chlorine. Affected residents are not going to disappear or stop pressing 
for a comprehensive revisitation of what was released that morning and how 
it could have affected their health.^"®
For an excellent critical analysis of ATSDR's actions in other Montana communities 
see: Lilly Tuholske. 1993. Ignoring the Obvious: The Agency fo r Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry's Failure to Monitor Public Health on the Clark Fork River Superfund 
Sites. M.A. Thesis, University of Montana. Additional resources detailing ATSDR’s 
failure to fulfill its mission to protect public health is found in the Environmental Health 
Network’s papers entitled Inconclusive by Design and Restoring the Public Health Focus 
o f  Superfund.
Sieck, Hope. 1997.Comments Submitted to ATSDR on the Phase I Study Report on 
the Alberton Chlorine Spill, Alberton, MT.
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And so it went, with agency after agency and issue after issue. In this way, the 
failure to disclose the chemicals spilled, chemical reactions and resultant health effects 
plagued victims throughout the past five years. The failure to disclose key information 
acted like a firewall between spill victims and the truth about what happened to their 
health. Still, ACCEH persisted and recently, a piece of the wall was broken through.
In March of 1999, Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) supported ACCEH’s request that 
the Ombudsman of the Environmental Protection Agency undertake an investigation of the 
Alberton incident. Senator Baucus wrote:
The community is concerned that they did not and do not have 
sufficient information regarding the nature of the material that was released, 
and risks posed by that material, because efforts by the Environmental 
Protection Agency and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry have focused principally on the release of chlorine. This has 
hampered efforts to diagnose and treat symptoms that may not be 
attributable to chlorine exposure and to take necessary precautions against 
continued exposure.
Members of the community have been seeking information and relief 
from EPA and ATSDR since soon after the time of the spill, nearly three 
years ago. Still, their concerns have not been satisfied. In view of the 
longstanding nature of this situation, and the continuing health problems, I 
urge you to conduct an evaluation of testing and other measures that have 
been taken in cormection with the spill, and to provide recommendations for 
future action.
The EPA Ombudsman, Robert Martin, conducted his first hearing in Missoula in 
November 2000. Over one hundred people attended and scores testified about their 
exposure to the chemicals, their health problems and how their lives were irretrievably 
altered the night o f April 11, 1996. Tears flowed and anger was palpable. Montana Rail 
Link did not attend the hearing. The Ombudsman made several findings at the close of the
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hearing. He asked EPA to undertake a full characterization of the Alberton site. This 
characterization is to include soil, water, air, and human health sampling to assess what the 
effects o f the spill were and what toxic chemicals remain. Such a characterization would 
answer demands that the “mystery be solved” through independent expert analysis and lay 
to rest many o f the lingering questions. The Ombudsman also announced plans for a 
second hearing for which 30-day notice will be given to ensure that those invited to the first 
hearing will be able to attend. Lucinda Hodges, coordinator of ACCEH said “We are 
extremely pleased with Mr. Martin’s investigation and look forward to a second hearing.
We simply want to know what we were exposed to, what our health prognosis is, and why 
we were lied to by Montana Rail Link and government officials. The Ombudsman is our 
last hope to get truth and justice for the sick people of Alberton.”
Effects o f  a Toxic Disaster on a Community: Natural versus Human-Causes Disasters
Toxic exposure directly assails several fundamental social beliefs: that 
personal control over one's destiny is possible; that technology and science 
are forces ofprogress only; that risks necessary fo r  the good life are 
acceptable; that people get what they deserve; that experts know best; that 
one’s home is one's castle; that people have the right to do what they wish 
on their own property; and that government exists to helpff^
A  toxic disaster like the Montana Rail Link derailment and chemical spill
permanently alters a community. The people o f Alberton and the fabric of the town were
fundamentally impacted by the disaster. Lives, health, homes and jobs were lost. The sense
of security and safety in one’s home and town was lost. Unfortunately, communities across
Brown, Phil and Edwin J. Mikkelsen. 1990. No Safe Place: Toxic waste, leukemia, 
and community action. University of California Press, Berkeley.
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the nation are similarly affected by toxic chemical disasters.
Human-caused disasters differ from natural disasters in how society views the 
victims and the impacts on the victims. Human-caused disasters result in greater, longer- 
lasting, and different kinds of stresses and health effects than those associated with natural 
disaster. ^ ^ ^ ,3 0 3  word disaster is rooted in the Greek word for star; until the prevalence of 
technological disasters, a disaster was simply a calamity which fell from the stars, harmed 
people and disappeared. Implicit also in this etymology is a lack of blame. Natural disasters 
are often deemed “acts o f God”, even those which are clearly exacerbated by human 
influence such as the flooding of homes knowingly built within floodplains or the burning 
o f homes built in fire-prone forests.
Leveling Blame
Human-caused toxic disasters are by definition technological in origin. A toxic 
disaster is viewed as a technological failure of our tenuous control over the risky endeavors 
that enable us to enjoy a high standard of modem living. The resulting "loss of control” 
contrasts with a “lack o f control” over natural disasters.^*^ Flood victims view the onslaught 
of water as "an act of God” from which they need to rebuild. Residents at Love Canal 
instead “regarded their disaster as stemming from corporate greed and government 
cormption.”^̂  ̂ The human causation of a toxic disaster leads to assignation of blame and
Edelstein, Michael R. 1988. Contaminated Communities: the social and psychological 
impacts o f  residential toxic exposure. Westview Press, London.
Bowler et. al.
Baum, Andrew, Raymond Fleming and Jerome Singer. 1983. Coping with 
Victimization by Technological Disaster. Journal o f  Social Issues 39(2): 117-138.
Edelstein, Michael R. 1988. Contaminated Communities: the social and psychological 
impacts o f  residential toxic exposure. Westview Press, London.
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distrust o f the agents of the disaster. It also can lead to greater emotional distress than a 
natural disaster.^”* Surprisingly, “the polluter often appears to receive less than its share of 
blame...Anger and blame may be mollified where the polluter is a major source of local 
employment.” ®̂’ This held true in Alberton, a town formed by the railroad in which a large 
percentage o f the population has ties to the railroad companies.
Communities tied closely to corporations often accept levels of risk as a necessary 
evil. For example, at Love Canal "The community also understood that the goal of industry 
is profit and that Hooker [Chemical Co.] was acting in a manner consistent with its goals by 
using the cheapest methods of disposal.” At Alberton, some residents referred to the 
derailment as "an accident” and seemed to accept the risk to their community. Indeed, the 
statistics of hazardous materials transportation and accident rates make some risk of 
derailment and chemical exposure necessary for the perpetuation of hazardous rail 
transport. Other residents, however, sought answers for why the derailment had occurred 
and questioned the transport of such deadly chemicals on trains at all. These people sought 
chlorine-free products and explored the connections between their consumerism and their 
injury. In this way, Alberton residents recognized the derailment as stemming from 
corporate greed, but at the same time acknowledged that MRL and government officials 
may not have had Alberton, MT specifically in mind when they obtained permits to haul 
chlorine and failed to upkeep track. But Montana Rail Link knew that eventually some
Brown, Phil and Edwin J. Mikkelsen. 1990. No Safe Place: Toxic waste, leukemia, 
and community action. University of California Press, Berkeley.
Edelstein, Michael R. 1988. Contaminated Communities: the social and psychological 
impacts o f  residential toxic exposure. Westview Press, London.
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community would pay the price for their profits. This realization is what spurred the
community onto reaching out to other trackside towns to inform them of the risks and the
realities of those risks.
Duration: Brief vs. Chronic
While natural disaster is often of brief duration, human-caused disasters such as
toxic exposure may be chronic and indefinite.
A site may be contaminated so that it will remain unsafe for generations due 
to the persistence of the toxic hazards; individual effects may also cross 
generations..Because it is not clear what damage has occurred to property or 
finances, or what long-term health effects may develop, it is difficult to
inventory losses As a result, the affected community is left in a vacuum
to fend for itself... the effects may not surface for quite some time. As a 
result, recovery to a “post-disaster equilibrium” is difficult if  not 
impossible.^®®
In Alberton, no spill victim has returned to their “normal life” as it was before the 
spill. As long as questions remain and health effects continue to evidence themselves, not 
only is return to the way things used to be an impossibility, but any certainty about the new 
life also remains elusive.
Control: Experts vs. Victims
Toxic disasters differ dramatically from natural disasters in that they require 
“experts” to interpret the harm to victims. The victim o f a flood knows what damage the 
water did and may require assistance only to repair or recover from that damage. The 
victim of a toxic spill, on the other hand, often cannot see the chemicals or understand the 
science behind the assessment of harm.
Edelstein, Michael R. 1988. Contaminated Communities: the social and psychological 
impacts o f  residential toxic exposure. Westview Press, London.
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Experts specially trained to measure and detect toxic substances are usually 
involved in the process of discovery and announcement. Victims become 
dependent upon others to help them understand the situation and to help 
create solutions. However, because the effects of human-caused disaster 
may not be readily visible, not only is the occurrence subject to differing 
interpretations, but key decisions (e.g. regarding testing, protective 
measures, and remediation) may be based on these interpretation...
Therefore, consensus about the cause, course, and possible outcomes of the 
crisis is less likely than with natural disaster. Furthermore, because there 
may be no visible damage, each family is forced to make its own 
determination of the significance o f contamination. The lack o f shared 
beliefs about what has happened opens the way for conflict within the 
community and between the community and potential helpers.
Toxic victims find themselves living in a world newly populated by local, state and
federal agencies all charged with assessing and rectifying the situation. Their lives “are
captured by agencies upon which they become dependent for clarification and assistance.”
When those government officials fail them, victims are left nowhere to turn except to
action.
And action is often required because the pace of relief for toxic disaster victims is 
often excruciatingly slow, as seen in the Alberton situation five years after the chemical 
release. Natural disasters are responded to swiftly and methodically: FEMA and the Red 
Cross enter, are the precedents for medical care, insurance benefits, legal proceedings, 
relocation, private and government relief all exist. Victims are housed, clothed and fed, and 
insurance and the government provided funding for people to rebuild homes and repay 
damages. Precedents for relief efforts do no exist in human-caused disasters. “Solutions 
such as clean-up, storage of waste, and permanent or temporary relocation are often
Edelstein, Michael R. 1988. Contaminated Communities: the social and psychological 
impacts o f  residential toxic exposure. Westview Press, London.
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unavailable or experimental and subject to change on short notice.” *̂®
None o f this certainty exists for victims o f toxic disasters. This uncertainty is 
compounded by the uneven way victims are treated by the responsible company and 
government officials. At Love Canal, residents reacted against treatment by the New York 
State Department of Health in a similar way to residents at Alberton. Love Canal residents 
felt that Department of Health official “did not pay serious attention to the task of 
providing information to them and working through the implications of the information.” 
As a result, residents “felt that they were being treated not as rational, respected adults but 
rather as though they had somehow lost their mature good sense when they became victims 
o f a disaster they had no way of preventing." It is in this way that toxic victims become 
“"disabled”, as suddenly they are dependent upon professionals to expertly handle various 
areas of life.. . What is lost is their ability to participate directly in understanding and 
determining courses o f action important to their lives.”
The challenge is to reclaim this ability. Public officials must work to address this 
issue, which may be difficult as long as strong ties to industry remain. The main tool for 
reworking these relationships between victims and the governmental officials and experts 
charged with helping them is the right-to-know. Access to full information creates trust and 
empowers individuals and communities to make decisions integral to their health and 
safety. Right-to-know is a basic tool, a basic right, which has been denied at great cost to 
scores of injured people in numerous communities. Without full disclosure of information.
Brown, Phil and Edwin J. Mikkelsen. 1990. No Safe Place: Toxic waste, leukemia, 
and community action. University o f California Press, Berkeley.
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situations like Alberton will occur again and again, leaving destroyed communities and 
broken lives in their wake. With full disclosure, victims o f toxic disasters can start their 
healing process with the information they need in order to make informed decisions about 
their future. With full disclosure, individuals and communities can make the decision that 
the risks presented are too great, and begin work to create change and bring about 
prevention of toxic disasters through risk reduction.
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APPENDIX A
Chronological history o f  the Alberton mixed chemical spill and evacuation,
April 11-April 29, 1996.
Selected from  the public record (Missoula County Clerk and Recorder's Office,
Missoula, MT) and media accounts.
April 11,1996
‘/ / /  ffî/tÆ 'M issouIian 4/11/96, A-l-A-10.
"Gov. Marc Racicot declared an emergency in Missoula and Mineral counties, which 
allows the National Guard and other state agencies to assist if necessary . ... An 18-car 
train derailment next to the Clark Fork River west o f Alberton ruptured three tank cars 
containing chlorine gas early Thursday and sent 105 people to area hospitals-two in 
critical condition.
The DOT described the 63 mile freeway closure as the largest and longest in the region's 
history. The injured were taken to hospitals in Superior, Missoula and Butte ... Initially 
officials believed that a single tank car was leaking, but after closer examination 
Thursday afternoon, they determined three o f the four tank cars containing liquid 01 were 
leaking."
Information O fficer's Log- 4:00 PM  Briefing to the Incident Command, 4/11/96. 
Montana Rail Link representative Paul Adams shared the following information with the 
Incident Command, composed at that point by Scott Waldron (Chief of Frenchtown 
Rural Fire Department and Incident Commander), Bill Reed (Missoula Rural Fire 
Department), and Paul Laisy (Missoula County Sheriff s Department).
" Train originated in Pasco, WA going to Houston TX 70 cars, 20 derailed. I sodium 
chlorate; I hazardous waste; 4 chlorine, I leaking.
Small fire at site- assessment is being made right now- out 45 minutes or so. do not 
know about further leakage besides one car vapor dispersion- cloud in air...'
Tank cars can hold 23-27,000 gallons- not sure how ftill cars were.
No river threat- 100 yds. from river.
4:35 There is no fire. Not sure if  there ever was.
Have heard from EPA, CG, OSHA, FRA.
5:40 3 cars are leaking; 1 car is bled out completely."
Inform ation O fficer's Log, 4/11/96.
A news release prepared at 6:00 PM that day was based on the information contained in 
notes prepared by on-scene responders and Montana Rail Link company officials. Those 
notes contained the following:
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"It will be 48 hours before anyone will be able to get to site. Animals are fine! No foliage 
damage. No plume of gas moving to Missoula. "
April 12,1996
Incident Command Notes 10:00; 11:15 Command Staff Meeting, 4/12/96.
"Kcres 'Caustic car'=car 5- has leaked approx 1/3."
"spelling chrysilic sodium UM 1760"
It was noted that an "[E]nvironmental inspection will need to be done" and that the 
"[UJItimate goal is safe (underlined) lift o f evac. and people returning home."
"A Pet Rescue Plan is being organized."
"There has been environmental monitoring of the soil and water today. There has been no 
damage to the water. There is some caustic chemicals on the ground (sic)."
"How long will the evacuation last? Possibly 14 days There has been no reports (sic) of 
any animal deaths. A home re-entry plan will be presented before evacuees are allowed 
home. A plan will be in place to monitor the air in the homes."
Technical Group Meeting Notes, 4/12/96 AM
"Pet Rescue/Feed- May begin tomorrow. Another assessment will be done at daybreak. 
After that, the decision will be made whether or not to begin the operation ... The plan is 
to have three buses set up, each with an industrial hygienist, haz-mat technician and 
MRL representative. They will take residents into the area to allow them to feed and/or 
pickup pets. They are also considering letting farmers, ranchers in to pickup livestock." 
"EPA personnel have been at the Nine Mile Road Command Post asking questions. Chip 
Raber will ask Dan Watts to give them the information they need. "
"There is no Potassium Cresylate on the ground. Everything has soaked in, and there is 
no free product on the ground"
"Sodium Chlorate car- the end is broken open. The product should be covered to keep the 
moisture out."
"12 empty chlorine tankers, 2-full caustic tankers, and 2 empty caustic cars are en route 
to the site from both Oxychem and Georgia Pacific."
"Kris Kok of Envirocon will be going out this afternoon to assess the area and begin 
water testing.
Technical Group M eeting Notes, 4/12/96,1800.
"Kris Kok from Envirocon went out to the site this afternoon to do water and soil testing. 
There was no elevated PH in the river. The fire road to the north is mildly acidic. It is not 
serious. There was no ground sampling done on the immediate site. No more sampling 
will be done tonight... They are in the process o f removing the rest of the train now."
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"Marty Rau will have enlarged photos of the area to distribute by morning. MSDS sheets 
have been distributed. EmTech has copies if  anyone needs one."
"Hulcher has two tractors, one boom and one bucket, set up. They will stage them for 
first thing in the morning for pulling out the old rail and moving the cars out."
'Train derails near Noxon' Missoulian, 4/12/96, B1-B4.
1200 feet of track damaged/ half hour after Alberton derailment. No hazmats in the 16 
cars and three locomotives that derailed.
'Aftereffect o f  chlorine sp ill largely unknown -Environmental i/T^ac/. 'M issoulian, 
4/12/96.
"At least for now, the chemicals spilled .. . do not appear to be a major threat to the water 
and air in the areas, officials said late Thursday. But the railcar's worth of liquid chlorine 
that vaporized into an acidic cloud hovering over the Clark Fork River west of Alberton 
is a serious chemical that can cause damage and death in the natural world.. .”
"The big things are the unknowns, said University of Montana chemist Ed Keller. 
"There's a whole spectrum, from nothing to a disaster."
Karen Knudsen, conservation associate with the Clark Fork-Pend Oreille Coalition, is 
also worried about long-term effects on the water. "There certainly are effects, but 
sometimes they don't manifest themselves immediately," she said. “The chlorine 
molecule is reactive and can combine with organic materials to form dangerous 
compounds called organochlorines that can stay in the air, water, soil and fatty tissues of 
humans and animals, she said. The most toxic groups o f those compounds are dioxins." 
By late afternoon, instruments used to test for chlorine gas showed no gas present at 600 
yards from the site and only minimal readings at the accident. [Bill] Reed [Missoula 
Rural Fire Department] said by then he was more concerned with fuel loads than with 
chlorine. "Everything I'm getting says the potential for environmental damage is very 
little, " he said. "It could have been much worse."
'Hazards routinely ride rails. ' Missoulian, 4/12/96, A1-B4.
"This stuff travels through Missoula all the time," said Bill Reed, Missoula Rural Fire 
Department chief "Every train has hazardous material John Fitzpatrick, spokesman 
for the FRA in Washington, DC, said the general public has no way of knowing what 
hazardous materials are moving across Montana. "The railroad, and the railroad only, 
would know," he said.
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April 13,1996
Missoulian, 4/13/96.
"For others in the more immediate areas of the derailment, it could be later than Friday 
night before they can return home or tend to their animals, which, in several briefings 
Thursday afternoon, was the prime concern of many residents, said Frenchtown Fire 
Chief Scott Waldron, the incident commander. ...He said that while residents’ safety will 
not be jeopardized to take care of animals, officials might have a plan by 10 AM Friday 
to get feed to stranded livestock. "It may be that we determine life safety is such that we 
don't go in. We've got all the best people in the country here doing all that they can do." 
"There doesn't appear to be any foliage damage out there, and everything seems to be 
green. Livestock in the area is fine, " he said.
'Two more weeks- About 400 attend meeting with emergency officials, experts. ' 
Missoulian, 4/13/96.
"Emergency officials, MRL personnel, and chemical cleanup experts attempted to 
explain to residents of an area that extends from about two miles east o f Alberton to 
about five miles west o f town why they could not return to their property.
But angry dialogue burst from the overflow crowd... "It's been a day and a half. We have 
pregnant mares out there," shouted one man from the middle of the crowd.
Chris Hohol, who works for an incident management firm in Milwaukee, said the 
decision to not allow residents to tend their animals until Saturday morning was made 
after receiving technical advice from experts on the site Thursday afternoon.
But that didn't wash with some residents, who continued to badger anyone that stepped to 
the microphone. "We don't care about the technical advice, " said on man. "Wasn't it 
technical people who put that train together?" added another.
Officials said that beginning Saturday, if  conditions at the derailment site did not change, 
residents could be given about two hours each morning and afternoon to tend to their 
animals. "This is the very best we can do, based on the technical advice we’ve received 
from the experts," said Dan Watts of MRL. "The issue boils down to the possibility of 
another release."
Four tanker cars containing chlorine leaked, sending a dangerous plume into the 
predawn sky. Chrysilic sodium, a caustic substance, also was leaking, according to 
Hohol. "It made the cloud look worse, much worse than it actually was," said Hohol, 
about the mixture o f the two chemicals.
Chrysilic sodium, a derivative of sodium hydroxide, is a strong caustic used in metal 
plating and cleaning. It does not give off a gas but is dangerous if inhaled, he said. The 
substances are leaking in minuscule amounts. While officials haven't seen any dead 
animals in the derailment area, they readily admit that they have not been looking, and no 
flight surveillance has been made.
Waldron, who lives in the Sixmile area, said in an interview that he would rather err on 
the conservative side. "I would rather have you go home and complain for the rest of your
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lives that we kept you out too long," he said, "than allow you in for one minute and have 
an occurrence where you get injured and complain that we didn't keep you out."
Missoulian, 4/13/96 Other headlines:
'In the wake o f  the chlorine gas spill:
-Officials said th ^  have seen no evidence o f  dead pets or livestock, but they admit 
they haven V really looked -Beginning Saturday, residents will be allowed into the area 
fo r  two hours morning and evening to care fo r  their animals- as long as conditions at 
the wreck remain stable
-A fourth tanker car was found to be leaking chlorine Friday, as was tanker 
containing chrysilic sodium, an industrial caustic that's not a gas, but can be harmful 
i f  inhaled
-Toxicology samples have been drawn from the train's two crew member, and it will 
take several weeks for results. ’
Evacuee Meeting Notes. 4/13/96.
“Sec. o f Transportation spoke. Sen. Baucus will visit.
2 vets talked "Examined animals that were brought out. Did not find any with major 
problems, 1 with problem, fairly moderate conjimctivitis. "
Waldron. "We have set up a unified command: Fire, Law Enforcement, Health and MRL. 
Safety is the main concern."
At tomorrow's meeting will "assess issues, provide health information, and monitoring 
that will be available" "The re-entry date for those areas [Bible Lane and Alberton] will 
be set for April 26. That is if  the findings at the site meet the entry criteria, and 
everything goes on schedule.
Question: "Medications: can we go get them"?
Contact Randall Little at MRL Claims: phone #.
Last item recorded "If you have any medical problems, see your doctor "
Technical Group Meeting Notes, AM, 4/13/96.
"...they noticed a small vapor cloud in the morning ... They are working with full-face 
canister respirators and have experienced no problems. They have cut the remaining 
pieces of rail, removed the trucks from the cars, and cleared the material out of the way. 
The Sodium Chlorate car has been moved over about five feet. The panels have arrived 
and will be unloaded. Hulcher and MRL track crews will begin laying the new rail this 
afternoon. All work will be done on the east end of the site."
"Chris [Hohol] reported Operation Pet Rescue/Livestock Feed is in progress and will 
continue until dark. He will be notified if  Georgia Pacific decides to remove the angle 
bars from Car 3 to make sure the Rescue process is halted."
"Envirocon will plan on putting in a berm near the edge of the contaminated area to 
prevent spreading in case of rain fall."
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"Everyone is reminded to watch what you say when you're out in public. The general 
public is very unhappy about the situation, so things you say can be misunderstood or 
misconstrued and you may end up with a problem on your hands. Linda Frost and Dan 
Watts are the spokespersons for MRL and any statement to the press should come from 
them."
Technical Group Meeting Notes, 1800,4/13/96.
“Pressure of all cars was checked. "The cresylate car was checked. There are 
approximately 3000 gallons remaining in the car. The vacuum truck is on the site," 
"There is a thin frost line on car 4, where it meets Car 1. There is a vegetation kill 
straight down the line from that meeting point."
"Envirocon is continuing to do ground sampling. They have a track hoe on site ready to 
build a primary berm on the south side ditch to prevent spreading of the contamination. 
They will build a second berm, the height of the road crossing, for backup."
"Dan Watts reported Operation Pet Rescue/Livestock Feed was successful today and 
eased some o f the worries of the residents. They went in with monitors and tested every 
residence before entering. There was nothing detected in any of the homes tested. All 
livestock and pets were OK. They will plan to let the farmers and ranchers back in first 
thing in the morning to do their feeding before any of the transloading begins ... We may 
want to notify residents of the odor of the Cresylate. It is not harmful but does have a 
sulfur odor."
April 14,1996
Evacuee Meeting Notes.
Present;
FRA Clairmont 
NIRL, Little 
EPA, Weis 
Olympus, Stine 
IC,Waldron 
MRL, IC, Watts
"Safety is the top priority. ...we will try to answer your questions."
Stine: “Soil and vegetation samples have been taken from residents (sic) in the area. We 
are checking our chlorine readings, any potential health or environmental threats. We are 
having the samples analyzed by a lab. We are taking PH samples from 100' of the site.
No depressed PH levels at any residences. There is no data on the Chlorine levels...”
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Weis: “I have been to the work site, out to Petty Creek and Ponderosa. Becker residence 
water source, looked at animals large and small. Regarding the vegetation there is 
nothing to believe there is a problem...
The re-entry area, we are working with medical personnel at the site since Thursday out 
o f the office in Denver. It is very safe to re-enter the area with respect to residual 
chemicals. We think your home is safe. There is technical activity in the Hot Zone. The 
EPA is continually monitoring the activity. We have reviewed the evacuation plan. 
Things are in order. The evacuation is in place in the event of a failure. For added 
protection, use a wet rag over your face to cover your mouth. Baking soda in the water 
gives more protection...The local Health Dept, is involved in all the decisions."
Leahy: "We have been testing since the first release. Everything is okay. If you find 
anything questionable, please call.”
Discussing access for re-entry and re-evac.
Q: My wife has been having reactions..
"No evidence o f exposure that would lead to long term health problems."
Dr. Peschel: " I have treated 3 patients. I have contacted the St. Pat's list search of 
experts. Chlorine is very toxic, can cause tissue damage. Mild exposure: sore skin; longer 
exposure: blisters. Long exposure might have long term respiratory problems. "
If you have any symptoms, seek medical care. Contact MRL for follow-up.”
Technical Group Meeting Notes, 1200, 4/14/96.
"The vacuum truck has removed 3000 gallons from the cresylate car. There are 
approximately 1000 gallons left."
"There was a visible plume in the area of the cars, over the river and across the road." 
"We have negotiated an entry plan for the NTSB, the EPA and the Coast Guard."
"The Health and Safety Team reported they have a better relationship with the IC and the 
EPA.
The Coast Guard has been pointing out a few minor things, but overall, they and the 
NTSB seem satisfied. John Grewell reported there will be a uniformed security officer 
assigned to the bridge to keep a tight control on who enters the area. "
"Plans have been developed for 24 hour monitoring of the area. "John Grewell noted that 
MRL needs to be kept informed as to what they can tell the public regarding the time 
line.”
"The berms are not yet in place. They are waiting on equipment."
Technical Group Meeting Notes, 1800, 4/14/96.
"A body was found today at 1250. As of 1800, the body had been removed and taken to 
the morgue. Everything went well and appropriately. "
"A permanent decontamination station is now on site at the request of the EPA.”
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"The first draft was written for the unloading of Car 3. The EPA, USCG and NTSB have 
given their blessing." "24 hour monitoring will begin today. One Marine Environmental 
person and one MRL person will be in charge of that. "
"The side boom dozers were brought in to move the box cars, move the Sodium 
Cresylate car, and roll over Car 3. "
"Car 5 was finished, the load was shipped to the consignee."
"We should have two boxes of Sodium Cresylate moved by Tuesday morning. The 
groundsmen will be in SCBA's, to do the wrecking of the cars."
"The EPA requested to review the work plan for the transfer operation. The USCG wants 
to stay on the site during the entire transfer. It was noted we need to limit the total 
number o f personnel on site. It was decided to allow the USCG and EPA 15 minutes on 
site to view the operations. They may be allowed in more than once but only in 15 
minute windows."
*Fear turns to relief as residents find  their animals survived spilL * Missoulian, 
4/14/96. A-l-A-10.
"[Djuring the pet rescue effort in the evacuated town residents were allowed 5 minutes to 
gather pets and other belongings before being ushered out o f town again...
Ranchers had 30 minutes. As long as conditions at the derailment site don't change, 
residents will be allowed to return a couple of times a day, according to Sgt Howard 
Reed, who coordinated the pet rescue effort... Technical advisors have said there could 
be another poisonous cloud released if  something unforeseen happens during the 
offloading and removal of cars...
Residents in the area closest to the derailment site were not allowed to return. Hazmat 
personnel with protective equipment were given directions by residents whose homes are 
in the 'hot zone' and they provided as much pet care and brought out as many personal 
items as possible ... Brodsky said affected residents should be assured that the company 
intends to take care of their concerns. "I think on any incidents that we've been involved 
with, we try to do what's righ t... We know the inconvenience we've created for people 
and we're going to be here for many, many years."
'Lucky few  to return home'- official word comes at meeting this AM  with emergency 
officials.
Missoulian, 4/14/96.
Re-entry for those who access homes via Petty Creek, Southside Road and Terrace View 
Drive.
'Zero tolerance- Federal railroad chief puts public safety first' Missoulian, 4/14/96, 
B-1.
Jolene M. Molitoris, Chief of the Federal Railroad Administration.
201
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
"What you see around these crises is the American spirit alive and well... The best 
experts are on the scene ... our mission is to make sure this doesn't happen again."
Late last year, senior management at MRL had meeting with the FRA to discuss potential 
safety improvement, Molitoris said. Such meeting are held periodically with individual 
railroad companies, she said. "It was an extremely comprehensive meeting. The railroad 
was responsive."
*Indusirtes tout safety records, but critics see calamity ahead. ' Missoulian, 4/14/96, 
B-1.
"We want people to understand that this (accident in MT) is an anomaly." Gardner B. 
Bates, National Chlorine Institute.
1995 13 million tons o f Cl produced in US
1994 12.7 million tons Cl produced
1994 1.9 million cars o f hazardous materials on shipped
10 years ago, 1. 1 million cars.”
April 15,1996
Technical Group Meeting Notes, 4/15/96,1300.
"Operations were stopped for a few hours this morning when it was discovered there 
were families who had not been evacuated from the southwest region of the evacuated 
area. Apparently they called in to find out why they had not been evacuated. They are all 
of the area now.
Hulcher began wrecking the west end o f the site to prepare for the handling of Car 3.
Two boxcars were pulled out of the way. A yellow substance was observed on the end of 
the boxcars which looks like a reaction to the chlorine. The area will be guarded off,” 
“The cars will not be decontaminated now, but will need it before they leave the area.” 
"We negotiated with the EPA for entry and revision o f site operations."
"Security has been tightened on the site. Terry Corson did a survey of the area to ensure 
everything is up to OSHA standards. There were a few items noted, but things are getting 
straightened up."
"Envirocon is working on a remediation plan for the area. They noted the railroad will 
want all o f the bad soils out o f the rail bed before the rebuilding of the rail begins. They 
will be allowed to puli samples from the soil while the cars are being moved out. "
"MRL wants to be able to show forward progress on the yardstick. The biggest concern 
now is Car 3, and the patching process. It was agreed that the residents should be allowed 
a three hour window, from 5-8 AM tomorrow, to go into their homes, feed pets and
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retrieve belongings if they would like. Everyone coming in would be escorted, either by 
buses or by law enforcement."
Technical Group Meeting Notes, 4/15/96,1800.
"The EPA will be included in the meetings from now on. He will not be a speaking 
member, he's just here to listening.(sic)
Estimated 60,000 lbs. left in Car 3. Worst case scenario put together for release from 
Car 3.
The worst case scenario showed the chlorine taking 10 minutes to reach the Forward 
Command Post with a 7 mph wind. More scenarios will be developed tomorrow, 
including ones with higher wind speeds"
'Alberton horses showing signs o f  sickness. ' Missoulian, 4/15/96.A-1.
"Stewart, a nurse, said she would not expose her family by returning home and would 
continue to keep her horses at the Stockyards where she is medicating their eyes several 
times a day...
Montana Rail Link officials continued to emphasize their concern Sunday for the well 
being o f the animals as well as the affected people and their property. "We'll do what's 
right. We always have." MRL president Bill Brodsky said earlier.
Some residents are skeptical, others more understanding. "I don't trust Rail Link at all, " 
said [Lori] Hawk.
'Evacuated families staying p u t ' Missoulian, 4/15/96.
... "[Rjesidents of Petty Creek and parts east have been given permission to return to their 
homes. For the most part, they're not going. Resident of the eastern reaches of the 
exclusion zone were offered the opportunity to return to their homes for good Sunday, 
and were given special notice o f evacuation routes to use should there be another rupture 
of a chlorine-filled train car. For many residents at Sunday afternoon's packed meeting at 
the Red Lion Inn, there are just too many, unanswered questions...
Although residents were reassured by officials from the U.S. EPA and the MCCHD that 
there is very little danger in the newly opened areas, questions about the long-term 
effects of the various spilled chemicals were Wemost on the minds of residents at the 
meeting...
Residents were told their soils were safe and that they would be able to smell the 
chlorine if it settled in their homes .... [Jamie] Becker and other residents of the areas 
said they feel they haven't been given all the facts. "All of the materials that were in that 
other car, that they don't want to talk about," Becker said, referring to a tank of material 
railroad officials are calling a "caustic" substance.
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"We have no idea what’s in it," Becker said. "I don't want to be asking about one thing if 
the problem is something else."
Don Rainey said he won't go back "until they stop saying, 'I think it's safe,’" he said. 
"We're not being given information," Becker said to muted cries of "Shut up!”.
"Is this malarkey responsive to the questions we asked this morning?" Becker demanded. 
Waldron replied; "Nobody’s holding anything back from anybody. I have nothing to 
gain.”
Ellen Leahy of the Missoula City-County Health Department said there are no answers 
yet about the long-term effects the chemicals may have on humans, animals or the 
environment.
"In general, there is going to be a lot of question, many questions, that we share," Leahy 
said. "I don’t want to sit here and tell you we have all those answers yet. They don’t exist 
for the long-term issues yet."
Although Becker expressed frustration at the lack of information, she praised law 
enforcement's efforts to evacuate the area quickly.
"I don't think any other group of people could've put themselves on the line in that 
situation," Becker said after the meeting. "I think they’re exposing themselves to things 
they don't even know about. "
Missoulian, 4/15/96.
Other headlines:
'The discomfort zone- chance to go home brings little peace, 
Alberton area residents 'They just don't fee l safe*
Spill claims first victim. '
April 16,1996
Evacuee Meeting Notes.
"Dr. Bekemeyer will be at the evacuee meeting on Wednesday to answer questions" 
Technical info.
"April 24th if the timeframe set for re-entry.
Leahy: "There are mental health personnel, a nurse, and environmental services available 
to answer questions after this meeting. The Health and Environmental Services phone 
number is 523-4920. Our objective is to prepare you for re-entry into your homes. We 
will get information to you. We will have a briefing on Monday, April 22 to prepare you. 
We will have monitoring available and will continue to monitor the area before your 
re-entiy. The general information hotline number is ...”
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Weis: “If you experienced any problems with the temporary entry into Alberton today, 
contact me. Dr. Peschel will appear on some local talk show to address any concerns you 
have. St. Patrick's Hospital will have radio messages.”
Stine, Olympus: "We have been taking samples of the soil, water and vegetation. The 
data we are receiving is in the normal range for pH levels. There has been no concern for 
the houses we have checked. To check odors we have used a flame ionization detector. 
No measurable levels were found in Alberton. We have found no contaminants. We will 
take soil samples of the derailment site."
Swartz, etc. Animals mostly fine. "Advise you to keep track of your animals and monitor 
them. Any problems, call your vet. There is no data available on long term effects. 
Margaret Watson, from the Mental Health Clinic will be available to answer any 
questions after today's meeting.
Mrs. Becker statement: "There are a lot of fragmented actions ... lack of communication 
starts problems. Do not want lawyers, bureaucrats, do no want to give Dennis 
Washington a bad time. I was in the hospital last night with another bad reaction. I'm 
homeless ... we have the beginning of a plan. We will try to communicate our ideas to the 
group ... In turn we asked that there be not cover-up, no withholding of information ... 
symptoms- no smell o f chlorine gas ... got good dose o f some other chemicals. One 
extremely toxic- what are long term effects. It’s hard to find a lab to test. Given 
information to doctor in the city to test. We have organized a think tank. We want no pay 
offs under the table, we want our life back, I want my yard back and be able to give it to 
my daughter someday. We will contact the company when we’re ready as a group. "
Q; [From resident of 9-Mile area] Gentleman staying with me has burnt eyes. I have 
medical report to confirm this. Have you tested the 9-Mile area?
A: We have received monitors, so we are able to do that.
Q: Resident would like a notarized statement declaring the home free from any 
chemicals in order to rent or sale the house in the future.
Q: When you bring equipment back to the motel after being g in the toxic zone, it could 
be contaminated. I'm not happy, please check this. Roger Chalmers.
Q: You say there is nothing detectable- you need to adjust to peoples' reaction...
Waldron: The calibration of the monitors is set at the recognized standards.
Weis: EPA standards are being used in the calibration of the monitors.
Q: Who should we listen to- monitors or people..The nose is sensitive and we smell gas...
Q: I live in the middle of Alberton and go in for livestock feeding., people are having 
reactions. Is there a buildup effect-should we go back in ...
Weis: You are more sensitive after exposure . .. after a period of time sensitivity does 
disappear ... 68 weeks for sensitivity from exposure..
Q: Should you go back in for livestock feeding if you have a reaction?
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Pamell; If you have a reaction, no.
Q: Can you attempt to determine the level of exposure by computer modeling?
Q: ... returned to area—was forced to return to the hospital..does not match monitor.
Q: My nose is a better indicator than a monitor...
Weis: If you smell it..does not mean its dangerous.
Q: Turning chlorine into bleach ... can other chemicals be produced?
Weis: Not likely, if the chlorine was pure..carbon baring (sic) compounds cannot be 
formed...
Q: Get back to us...
Q: Were there any fires at the site..?
Waldron: Report o f fire at the site was unfounded. There was a fire yesterday, it was a 
grass fire started by a welder. There has never been a chemical fire at the site.
Q: Can chlorine cause permanent lung damage?
Leahy: If someone was severely exposed to chlorine gas... if  you were hospitalized.
Q: What was in the box cars next to the tankers?
Watts: On the east end of the derailment there was plywood, on the west end by the 
caustic car there was fencing.
Q: What do skin irritations look like? My animal did not want to be brushed.
Swartz: This would not be common in an animal with thick hair-possibly mixed with 
water and penetrated...
Q: Isn't it a federal regulation where box cars are placed when filled with chemicals? 
Watts: Chemical cars are required to be six cars behind the engine. No other restrictions. 
Q: If you had a family, would you move back into the red zone after the incident is over? 
Watts: Yes.
Technical Group Meeting Notes, 4/16/96.
"The re-entry of the residents into Alberton will continue to be on hold, as well as-the 
opening of 1-90. Until we know more about car 3, it is too risky. We will continue to 
allow the people back in to feed and check on pets, and retrieve their belongings during 
the early morning hours.”
Technical Group Meeting Notes, 4/16/96.1800.
"This afternoon we had a few events. We had a very hard rain fall that lasted about three 
to five minutes. The water got into the intersection o f Cars 2,3, and 4 and created a cloud 
which looked like a grass fire. I quickly enveloped car 2. Health and Safety was prepared 
to begin evacuation when suddenly the wind changed and cloud moved westerly...
Terry and Chris had a scare this afternoon. They went into the hills to recheck that 
everyone had been evacuated. They cam across a house that he hadn't previously know 
about. It looked like someone was still living here, however, they didn't find anyone.
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This afternoon the techs tossed around some ideas and plans for Car 3 ... The plan will be 
sent to the Chlorine Institute for their approval. Once we receive that approval, it will be 
made public at tomorrow’s 2:00 meeting at the Red Lion, so the residents have a better 
idea o f what is going on.”
From Incident Command Notes, author unknown (handwritten).
Nose "serious lung" (brain?) Immune Heart 
Lung tissue scarring- baseline monitoring?
some placard numbers fi-om train- UTLX 28662 ACFX 8850 GPBX 715 
Porphyria behavioral disturbances documented in children form chlorine exposure 
MCR potentiation 15%? 
permanently sensitized
FULL STORY (circled)
Union Carbide nose
synergism- Example- CO + C12= COC12 Phosgene gas.
environmental fate
organochlorines
pockets
chlorine-pesticides, basis for — >dioxin 
40 mile plume Missoula reports
If non detect then why are people experiencing breathing problems when returning to 
area.
Workers still wearing respiratory protection.
Damage can occur at levels below the threshold of human smell.
Missoula effects.
If no residues, then why test soil "soil tests for ph" what about other chems? 
"hypersensitivity" 15% dont be afraid of "it does disappear" almost all cases 
Will Snodgrass'phone # 
date (4/16/96)
‘M RL vets say horses looking OKfor now. 'Missoulian, 4/16/96, B-4.
"With the Stewart group of horses, our consensus here after the three of us checked it out 
is that it wasn't anything like what was in the paper,” [Dr. Stan Swartz]
'Chlorine spill update- Cleanup ahead o f  schedule.' Missoulian. 4/16/96, A-1.
"One car of potassium cresylate has been emptied and the car removed...
Chlorine readings near the site and in the surrounding area remained mostly 
non-existent, according to Chris Weis, a Environmental Protection Agency Toxicologist
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from Denver. . He assured residents at Monday's daily meeting that once the tank cars are 
removed, there will be no danger in the area.
" Once we move a hundred yards away from the train we are unable to measure chlorine 
... Once any chlorine clouds move out of the area, there will be no residual chemical left 
in your soil or your water that we are concerned about," said Weis.”
'Claims adjustors and lawyers line up to reassure victims, ' Missoulian, 4/16/96, B-1. 
“Minneapolis lawyer William Jungbauer. "We’ve done railroad litigation and toxic 
litigation. One o f the biggest problems in cases like this is that people don’t realize they 
need to see a doctor right away, to document what's going on, " he said. Jungbauer said a 
baseline medical report could help determine if  later problems are linked to exposure to 
the chlorine. .. “People affected by the derailment should take advantage of the services 
that Montana Rail Link has provided for them, but understand that the help may not last 
forever”, Modine said. "I hope Montana Rail Link keeps it up all the way through and 
then pays for everything," he said. "But my feeling is, once they are back in their homes, 
the spigot might turn off as far as the help."
'Many evacuees breathe easier, doctor reports, ' Missoulian, 4/16/96, B-1.
"A week ago. Dr. Walter Peschel had never treated a patient for chlorine intoxication... 
Those people who suffered the most serious exposure to Thursday’s chlorine cloud .those 
in intensive care- will have to wait and see the long-term effects, Peschel said. "They 
could develop a reactive airway syndrome like asthma," he said. "That could last for 
several months. There is also the possibility of permanent lung damage or disease. There 
is also, though, the possibility o f a complete recovery."
In those cases, the children- or adults, if  they have similar problems-should stay away 
from any new exposure to chlorine while their bodies are healing, Leahy advised.”
Missoulian, 4/16/96.
Other headlines:
’Chlorine killed hobo in seconds, toxicologist says, '
’Knowing what’s normal- counselors tell victims i t ’s OK to be upset’
April 17,1996
Evacuee M eeting Notes.
Dr. Beckemeyer- explains respiratory symptoms...
Q: Long term effects..’*'.what do we know?
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Beckemeyer: 1-2% that have problems with asthma may be sensitive. Problems will be 
limited to individuals who have had major exposure.
Q; Chlorine exposure..does it knock you down, make you lose consciousness? 
Beckemeyer: No.
Q: I was knocked dovm twice—after exposure. This is not classic from chlorine 
exposure...
[No response to this- moved on to discuss roadblocks and reentry.]
Leahy: Health issues: If  you are experiencing any problems or have any concerns, we 
encourage you to consult your physician.
Nielsen- describes monitoring. Chlorine and pH.
Q: The off-gassing coming out o f the ground? Is that what the smell is? Should we be 
concerned. No answer.
Technical G roup M eeting Notes, 4/17/96.
"All non-essential personnel were removed from the Forward Command area today. All 
firemen, etc,, will be sent for complete physicals, including x-rays and blood tests, at 
Frenchtown. This will be done for liability purposes...
We will need to develop a plan for what we will find underneath Car 3, once it is 
finished."
*Next step: getting rid o f  chlorine in 'Tank 3. ' Missoulian, 4/17/96,
“ ... Some residents said they had returned to their homes and smelled chlorine.
"If your machines are right, are the people wrong?" one woman asked. ...Weis also said 
that anyone exposed to the chlorine might become hypersensitive to it- in swimming 
pools or in return visits to the evacuated area to feed livestock. That hypersensitivity 
should go away within about eight weeks."
Missoulian, 4/17/96.
Other headlines: 'Alberton man sues Rail Link. '
'Counselors help kids cope in aftermath o f  disaster. '
'The Scenic Route- road crews to keep up with the traffic and potholes on 1-90 detour. '
April 18,1996
Evacuee M eeting Notes.
Health, Leahy: Health concerns call #. The nursing staff will make referrals to a doctor or 
give you the needed information. "The people saying they smell something in Alberton 
we believe that you smell something. We don't have answers yet, but we are working on
209
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
it. We have contacted Garon Smith. We are attempting to find what the smell is. We are 
in the assessment phase to determine the chemicals on site. We are testing the soils, 
water and air. The DEQ, EPA and local health department are working on it. The results 
will be public information.”
Nielsen: We are monitoring the chlorine ... The soil readings have all been okay. We are 
looking at the chlorine reaction with other chemicals.
Stine, Olympus- Testing for Ph, Na, K, and Cl- non detection. "Readings look very 
good."
Q: Do you have any data on the water, soil chemical levels before the spill?
Nielsen: The interaction with other chemicals is being looked into .... We are not 
concerned with the chlorine readings at this time, more concerned with the reaction of 
the other chemicals with the chlorine.
Q: We don't understand the chemistry that has happened here. I want to extend my 
personal thanks to Snodgrass for his concerns, it is good to know the worst case scenario. 
Q: Can you tell us the number of cars derailed and the actual number of the car. 
Chemical concerns:
Chlorine 
Sodium Chlorate 
Potassium Cresylate
Watts: The MSDS sheets were left here, we provided all the information that we had.
Q: What by-products can be produced? Are the chemicals being analyzed, need chemist 
to explain.
Weis: We are looking into the source of the potassium cresylate. We know it was used to 
remove the impurities from gasoline. The bad mercaptans extraction was done in 
Washington. They are no longer effective, they have been neutralized. ..The product is 
regenerated with sulfuric acid and then becomes reusable... Samples form the 
contaminated soils are being tested to give some idea o f what chemicals mixed. We are 
using a mass spectrometer.
Q: Plateau Road- trees browning, heavy smell, eyes burning.
Weis: A plant specialist in being brought in.
Q: what are levels at the spill site.
Weis: We have that information and it is being continually monitored.
Q: But what are the levels..
Q: What was the reading at the initial time o f the wreck. I had family that went to help. 
Weis: MRL is completing a computer model from the evidence on site. .. We don't want 
to speculate.
Q: All those exposed can get detoxing herbs.
Leahy: I haven't looked into th a t... but I don't have that information.
Q: local health food store, vitamin C, don't drink chlorinated water...
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Q: Expertise for humans, bring someone in..
Watts: We have doctors in, if you have further concerns, contact your doctor.
Technical Group Meeting Notes, 4/18/96.
Norman called in during the meeting to report that car 4 had been pulled away from Car 
3. The access will be better now, with Car 4 away. The soil in this area is yellow, and 
readings are at about 100 ppm. There is still concern about the north end of the car. 
There hasn't been any excavating done around it..
Health and Safety notes there is more than enough monitoring going on, and the Coast 
Guard in assisting with this.
Oxychem requested that Envirocon shorten the distance to the decon station, as long as 
the readings are OK. They will put the operators in Level C protection (slicker suits). 
Although it is nice to have some knowns, Brian reminded everyone there are still a lot of 
unknowns out there."
Incident Command Notes.4/18/96,1900.
At 1900 hours Ellen Leahy contacted I. C. Scott Waldron and confirmed that the chlorine 
and Potassium Cresylate did mix. Chlorinated Phenol.
On Waldron's "From the Chief paper": Health Dept, confirm the mixing "What does this 
mean?... He measured liquid sample."
* Firefighters and MRL officials got a much-needed boost at Wednesday's regular 
briefing fo r  evacuated residents-applause fo r  a job  well done' Missoulian, 4/18/96. 
A-10
"The 2 pm sessions have been well attended ... Many participants have used the time to 
voice their fears and speculation that information about the situation was being withheld 
... But on Wednesday Frenchtown Fire Chef Scott Waldron started the session with an 
impassioned defense of the work that cleanup officials and Rail Link employees are 
performing. "It's very difficult to sit up here and listen to some of the things we hear," 
Waldron said, his voice cracking. After Waldron's speech, most of the question and 
answer period after the briefing was dedicated to residents praising the incident staff and 
Rail Link...
"The opinion of the few is not necessarily that o f the rest of us," one man agreed. One 
woman said she doesn't want outside lawyers trying to get into the picture. "There are 
outside agendas creeping into this."
Missoulian, 4/18/96.
Other headlines: M RL calls suit ’P rem ature’.’
’N arrow  escape- Rail Link engineer describes brush with death after derailm ent.’
211
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
April 19,1996
Incident Command Notes, 4/19/96,1200.
1st Draft Transition Plan
When is When: When chlorine no longer poses a threat to the public 
Other issues: Is there some other chemical threat that will prevent re-entry?
Leahy: Samples of air, water and soils are being tested. There is a white chemical in the 
homes (white dust) being sampled.)
Leahy: Smell-people are having symptoms when they return for limited visits. 
Background: there is concern that the chlorine mixed with the chemical in Tank car #5. 
Did it happen? There are symptoms-smell. Dr Garon Smith, U of M chemist confirmed 
that the chemicals did mix. We don't know what all the compounds are at this time. 
Residential monitoring has started. How far this compound migrated from the site is 
unknown. Air and soil is being monitored. We are attempting to answer this question. 
We are working from the site out in a spoke-like pattern to attempt to locate the 
migration zone. We are doing some monitoring in the homes, with the permission of the 
homeowner. We will not have any further information today.
Watts: Best case scenario: Car #3 process complete and the chlorine will be gone.
DOT, Swartz: We also need the information on the threat of the chemical. We also have 
a life threatening potential with the detour o f 1-90. The threat of both will have to be 
weighed.”
Evacuee Meeting Notes.
Watts: April 24th is still the re-entry date.
Leahy: “We are checking other components at the work site and the smell in Alberton. 
We are testing the white dust that was found in the homes. The potassium cresylate did 
mix with the chlorine. The chlorinated compounds are of greater concern. We have taken 
samples from the area o f the wreck The symptoms that you have described to us have 
been very helpful. We want to find the answer...
Dr. Garon Smith ... has confirmed the presence o f chlorinated phenol We do not know 
the migration off the site. Air testing has been done and the residue in the homes and the 
solid is being tested...We do need answers about the compound, and the migration before 
we can allow reentry.”
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Garon Smith: “I was called Tuesday by the health dept, regarding the pesticide smell and 
the contents o f the compound. I received samples on Wednesday and ran the tests 
Thursday .... We have told MRL to have the spill at the site covered with plastic. The 
compound will mix with water and go into the ground. This compound is not in aerosol 
form. It will not ?? into the air. It could have been carried by the cloud and the rain the 
day o f the incident. Cleanup at the site will be necessary. The compound coming in 
contact with water is a concern. It is heavier than water and will pool in the bottom.”
Q: Tweedale- Is heat necessary for formation of chlorinated phenol 
Smith- No, it can form at room temperature.
Q: What about the concentration .... garden plants?
Q: Fish, the Clark Fork River Smith: This compound accumulates in the fatty tissue. 
Leafy vegetables can be washed. I would be more concerned with cows milk, meat..wild 
meat., should stick to lean meat.
Q: It is critical the dispersion rate, how far would this compound disperse.
Smith: The more rain the tighter the pattern 
Q: When will tests be done...
Leahy: Tests are being done on the disbursement, until results are known there will be no 
re-entry into the exclusion zone.
Way, EPA: “There are extreme peaks o f chlorine monitored at the site and at times lethal 
amounts
of gas. When the dirt is disturbed when the cars are moved, there is extreme amounts of 
chlorine
gas released... We are now turning our attention to the testing of chlorinated phenol. We 
will analyze the data as
it comes in. We are taking sampl[es] from the Alberton area: homes, etc. Dr. Pruyn has 
sent
samples to a vet. diagnostic clinic in Moscow, ID. He will test animals as he thinks it is 
necessary.
It is possible the compound could cause liver damage.”
Q: Human health risks?
Way: exposed to high concentrations- dermal, respiratory, liver damage, accumulates in 
fatty tissue, remains in the tissue.
Q: If people left their furnace running, would you be able to capture samples form the 
furnace filter?
Way: It is unknown., possibly too many variables. It is an interesting suggestion, and we 
will consider it.
Torgeson, Olympus- Altered sampling techniques to address white powder. . "We 
learned the results of the sample from Dr. Smith. We will start sampling the compounds 
to identify them. We are testing the soil close to the site. We have had one small hit in
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the soil close to the site. It was below the allowable limits. There has been no detection 
in the water.”
Watts; “MRL has established rules for this meeting... we are providing support to the 
evacuees, we have pledged to bring in the specialists to answer questions (they will find 
the answer to: "what's wrong, what's going to happen, are my kids going to be sick, what 
types, if  any, ill effects will I experience).”
Benowitz (expert): “ We will be measuring exposures and testing samples. It is 
premature to answer questions at this time.”
Way: “Monitoring the on-site cleanup with the technical specialists., the operation is 
going well. We have the highest quality of expertise from all over the country. Our focus 
at this time is on safety. Samples were taken the first day of the spilled caustic material. 
We [will] have data by the, first of next week. We are attempting to identify the 
migration of the compounds. After the site is stable, more research will be conducted.”
Q: Regarding nausea, lots o f us have been nauseated. Will it pass..
Way: Two issues. Chlorine gas is nasty. There is nausea and vomiting from chlorine gas. 
Symptoms abate in approximately 2 weeks. Sometimes children and elderly adults will 
take longer.. Everyone is different.
Q: Perhaps it wasn't chlorine. If you have an additional release of chlorine will it mix 
with the potassium cresylate and make more chlorinated phenol.
Way: At the time o f the spill it did mix, but the chemicals are not close enough at this 
time.
Q: When the earth [soil] is moved will the chemicals mix?
Way: It's possible.
'UM chemist looks fo r  other toxins resulting fro m  spill'. Missoulian, 4/19/96.
“A University o f Montana chemist is analyzing soil and air samples taken at the Alberton 
canyon train derailment, looking for any new compounds created by the combination of 
chemicals spilled when 20 cars left the track a week ago. Chlorine gas, which rolled out 
o f one ruptured tank car, posed the most immediate and deadly danger, said Garon Smith 
... But evacuees who have since returned to Alberton-briefly to retrieve belongings- 
reported a pesticide smell that gave them headaches and made their eyes water. Thus, 
Smith's analysis o f the other chemicals spilled in the derailment: potassium cresylate, a 
degreaser that spilled into a ditch alongside the train track and sodium chlorate, a white 
crystal and strong oxidizer.
Late Thursday, Smith said he believes the cresylate is causing the odor. But he still did 
not know if  some new compound was created when the cresylate came in contact with 
the chlorine gas...
" The potential health problem would be combination of the organic and the chlorine into 
a chlorinated organic”, according to Smith. "Even then, though, my guess is that if some
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chlorinated compounds were formed, they were probably not produced in significant 
numbers.” Chlorinated organics .... work its way up the food chain. Any impact on 
humans would be from eating affected fish. ...The chlorine gas will cause 'quite a bit' of 
contact damage to vegetation, the chemist added...”
'Governor reviews Chlorine cleanup ~ Missoulian, 4/19/96. A- 1.
100 people treated at Community Hospital; 23 5 at St. Patrick's, and 14 at Mineral 
County/Superior.
'Quick response- rapid deployment o f emergency teams kept chlorine casualties low in 
Alberton. 'Inside: 'The nation's biggest chlorine spill in Florida causedfar worse loss 
o f life.' Missoulian, 4/19/96.
National Chlorine Institute- 6 major leaks of Cl from rail cars since 1979 Youngstown 
Fla-90 tons (180,0001bs) full carload- biggest in history.
April 20,1996
Evacuee Meeting Notes.
Clark Johnson, facilitator. "Rules for today’s meeting. ..Any debates will be after the 
public meeting.
Waldron: IC update. There is a handout available showing the organizational structure of 
the incident command. We are extremely busy, there is a lot going on, we do have a time 
limit today for this meeting.
Q: You talk about the soil, what about the people. Are you recommending blood tests, 
spit tests, this hasn't been addressed.
Dr. Benowitz: If  there was severe irritation, the chlorine has been excreted. Testing 
wouldn't reveal... the organic compounds, it does not appear that they migrated to where 
people live.
Q: It has been 8 days and still there is no answer. Isn't it better to get tested now and to 
have the data, than have no data?
Dr. Benowitz: The compound was not transported, it is heavier than air. The only reason 
for concern there may be some reaction with another chemical. The distance that it could
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have travelled is minimal. The farther it was transported the more diluted it would 
become.
Q We should write down everyday how we're doing...
Dr. Benowitz: It is not a hazard if the compound did not enter your system. It cannot get 
into your water supply. Only way is by surface contact. There is no concentration of any 
impact.
Q: Are those people that re-entered already at more risk?
Dr. Benowitz: No, at this time there is no detectable levels, (sic) Chlorine gas can be 
released, but not in major amounts.
Q: Can you speculate on the long term effect? Can we get a contract from MRL to assure 
medical coverage.
Watts: I can't answer that. MRL is here for the long run.
Q: What are you going to do about the white dust in our houses—will you hire someone to 
come in and clean? (Command staff had already left the meeting, this will be addressed 
on 4/21/96.)"
Technical G roup M eeting Notes. 4/20/96.
"The subject o f 1-90 was brought up: It was agreed no decision can be made until we see 
what will happen with Car 3. Once Car 3 is taken care of, the Interstate can be opened 
without there being a threat to motorists. The only problem will be with the dirt 
excavation stirring up some vapors. At that point, finishing Car 2 and Car 3 will be a 
normal operation. The highway will be marked and patrolled so there will be no 
onlookers."
'New Fears in Alberton- Chemist says train wreck produced dozens o f dangerous 
compounds, ' Missoulian, 4/20/96.
"We hoped we could rule out that a reaction took place," said Ellen Leahy, director of 
the MCCHD. "But there was a reaction. We have confirmed the presence of chlorinated 
compounds at the site. Most importantly, we do not know if the compounds have 
migrated off site, away from the derailment," Leahy said. "But we do know what to look 
for now. And, certainly, chlorine is not the only thing."
The finding could affect Alberton residents' return to their homes, Leahy said. "Our 
position at the Health Department is that re-entry won't take place until we have 
satisfactorily asked and answered all the public health questions."
It also confirmed reports by residents who returned briefly to their homes this week to 
retrieve personal items- reports o f a pesticide-like smell and complaints of severe
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headaches, burning eyes and nausea. The ill effects didn't jibe with tests showing no 
further chlorine gas in the air.
So Garon Smith, a chemistry professor at the University of Montana and member of the 
Missoula Board of Health, tested chemical samples taken at the derailments. The mixture 
was so concentrated that his equipment had to be cleaned and reassembled on Friday. 
...He found what he hoped not to find; chlorophenols created when chlorine from one 
ruptured tank car mixed with potassium cresylate-a degreaser- that leaked from another. 
While the chlorine gas that rolled out of tank car No. 3 immediately after the derailment 
was the first and deadliest risk, the chemical compounds created afterward pose the 
longer term problem. Smith said. ...The compounds are "pesticide like", by Smith's 
description and are highly toxic and persistent in the environment. They tend to 
accumulate in the food chain. At Smith's urging, health officers asked that the most 
contaminated soil be covered with plastic late Thursday to prevent the chemicals from 
further washing into the ground - and ground water. The "worst scenario" would find 
pools o f chlorinated compounds sinking in to the aquifer and eventually polluting the 
drinking water..., Smith said. There is also some possibility that the chemicals floated 
away from the derailment on water particles-either particles created by the release of 
chlorine or in the light rain that was falling at the time, he added .... Smith said the 
chemical compounds could show up in cow and goat milkand in river fish. Leafy 
vegetables might need washing with a soap solution. Meat from animals affected by 
contamination also could be contaminated, particularly the fatty tissue where chlorinated 
phenols tend to accumulate. "It's a matter, though, of how far the compounds moved out 
from the site," Smith said. Air and soil samples will be taken is a "spoke" out from he 
derailment until there is no further detectable contamination, said Peter Nielsen ... Then 
the unanswered questions can be answered, Nielsen said.”
^Health Survey starts Monday'. Missoulian, 4/20/96. A-1.
Leahy said "... the survey will scientifically characterize the health effects of the disaster. 
Step one will be an overall description o f the symptoms-"and the symptoms as they relate 
to where people live and where they were during the incident.," Leahy said. "We would 
hope to come back then and follow up with a look at longer-term issues. What we have 
now is anecdotal information that has been very helpful to us, addressing people's 
questions and looking for problems," she said. "But we need the scientific survey 
approach to give us a true picture of the event."
'Lawyer defends timing o f  suit- says it's needed to get facts. ' Missoulian, 4/20/96. A-5. 
Zander Blewett "It is absolutely mandatory in a chlorine gas exposure case of this 
magnitude that the injured parties determine, as soon as possible, the facts surrounding 
the incident. The passage of time tends only to obscure the facts." "It is extremely 
important for those injured persons to marshal the facts as soon as possible to avoid any 
confusion in the future. This is the reason the suit was filed,"
217
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Missoulian, 4/20/96.
Other headlines: 'Workers fin d  24-inch rupture in still-leaking chlorine car. '
April 21,1996
Evacuee Meeting Notes.
Watts: Car #4 and #1 are empty. #5 is empty. 2 cars have residue. The product in the 
Sodium Chlorate car does not affect re-entry. April 24th is still the re-entry data.
Leahy: Re-entry allowable criteria: We were on a conference call with state 
toxicologists, 3 medical doctors from the Rocky Mt. Drug and Poison Control Center, Dr. 
Loehnen, Missoula, Dr. Brown, Msla, Dave Torgeson, Ellen, Jim Carlson, Peter Neilson, 
Mike Schestedt, Missoula Co. Atty. We have gathered sampled at the site and going from 
the site out in concentric circles.
Torgeson, Olympus: Showed map of site and the chlorinated phenols. The samples sent 
to the lab were collected 5-6 days ago from residential sites close to the derailment.
There is very low concentration. All the hits are from the spill site. We are sampling to 
see if  the compounds migrated off the site.
Notes from Conference Cali with Health Officials. 4/21/96.
To establish re-entry criteria 
"13 ppm trichlorophenol in (air?) near tracks 
Cl- 400- 1 OOOppm spikes 
est. 550 still evacuated
I Cl- all removed
II Cl- compounds
III cresylate odor and sx (symptoms)
IV sodium chlorate- public health emergency — > clinical”
Diagram of K cresylate "pesticide like odors"
Diagram of "chlorinated compounds'- dioxin per Chris -do not expect dioxin- not enough 
heat in exo ..?
pH too low- there would be radical scavengers 
ND- ? ppm for surface and soils samples
sx o f delayed hypersensitivity kids in pool could also be triggered by other "phenolic 
compound-move off site
I Cl transfer- Hwy open ND expected -some odor threshold
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n
III PH emergency clinical OSHA 10 hour standards
A) no info re: residential extrapolation
B) But population re-entering has been injured Loehnan- sever[al] that are complaining- 
small airway diff. H/A Nausea -signif sx upon re-entry- much psych overlap- hard to 
dissect re-entry- H/A Nausea resp. sx- chest pain- trach?
Small sample o f patients in office- those with problems have underlying problems 
-Some children have small airway obstruction
Bronstein
I no chlorine leaking
II neg. soil C l
III odor will be a problem
per Chris- not much off-gassing; will dredge out K cresylate; calcium carbonate?
Railroad will do indoor air monitoring prior to and during re-entry per MRL consultant
Can use the FID for Cl hydrocarbons ? 
consensus Statements
I Cl- When Cl levels are los (ND on highway but some odor in zone) and CL cars stable 
(little/no risk o f catastrophic (?) releases) then open Hwy as long as engineers., no 
stopping no gawkers
II A) Wait for the samples
B) When they do come back- even if  a small amount (NOTE: small underlined in 
origninal)-will have to extrapolate
C) a list o f compounds- not the only ones there
D) Dioxins- background levels difficult due to kraft mill
Peter 1/3 mile from site 
10 soil samples -site -residential
10 compounds in Garon’s all not detect BUT work-zone has low levels of 
tri-chlorophenol detected-
other home samples pending EL can screen for those 10 compounds as indicators 
-agree-wait- but ? qualitative- agree to go for the indicators- hold on dioxin testing 
Loehnen- potential for stress and overreaction and fear?? hard to read IE cresylate- 
optimally gone before re-entry if  cresylate not gone- reconsider re-entry 
Schestadt- cannot sustain an exclusion on hypersensitivity 
“can go in" -should be advised may be hypersensitive- talk to physician 
A1 Bronstein- the bulk of cresylate should be removed per Kohan? - re-entry- no 
migrationcresylate removed then- becomes hyper-?-go to physician 
Proviso- a bunch o f people obs. rashes or PFT changes . .come back to . .consensus group
IV calcium carbonate (lime chalk)- irritants- dust- poison control will prepare info
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per Loehnan- benign
per Bronstein- Be clear- terminology 'hypersensitivity' not multiple chemical 
sensitivity self-limited; not progressive; time frame different from individual to individual 
Kohan- delayed reaction to Cl some have a lowered threshold - sun bum analogy 
Per Mike S.
1. Chlorine stable- Hwy open
2. Chlorinated Compounds- ? -move off site use markers if neg-OK if pos-confer
3. Cresylate- bulk ? removed A. reconvene if symptoms
4. Chalk Consensus on all 4 issues- meeting set for Tues 4/23 9 Am.
Signed E. Leahy.
Missoulian, 4/21/96.
“Scott Waldron told those in attendance at Saturday's briefing that officials were going to 
concentrate on questions from Alberton area residents. Waldron said there had been 
complaints that residents were unable to ask questions because much of the briefing time 
was being taken up by environmental activists. "This is not a forum for environmental 
organizations" Waldron said "This is your meeting and we want to keep it that way."”
April 22,1996
Evacuee M eeting Notes.
Dr. Pruyn (vet) there again "to answer any questions you may have regarding your 
animals.
Torgeson; " We have samples from the cresylate and have received some results. Some 
detectable concentrations from near the site and some no detects. ...All the analytical 
results have been low... "The potassium cresylate is being excavated from the site.
Q: After or before reentry?
A: It's going on right now
Q: So all contaminated soil will be gone...
A: Health Department has a flow chart.
Q: Are you using meteorological..
A: We are not an air sampling company..
Q: No- where the clouds went..
Deis: Please hold all questions like we agreed on.
Leahy: I have some announcements.
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'Officials set safety conditions fo r  return'. Missoulian, 4/22/96. A -1.
"We're still optimistic that (April 24 re-entry) will take place," Watts said after the 
briefing, "But I think it's going to come down to the health department... Leahy said the 
bulk of the soil contaminated by the potassium cresylate will have to be removed before 
residents can return.”
'Cracked rail may be clue to derailment'. Missoulian, 4/22/96.
"Hazardous material crews that have been on site did locate apiece of track that appears 
to be partially fractured. However, until the remainder of this track is located and 
microscopically inspected, it is impossible to determine the cause, said Lynda Frost of 
Rail Link . The NTSB ... and FRA ... have not been to the derailment site during cleanup 
because o f safety concerns. All have been informed of the findings. "As soon as the 
investigative teams are allowed on site, every effort will be focused upon determination 
o f the cause o f this derailment." Frost said.
'Asleep at the switch- NTSB: Train safety suffers because engineers are fatigued. ' 
Missoulian, 4/22/96. A- 10.
Rail traffic has jumped by 27% in past 10 years. At same time, number of crewmen is 
one-half what it was in 1980.
Missoulian, 4/22/96.
Other headlines: 'The checklist- MCCHD officials have set up 4 criterita for allowing 
re-entry to the evacuated areas'.
April 23,1996
Evacuee M eeting Notes.
Leahy: “To keep the chemicals in perspective (went over flow chart). The known risk is 
chlorine. We are making progress. All our data is getting us towards the Yes. The 
question: did the chlorinated phenols leave a trail from the site—so far we have a no 
detect. The potassium cresylate, we are working on the best way to treat and excavate the 
soil. On the white dust, so far a no detect. We are just being prudent and cautious.”
Technical G roup M eeting Notes. 4/23/96,1200.
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"There can be no reduction of the evacuation zone. The readings on 1-90 are above the 
acceptable level."
Technical G roup M eeting Notes. 4/23/96,1800.
"It was noted we have a 19 page report from the chlorine spill in Florida. The report lists 
everything that was done wrong. We are not making the same mistakes... It will be 
announced to the public today that the evacuation will not be over tomorrow. It is 
expected that law enforcement will tell the people it will be about five more 
days...Everyone is reminded they need to be in a full face respirator in the red tape area. 
The readings have been averaging in the 3040 ppm range.”
Technical Group M eeting Notes. 4/23/96,1830.
"The Sodium chlorate car transfer is complete and the ground spill cleanup is well 
underway. Envirocon will have two decon techs working the station. They are excavating 
the soil as they can get to it. It was noted that the stain in the railbed is small for the 
amount o f product that was spilled. Most o f the product went south."
'Tests show spilled toxic chemicals stayed put- More samples are ye t to be analyzed. ’ 
M issoulian, 4/23/96. “Soil samples taken in a backyard garden and at two homes within 
one-third mile of the Alberton canyon train derailment showed no trace of the dangerous 
chemical compounds found at the accident site, a county health officer said Monday. 
..."To hurt people, these compounds would have to get into their body either by ingesting 
water or inhaling gases and into their bodies through puncture wounds," Nielsen said.
“So far it looks good," Nielsen said. "So far, there is no indication that any of these 
compounds moved off site."
...The resulting chlorophenols are highly toxic and persistent in the environment. The 
contaminated soils at the accident site, must, in fact, be excavated and removed.
Olympus
Environmental, a cleanup consultant to Montana Rail Link, is testing soil and water 
samples in a
wide circle out form the derailment, looking for any trace of the chlorophenols.
"We are sampling all the way upriver and downriver," said Dave Torgerson o f Olympus. 
"We need to see whether the chemicals forming on site are getting off site. We have no 
indication that they have gotten off site." "But we are going to make sure" he said. 
Torgerson said ground-water and river-water samples also have shown non sign of the 
toxic mixtures .... We want that cleanup pretty much done and the contaminated soil 
contained in some way before re-entry," Nielsen said. "The chemicals are real odorous. 
They could cause some discomfort for some o f the people who already had the chlorine 
exposure and may be sensitive right now."
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Missoulian, 4/23/96.
Other headlines; 'Officials still hold to Wednesday return. '
April 24,1996
Evacuee M eeting Notes.
Waldron: We have had some high levels o f chlorine. (Technical information on patching 
tank car #3 followed.)
Leahy: Chlorine is the biggest known risk. The other issues are being tested, just to be 
prudentand cautious, because you have concerns. Chlorinated phenols: 75% complete 
towards yes- migrated-no trail. Potassium Cresylate: 50% towards yes-excavation started. 
White dust: 100% yes. Consultants have determined the criteria for re-entry and will give 
the Health Department go ahead when all the data has been received. We have tested 
2000 samples. All data shows No Detect outside the spill site. We will meet again to go 
over the data. The white dust, we have ruled out anything that could be a health threat. 
...The consultants have agreed there is no substance that’is harmful."
Huff. The stock is fine, the EPA has been watching them, and they say the animals are 
fine."
Weis, EPA regional toxicologist. I have been... roving the area. I have stopped and 
visited with the animals. They are fine. I have not seen any signs of chlorine exposure.”
Technical Group M eeting Notes. 4/24/96,1200.
“Olympus Environmental is still doing testing in the area. Health and Safety is 
continuing with a lot o f monitoring. There is a lot gas coming out o f the wet soil now that 
the rain has stopped."
Missoulian, 4/24/96.
Headlines: 'Chlorine cleanup: It's going slower than expected'
'Detour on the detour- wreck temporarily closes Highway 200. *
Letter to the Editor 'Give MRL a break'.
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April 25,1996
Evacuee M eeting Notes.
Leahy: ”In answer to health question. The criteria list—go home is the best answer. We 
want to answer all question so that you know you are safe. "
Leahy went over the chemical flow chart. Dust- answer: yes, no problem. Chlorinated 
compounds tested from the site, stayed at the rail site. All results came from data, not 
form speculation and done quickly. Today’s answer the chemical trail from the site-DO 
NOT FIND ANY MIGRATION.
Torgeson: "In scanning the data we have non detects in the sample. Any detectable 
between Plateau Road and the spill site was 246 trichlorophenol, but that did not go off 
site.
Q: Have you determined which molecule was airborne and causing the odor?
Nielson: Cresylate, the mercaptan, causing pesticide like odor. Not a a strong odor now. 
If you have been sensitized you might notice it more.
Q: Are there live fish in the river now?
Technical G roup M eeting Notes. 4/25/96,1400.
"Everyone is reminded to try and keep your attitudes up. if our coworkers see us down, it 
will bring them down.”
'Alberton residents may be allowed home by weekend. ' Missoulian, 4/25/96.
“Leahy said authorities are about 75% sure there is no trail elsewhere. "We're looking for 
a trail to see if  our chlorinated compounds documented in the sludge itself traveled, said 
Leahy. "We’re not finding evidence of a tra il ... (after) almost 2,000 analyses, we’re 
getting no detect anywhere outside the spill site”  Leahy stressed that chlorine remained 
the biggest threat and that other chemicals have been examined out of prudence and to 
answer the concerns of residents. "From the beginning of this issue to now to the end of 
this issue, we believe to a person on the incident command team and the consultants that 
chlorine is the biggest known risk. It’s the big hazard," she said. "It's easy to lose sight of 
that when we start talking about things (chemicals) that are a little more complex."
'With luck, evacuees may be home this weekend. ' Missoulian, 4/25/96.
Displaced Alberton residents got an apology, along with some assurance Friday from 
Montana Rail Link President Bill Brodsky. "We’re going to be with you for the long haul 
... We’re going to be here to see you through this thing." Brodsky apologized for the 
"inconvenience" caused by the derailment o f the 71 -car Rail Link train which spewed 
deadly chlorine gas, killing a transient railrider .... Ellen Leahy .gave people a few hints
224
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
for getting back into their homes. Leahy said it was 'highly unlikely' that residents would 
smell chlorine upon their returns but advised them to ventilate their homes and get out 
should they find gas in their homes. In general, Leahy said, "It should be safe for your 
children and your pets outside."
Missoulian, 4/25/96.
Other headlines:
'For most, motel life's getting old'
'Evacuee group presses MRL on health issues'
April 26,1996
Evacuee Meeting Notes.
Watts: They estimate there is 5 tons o f product left in the car. We have scheduled a 
meeting for 9 AM on Saturday, 4/27/96 to finalize the going home process.
Leahy: We are preparing a document for you, the most frequently asked questions. That 
will be a handout tomorrow.
The four criteria. Chlorine product gone. Chlorine smell- highly unlikely. There should 
be no pockets of chlorine in your home, if you smell chlorine ventilate the area.
Food: Medications Veg, Water Symptoms: You may continue to have symptoms. Get in 
touch with your health care provider.
Chemicals: you may notice some smell, some do, some don't. There may be a residual 
smell.
Clean your counters or rugs, use baking soda solution if  you feel its necessary. A handout 
will be available before you go home.
Bill Brodsky, MRL President. "We're here for the long haul- 1 year, 5 years, 10 years, 
we'll be here. We can’t answer all the questions now. We want you to know we are deeply 
concerned. We will evaluate all o f your concerns. We tiy to do what's right for our 
employees, for our customers and for our community. We will be here. We are doing the 
best job we can. We have respect for others, and we treat you like we want to be treated. 
We will work with you. We will be here down the road. We apologize for any 
inconvenience and any problems that we have caused. We won't forget you. We have the 
best quality of people here to help you. We are proud o f our people and the team. Our 
goal is to get you back home."
Technical Group Meeting Notes. 4/26/96,1800.
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"We have been moving product at a rate of one ton per hour We believe we now have 13 
tons of product left, so at this rate, the car should be finished by early morning." Once the 
car is in the clear, Envirocon and Hulcher will get in to continue excavating and 
preparing to lay rail. Health and safely noted they have plenty of coverage and plenty of 
monitoring is being done."
"Everyone is asked to relay to his people that we're not out of the woods yet. Since it does 
look like we're getting hear the end, people may have a tendency to get in a hurry and not 
be as careful as they should be."
Letter to the Editor: 'Give MRL's victims a break* by Jabe Jackson. Missoulian, 
4/26/96.
"How dare any of them ask the victims of MRL's chlorine disaster to give MRL a break. 
Who answers for those crimes? What form o f redress do the people have? Who is our 
advocate? Did anyone give Exxon a break in Alaska? Or Union Carbide a break in 
Bhopal, India? Maybe corporations should all be given breaks for not yet killing 
everyone. Do these advocates o f poor unfortunate MRL really expect people who have 
had toxics dumped in their town to somehow feel bad for MRL?"
Missoulian, 4/26/96.
Other headlines:
'Evacuee group presses MRL on health issues, ' 
'Some residents get a quick visit via videotape. ' 
Letter to the Editor- 'A safe substitute fo r  chlorine. '
April 27,1996
Evacuee M eeting Notes.
Watts: We are going to have a partial re-entry today .... Steve Way, EPA has approved the 
reentry.
Way: I am the on-scene coordinator. I am from the EPA, Emergency Response Unit. The 
following conditions have allowed me to make the decision to let you go home. I have 
been at the site everyday since April 14 .... We have control of the chlorine through the 
off-loading process. When car #3 is empty, we will remove the soil from around the car. 
Soil removal: the bulk o f the product will be staged on site, and covered. This soil will be 
stable on site. The soil will be transferred off site at a later time.
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Watts: Re-entry today is not mandatory. You can wait until tomorrow. There will be 
another meeting Sunday at 9 AM. MRL will meet with the leadership of ACE, at 6 PM 
today at the Red Lion on W. Broadway.
Waldron: A handout is available: Health information. Phone Numbers MRL information 
... There will be a claims office set up in Alberton within the next couple of days.
Way: The 1-90 re-opening will be based on the level o f the chlorine monitoring. The 
ofF-loading o f Car #3 continues to release high concentrations o f chlorine gas on 1-90 
near the derailment site. We are unable to give a time when car #3 will be empty.
Watts: The EPA has completed a handout regarding the criteria for the contaminated soil. 
The Health Department document has been signed by Ellen Leahy, Health Dept., Dave 
Ball, Law Enforcement, Scott Waldron, Fire and Dan Watts, MRL.
Re-Enhy Allowable Criteria Sheet
1) Chlorine Gas
2) Chlorinated Compounds
3) Potassium Cresylate Spill
4) "White Dust"
Incident status summary. 4/27/96 by Paul Laisy [Missoula R ural F ire Dept.].
EPA concluded risk to the city o f  Alberton was over. Chlorine contained although still 
vapor transfer ongoing. All other(?) contamination risks eliminated. People of Alberton 
..were allowed to return to their homes. 1-90 still closed due to chlorine spikes carried by 
wind from the site.
April 28,1996
'Home at last'. Missoulian, 4/28/96.
'Officials have found no trace o f chlorinated compounds, which were formed when the 
spilled chlorine mixed with_potassium cresylate, anywhere but at the derailment site. And 
the contaminated soils has been stabilized and taken to a nearby area until a permanent 
disposal site is located .... Members o f one of the groups MRL is still meeting with -the
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Alberton Community Evacuees (ACE)- said Saturday they won't return home until MRL 
addresses their concerns. In a press release, ACE listed the following conditions.
-A document signed by NIRL, the MCCHD and the EPA stating that it is safe for all to 
return to their homes.
-Independent tests performed on ACE members, home and properties, including soils and 
waters, by a lab of ACE’s choosing.
-Base-line medical testing as determined by a health professional of ACE's choosing. 
-Removal o f all contaminants from the accident site.
ACE members were meeting with officials from the train company Saturday night.
April 29,1996
W(9 more detour- last o f  evacuees allowed back into their homes. ’ Missoulian, 4/29/96. 
“After 17 days... "Ifs entirely safe for these people to return to their homes," said Lynda 
Frost, Montana Rail Link spokesman (sic)... And although MRL, the local and state 
health departments and the Environmental Protection Agency say the area is now safe, a 
small group o f residents says they just won't go back. ..None of the evacuees were forced 
to return to their homes this weekend. Frost said. MRL will continue to pay for their 
lodging. "We're willing to work with the group," she said. ...ACE wants an independent 
tester- and perhaps two separate labs- to perform tests on their homes an property, before 
they'll feel safe enough to return. "Our position is basically ... thus far, thousands of tests 
have been performed," Frost said. Those tests have been analyzed and Alberton has been 
deemed safe for reentry.
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APPENDIX B
Year Six (FFY 1999) USDOT-HMEP Planning Grant
1. Project Manager(s):
Hope Sieck
2618 Rattlesnake Drive 
Missoula, MT 59802 
(406)728-1001 
Missoula County LEPC
and Bill Silverman, Director
Missoula County Office of Emergency Management
200 W. Broadway St.
Missoula, MT 59802^292 
(406) 721-5700
2. Project Title-. Hazardous Materials Transportation Study; Assessing and Planning for 
Transportation Risks in and around Missoula County
3. Project dates: Start date; December 1, 1998 End date: September I. 1999
4. The specific hazardous materials risk management need to be addressed by the projecr.
To determine more specifically the risk presented by hazardous materials transport through the 
community to allow for better emergency preparation and population protection
Background:
Missoula County is described in the Hazardous Materials Response plan as being "centrally 
located in western Montana. The County has the largest population of all counties in the region 
and is a center of commerce, industry and transportation. The City of Missoula and its 
surrounding urban area are located in a large valley formed by the confluence of five major 
drainage systems. Ninety percent of the County’s population lives in this central valley. The valley 
has three highway access points. All of these points are located on interstate routes for railroad 
and truck carriers. The valley’s air shed routinely experience inversions for six months each year. 
A sole-source aquifer provides drinking water to the entire valley."(p.9)
A 1985 database of acute hazardous events nationally ranked attributed 25.2% of 
hazardous materials released to transportation incidents. That number has likely grown as the 
number of chemical shipments by rail increased since 1985. Missoula County has had the 
unfortunate experience of responding to a variety o f transportation incidents since its formation in 
1986. The Missoula County LEPC is the most well-organized and active LEPC in western 
Montana. Responders from Missoula County routinely assist departments in more rural, less 
populated areas. The Missoula Regional HazMat Team travels statewide and is integral to 
response in western Montana. The past several years have seen several transportation related 
incidents in western Montana: an accident involving a truck carrying pesticides, an intentional 
train derailment just east of Missoula, a train derailment with chemical release just west of
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Missoula.
Responders learned important lessons from each of these rail and truck accidents. The 
importance of pre-planning was clearly illustrated by these incident responses, especially as it 
related to communication between responders and industry and in the arena of public protection 
(specifically in the form of evacuation).
In order to improve overall response and preparedeness efforts the Missoula LEPC wfl] 
conduct a hazard materials transportation flow study for Missoula County and surrounding areas 
and implement that data to improve response. Our project is in three phases; Phase 1 and Phase 2 
are outlined in full here; Phase 3 will be pursued in the next funding cycle.
The purpose of Phase 1 is to identify shipments of hazardous materials that originate 
from, or are destined to, or pass through the above men areas. We will also identify the 
transportation routes and schedules likely to be used for the transportation o f substances from or 
to those facilities subject to the requirements of Title ILL
We will use the compiled data to improve upon our emergency plans and response training 
in Phase 2. Population protection work is ongoing and this data wUl greatly assist those efforts to 
identify vulnerable areas and create evacuation strategies. This information will supplement 
existing information on fixed facilities and greatly assist responders from county departments and 
the Regional HazMat Team. The HazMat Team will benefit from an analysis of risks from 
surrounding counties, as they are relied upon to respond to incidents in those counties but have 
little if any pre-planning information for those areas.
Phase 1: Conduct hazardous materials transportation flow study
The process used to conduct the study will include:
• Identify the chemical, amount, frequency, and route of hazardous material that originate 
from, or are destined to, or pass through the study area via raU, truck, air. or pipeline
• Review transportation accident information in the study area for past 10 years
■ Identify high accident areas and high risk areas
• Identify facilities vulnerable to transportation caused incidents
• Contact federal, state and local regulatory agencies for additional hazmat data (e.g. 
inspection, surveillance information)
• Ask transporters to provide hazmat flow information to supplement our studies; 
specifically any 24 hour, weekly, or seasonal fluctuations in loads
• Develop a data base to house this information, along with a data entry process, data 
retrieval and access for local users
• Prepare a final report which summarizes collected information to be used by LEPC and
responders to improve response and preparedness
Phase 2: Incorporate flow study data into updated disaster and response plans; utilize 
study data in pre-planning and public protection efforts via GIS mapping and risk 
management planning
The LEPC is currently assisting in the improvement o f pre-planning for a variety of fixed sites
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throughout the County. The addition of current, specific transportation risks to pre-planning and 
population protection efforts will be extremely beneficial. We will work with rail, truck, and 
pipeline carriers to achieve a higher level of preparedness, improved communication, accident 
mitigation and tniniraization, and increased public understanding of risks.
Use the information gained to improve upon and update existing emergency response plans.
An update of chemicals hauled and timing of those shipments will enable responders to determine 
the most likely hazmats to be encountered and in what potential combinations.
Phase 3: Plan and carry out a training on a transportation accident scenario incorporating 
study results. A full training for hazmat responders and law enforcement officials involving 
evacuation will address many concerns from previous transportation incidents (e.g. Clinton and 
Alberton derailments). A funding request for this exercise will be submitted during the next round 
of the grant.
S. Outline o f the work plan, with personnel, time schedule and deliverables.
WORK PLAN
Phase 1: Hazmat Flow Study
1) January 25, 1999- Training and practice run for aU involved in the survey. 
Total: 8 hours each
2) January 26- February 2, 1999 
1-90 east and West survey
2 employees 
Total: 50 hours each
Hwy.93/12 North and South survey
2 employees
Total: 50 hours each
Railroad survey 
2 employees 
Total; 50 hours each
3) February 3, 1999
Employees review data with employee hired to do data analysis 
Total: 5 hours each
4) February 5-15
1 employee completes data analysis o f highway and rail surveys 
Total: 40 hours
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5) February 4
Inservice training for 2 employees involved in fixed site facility transportation survey 
Total: 8 hours each
6) February 15-17
2 employees review transportation plans of fixed facilities under Title HI and document routes, 
volumes, and trends.
Total: 24 hours each
7) February 17-18
I employee completes data analysis of fixed site facility survey 
Total: 24 hours
8) March 5. 1999
Final report and database delivered to LEPC 
Total: 10 hours
W ORK PLAN
Phase 2: Inclusion of data into planning efforts
1) Present data and prepare recommendations for emergency plan updates to LEPC 
1 employee
Total: 10 hours
2) Facilitate meetings with transporters and responders to identify areas of improvement to 
mitigate accidents and increase response coordination; prepare report of findings firom these 
meetings and chart future foUow-up for LEPC
1 errployee 
Total: 40 hours
3) Present information and prepare recommendations for population protection working group 
I employee
Total: 10 hours
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APPENDIX C
Reported Health Effects . 
vs. Expected Sym ptom s
Expected 
sym ptom s (m s o s )
Expected Sym ptom s
(M S D S )
Actual
Sym ptom s
C la s s ic  C h lo r in e P o ta s s iu m  C r e s y la t e /P h e n o ls
(a fter  K ilb u n i, 1996;  
ACCEH, 1 9 9 6 -9 )
acid  b a sed  im balance ab dom inal pain bum inq in ch est acid  reflux
bum inq skin allerq ic sen sitiza tion c h e s t  tigh tn ess asthm a
c h e s t  pain c a n c e r co u g h  with blood blurred vision
chokinq - ' conjunctiv itis cou gh  with m u cu s brain encephalopathy
conjunctivitis constriction  o f  th e w indpipe d e c r e a se d  sm ell can cerfs)
co m e a l b u m s s e v e r e  skin b u m s d ela y ed  blink reflex ch em ica l antibodies
couqhinq diarrhea d izz in e ss ch lorâcne
e v e  irritation d iz z in e s s dry cough chronic fatigue
inflam m ation of th e  skin e y e  pain dry m outh
d ecr ea sed  motor 
skiHs
lunq co lla p se e y e  r e d n e ss ex trem e fatigue d ep ression
perm anent skin irritation jq en etic  m utations e y e  irritation diarrhea
pulm onary injury harm ful n erv o u s sy s te m  e f fe c ts finger writing dry e y e  syndrom e
w heezinq h e a d a c h e h ea d a ch e dry skin
re d n ess  and tearinq heart m u sc le  d a m a q e indigestion e y e  d ise a s e
respiratory d istress s le e p  d istu rb an ces insom nia fibrom yalgia
runny n o se irritate m u c o u s m em b r a n e s irritability qastro-intestinal pain
skin b listers irritate respiratory tract liq h th ead ed n ess heart palpitations
so re  throat k idn ey  d a m a q e
long term  m em ory  
lo ss joint pain
sp a sm o d ic  blinkinq leq & arm  w e a k n e ss lo ss  o f  appetite light sensitivity
tearinq liver d a m a g e lo ss  o f b a lan ce lo ss  of concentration
teeth  corrosion m en ta l d istu rb an ces lo s s  o f  concentration
lo ss  o f  touch  
sen sa tion
upper air obstruction In au sea lo s s  o f libido lupus
p erm an en t c o m e a l d a m a q e m ood  sw in gs m ental d isturbances
p erm an en t ep ithelia l d a m a g e n a u sea m igraines
p ersonality  c h a n g e s palpitations
multiple chem ical 
sensitivity
! pulm onary ed e m a skin ra sh es m u sc le  pain
! redu ced  con centration sh o rtn ess  o f  breath 'peeling skin
I j ; reactive airway 
redu ced  m em ory  iskin itchinq id ise a se
i
t
1 s e v e r e  e y e  b u m s
: short term  m em ory  
word u sa q e  p rob lem s llo ss
(se v e r e  e v e  irritation teeth  corrosion verbal recall
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APPENDIX D
Potassium Cresylate Testing
Energy Labs Semi-Volatile Organic Compovnds Testing o f  sample from inside the 
Potassivm Cresylate tanker car. 1996
Compound Parts per million 
(ppm)
4-MethyIphenol/3-MethylphenoI 23600
2-MethyIphenoI 20400
Phenol 12900
2,4-DimethylphenoI 8180
2,4,6-Trichlorophenol 183
Olympia Environmental Semi-Volatile Organic Compovnds Testing o f  soil around 
Potassium Cresylate tanker car, 1996 (area where Chlorine and Potassium 
Cresylate reacted)
Compound Parts per million 
(ppm)
2-Methylphenol 7320
4-Methylphenol/3-MethylphenoI 7190
Phenol 6010
2,4-Dimethylphenol 1140
4-Chloro-3-methylphenol 930
2,4,6-Trichl orophenol 599
4-Chlorophenol 510
2-Chlorophenol 378
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APPENDIX E
April 11- Nine Mile and Six Mile re-entry
April 12- Envirocon conducts first environmental sampling at site (pH and chloride only)
April 13- Residents allowed in to feed pets and livestock and retrieve belongings 
April 13- Reports o f symptoms deviating from chlorine effects begin and continue throughout 
April 13- Olympus Environmental begins testing; tests potassium cresylate area for pH only 
April 14- Ponderosa and Southside Road re-entry
April 14- EPA gains access to site; first samples o f potassium cresylate stained soil taken
April 14- EPA states “It is very safe to re-enter the area with respect to residual chemicals. We think your 
home is safe. There is technical activity in the Hot Zone. The EPA is continually monitoring the activity. We 
have reviewed the evacuation plan. Things are in order."
Missoula City/County Health Department states: “We have been testing since the first release. Everything is 
okay. If you find anything questionable, please call.”
April 15-April 28 Pet rescues and livestock feeding continue
April 16- Olympus tests soil samples for cresylate and chlorine mixing
April 17- Olympus collects pure cresylate sample for Garon Smith
April 19- Smith’s results show chemical reaction between chlorine and cresylate created at least 35 organic 
compounds, mainly phenolics; discloses results to public
April 19- Smith states “There is some possibility that the chemicals floated away from the derailment on 
water particles-either particles created by the release o f chlorine or in the light rain that was falling at the 
time.”Garon Smith suggest dioxin testing inside o f cresylate car.
April 20- Envirocon tests cresylate on site; 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol 183ppm
April 21- Missoula City/County Health Department notes state: “13 ppm trichlorophenol in air near tracks.” 
In their final report Olympus states: “N o organic vapors were detected...on derailment site or beyond."
April 20-21- Soil samples taken on site to determine migration of chemical reactants
April 22- “The other issue [cresylate reactions] is no threat." Scott Waldron, Incident Commander
April 22- Excavation o f contaminated soil begins
April 26- Soil ar.d wipe samples taken offsite to deterniine migration o f chemical reactants
April 28- Incident declared over; evacuation ended based on re-entry criteria including “Bulk o f potassium 
cresylate contaminated soil removed from site prior to re-entry.”
May 18- 1610 cubic yards of potassium cresylate contaminated soil removed from previously evacuated area
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